























King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Michaels, E., & Karimi, B. (2021). Overview of expert claims and EU policy responses to ISIS’ rise to power in
Iraq and Syria. (King's College London).
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Jul. 2021
1 
 
Overview of expert claims and EU policy responses                                                 
to ISIS’ rise to power in Iraq and Syria 
 





Timeline: 1 November 2013 – 31 October 2014 
 
This period covers developments after the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)2 had started making significant territorial gains in Syria and 
had established itself as a major actor in the Syrian civil war. By November 2013, ISIS had also gained strength in Iraq as a result of its 
“Breaking the Walls” and “Soldier’s Harvest” campaigns, in which it targeted the Iraqi security forces. In addition, ISIS was launching violent 
attacks against predominantly Shia targets on an almost daily basis. The chronological overview traces ISIS’ rise to power in Syria and Iraq and 
its reach into Europe. It ends at the height of the battle for Kobane, which was then on the verge of becoming a major failure for the U.S.-led 
international military intervention against ISIS and had taken on huge symbolic meaning. By October 2014, some EU member states had also 
conducted their first airstrikes as part of the global counter-ISIS coalition. 
 
Eight key events have been identified after which the situation developed for the worse. The first four events (escalation of Sunni unrest in 
Anbar, ISIS’ surge into Fallujah and Ramadi, the first ISIS-inspired terrorist attack in Europe, and the beginning of ISIS’ advance on Mosul) 
provided indications that the likelihood of ISIS causing serious harm – based on its capability, intent and exploitation of structural vulnerabilities 
– was increasing. The last four events (ISIS’ seizure of two Iraqi border crossings with Syria and Jordan, its declaration of a caliphate, the Sinjar 




1 Eva Michaels is a Researcher at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) and a Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London. She holds a PhD in War 
Studies from KCL. Bahar Karimi is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre on US Politics at University College London. She holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from 
KCL. This database was completed as part of the INTEL project, which was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Grant ES/R004331/1). 





This overview is based on a systematic analysis of open-source data published during this time. In a first step, it looks at evidential claims and 
knowledge claims by non-governmental experts. Evidential claims can help build situational awareness by answering questions about what, 
when, where, and who.3 Knowledge claims can guide forecasts of what could likely happen in the future and when, and how this could change a 
given situation.4 
 
Four groups of experts have been selected as authoritative sources of evidence and knowledge:  
 
• researchers at international NGOs (International Crisis Group/ICG, Human Rights Watch/HRW, Amnesty International), 
• journalists reporting for well-resourced media organisations (New York Times/NYT), 
• analysts at European think tanks (European Council on Foreign Relations/ECFR, European Union Institute for Security Studies/EUISS), 
• business intelligence providers (Economist Intelligence Unit). 
 
Emphasis has been placed on non-governmental experts who shaped European policy debates during the period under study by writing or being 
quoted about ISIS’ activities and structural vulnerabilities. For reasons of manageability, only one media organisation has been selected: the 
NYT was better resourced and more authoritative than other quality newspapers, with a bureau in Baghdad and roughly 15 field reporters 
deployed across Iraq at the time. The keyword search for NGO outputs [through their websites] focused on ‘Syria’ and ‘Iraq’. The keyword 
search for all other expert publications [through their websites] included “Iraq”, “Syria”, “ISIS”, “Islamic State” and “Al-Qaeda”.  
 
This overview further looks at policy-relevant publications at the level of EU decision-making. This included a systematic search of: 
• documents published by the European Council, Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), European External Action Service (EEAS), and 
European Commission (EC) [on their respective websites; search terms “Iraq”, “Syria”, “ISIS”, “Islamic State” and “Al-Qaeda”], 
• references to Herman Von Rompuy as then President of the European Council, Catherine Ashton as then High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy & Vice President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso as then President of 
the European Commission, and the European Union [separate search in Google for each of the four names plus terms “Iraq” AND 
“Syria” AND “ISIS” AND “Islamic State” AND “Al-Qaeda”]. 
 
 
3 Omand, David. “Reflections on Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 33, no. 3 (2020), p. 475. 





Date Notable events 
including turning 
points  
Expert claims about ISIS’ activities, enabling conditions for its rise 
to power and likely future developments 
Impact of claims at EU level 
and broader policy 
responses 
02/11/2013  EIU “Iraq politics: Going all Wrong” (Document 
EIUCP00020131103e9b200044) 
EIU reports that Iraqi PM has requested additional military assistance 
from the U.S. as his security forces are failing to contain the increasing 
conflict in Iraq. “What Mr Maliki needs more than weapons is the will 
to compromise with his political opponents, especially Sunnis but also 
Kurds. In the past year Sunnis have felt more and more excluded and 
harassed. In addition, the civil strife churning up Syria has spilt across 
the border into Iraq.” 
 
05/11/2013  Discussions from an expert roundtable held by the ECFR on 
“European challenges 2014: Middle Eastern Challenges” conclude that 
there is no possibility for an end to the military and political deadlock 
in Syria without a major external player changing its stance 
significantly. Further, although some argue the Geneva II peace talks 
are the last chance for a viable solution before Syria risks complete 
disintegration, it is highly improbable that these talks will make any 
impact. De-escalation of the conflict relies on cooperation between 
regional powers: Iranian, Saudi and Lebanese support of different 
factions complicates the possibility of constructive talks, while 
Turkey’s porous border is facilitating the continuous supply of arms to 
rebels. When dealing with Bashar al-Assad, Europeans must keep in 
mind that any dialogue with him will strengthen his position. It is 
recommended that Europe support regional partners such as Turkey to 
encourage dialogue between civil society groups and Syrian state 
actors, and continue humanitarian assistance. 
 
06/11/2013  Norimitsu Onishi (NYT) reports that there has been a substantial rise 
in Sunni jihadis purchasing military supplies from Turkish shops in 




camouflage trousers, to prayer beads, to knives – “pretty much 
everything short of arms”. Storeowners report that they have started to 
receive bulk orders over the past few months. All of them claim not to 
know where these foreign jihadis are from – they do not ask – however 
all assume they are taking their equipment to Syria. Onishi writes that 
the mood significantly changed the day after Turkey shelled an ISIS 
target in Syria for the first time. The storeowners were no longer 
willing to sell equipment so freely to the jihadis and claimed to have 
been visited and questioned by the Turkish police. 
08/11/2013  Anne Barnard (NYT) writes that a new middle group is emerging in 
the Syrian civil war who have lost enthusiasm for either side. Fatigued 
by the war, they fear the demise of the Syrian state and currently feel 
as though there is nobody to represent them in the country. 
 
11/11/2013  Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad (NYT) report that there seems to be 
no actor committed to ending the Syrian civil war and the consequent 
deep suffering it has created. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Shia Militias Are Back”  
(Document EIUCP00020131113e9bc00018) 
EIU reports that there has been a revival of Shia militia groups because 
of renewed attacks by Al-Qaeda in Iraq over the past year and that 
there are signs that these groups may be forging formal relationships 
with the government. “There is a real risk that if the militia 
remobilisation continues apace, Baghdad and other mixed cities could 
see [sectarian] violence increase even further.” 
 
12/11/2013  Ben Hubbard (NYT) discusses the situation of Kuwaiti fundraisers and 
donors supporting rebel groups in Syria fighting Bashar al-Assad. 
Drawing on an interview with a Kuwaiti who has been financing the 
opposition, Hubbard explains that the money is transported by couriers 
through Turkey and into Syria. The fundraising for the rebels as well 
as the organisation and distribution of funds predominantly takes place 




uncertainty to the war, deepening divisions between the rebels and 
strengthening the more extreme elements within them. The Kuwaiti 
government insists that the flow of money into Syria is not as 
significant as it seems, however, even former members of Parliament 
have engaged in these fundraising activities. U.S. officials reportedly 
believe that Kuwait poses the biggest concern to the region in terms of 
financing linked to Jihadi groups in Syria. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Key Developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020131114e9bc00009) 
“The political situation in Iraq will remain highly unstable. Militia and 
insurgent groups will continue to exploit political divisions and 
deficiencies in the security forces. Spillover from the Syrian civil war 
is adding to insecurity.” 
13/11/2013  In ECFR’s “Gulf Analysis” Hadeel Al Sayegh writes that Iraqi PM 
Nouri al-Maliki has used anti-terrorism laws to marginalise his Sunni 
opponents and community which has in turn prompted Sunnis to look 
to extremists as their defenders, which ISIS has taken advantage of. 
This context has been exacerbated by the conflict in neighbouring 
Syria which threatens to destabilise Iraq and has heightened Sunni 
opposition to Maliki who is viewed as cooperating with the Syrian 
regime. Al Sayegh argues that Iraq will continue its cycle of violence 
and sectarian polarisation as Maliki and his supporters’ predispositions 
will not allow for meaningful reconciliation and unity. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Country Risk Summary” (Document 
EIUCP00020131115e9bd00017) 
EIU assesses that “Iraq’s political scene will remain highly unstable 
ahead of a parliamentary election in April 2014. Disputes between the 
central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 




exacerbated by the civil war in Syria, will add to the insecure political 
environment.” 
15/11/2013  HRW argues that the Iraqi government’s harassment of the Sunni 
population, e.g. through indiscriminate arrests, will further alienate 
them and spark more anger which could fuel rather than prevent future 
attacks by Sunni insurgents. HRW also reports that a suicide bomber 
targeted another group of Shia worshippers on 13 November, killing 
eight. HRW highlights that violence by Sunni insurgents against Shia 
worshippers on holy days is not a new phenomenon and that similar 
attacks happened on Ashura in 2012, killing 62, or in 2004, killing 180 
Shia pilgrims. Yet, compared to previous years, insurgent attacks 
against predominantly Shia targets escalated drastically after Iraqi 
security forces attacked a protest camp in Hawija in April 2013. 
 
Liam Stack (NYT) reports that ISIS fighters mistakenly beheaded an 
Ahrar al-Sham combatant whom they had believed to be a Shia. Ahrar 
al-Sham were reportedly enraged by this incident and circulated 
wanted posters for the killers. 
 
18/11/2013  Anne Barnard, Karam Shoumali and C. J. Chivers (NYT) report that 
Abdulkader al-Saleh, a pragmatic Syrian rebel commander, has been 
killed in a government airstrike. Saleh led the Tawhid Brigades, made 
up of local militias, at one time the most organised and effective 
groups, which had started to become sidelined by ISIS. Saleh wanted 
“to bridge the gap between relatively secular army defector and 
Islamist fighters” and his silence on the atrocities committed by ISIS 
disappointed many of his supporters. However, he was popular among 
all factions of anti-government fighters and it is argued that his death 
will be a big blow to their morale. 
 
In a commentary for the ECFR Alexander Kouttab writes that the 
continued dampening of relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Washington poses a risk for the wider region at a time where regional 
Council conclusions (FAC) 
on the regional impact of the 
Syria crisis: “The EU 
reaffirms its commitment as 
the largest donor in the 
context of the Syrian crisis to 
support governments, host 
communities and 
beneficiaries in countries with 
most refugees. It welcomes 
plans for a pledging 
conference in the beginning 
of 2014 (‘Kuwait II’). The 
EU will do its utmost to 
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instability adds a layer of unpredictability to the consequences of any 
possible policy decisions Riyadh may take. Kouttab asserts that local 
actors are becoming increasingly significant in shaping regional 
dynamics while the influence of outside actors has declined. Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia have emerged as forceful powers in the region 
alongside Iran, further complicating the balance of power 
arrangements. A consequence of this will be an escalation in rivalry 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia which has the potential to drag the 
region into a protracted cycle of politicking and polarisation. 
further increase its 
commitment and calls on 
international partners to 
increase humanitarian and 
economic support to those 
most affected in Syria and the 
neighbouring countries. (…) 
The EU is committed to work 
closely with the national 
authorities, the United 
Nations, aid organisations, 
development actors and 
international financial 
institutions one of the main 
priorities being the 
reinforcement of local 
capacities in order to cope 
with the essential needs of 
both refugees and affected 
local populations.” 
 
Remarks by EU HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton following 
the FAC meeting: “There was 
a great deal of concern for the 
people inside [of Syria], the 
refugees and displaced people 
there and also for the refugees 
and displaced people outside. 
We recognize the 
implications for the 
neighbours who are having to 
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deal with a large numbers of 
refugees. And we are very 
worried that the winter is 
approaching and the potential 
for that to exacerbate the 
situation. (…) We believe 
that there needs to be real 
access for health and 
humanitarian workers to 
reach people all around the 
country. (…) we recognize 
there has to be a negotiated 
settlement. We do continue to 
urge everyone to make what 
we have called Geneva II a 
reality as soon as possible.” 
19/11/2013  HRW documents unlawful killings of civilians during a joint offensive 
against regime forces by ISIS and five other groups in the Christian 
village of Sadad, northeast of Damascus, from 21 to 28 October 2013. 
The insurgents had entered the village claiming not to harm civilians 
but executed many and used others as a human shield. 
 
21/11/2013  Alan Cowell (NYT) relays reports from The Times and BBC 
Newsnight that numerous Britons have died while fighting with rebels 
in Syria. The British government has said that it is investigating these 
claims and security officials reports that 200 to 300 Britons are 
currently fighting with jihadist groups in Syria.  
President of the European 
Council Herman Van 
Rompuy argues that only a 
negotiated political solution 
will resolve the war in Syria, 
not a military one. 
22/11/2013  Ben Hubbard and Karim Shoumali (NYT) write that a new umbrella 
alliance of seven prevailing rebel groups in Syria, named the Islamic 
Front, has formed. The alliance is a product of months of discussion 
between rebel leaders to establish an alternative to the Syrian National 




alliance could quell the competition between rebel groups for financing 
and arms, yet Hubbard and Shoumali explain that the reorganisation of 
rebel forces is not new, and it is unclear to what extent this new 
unification would affect dynamics on the ground. The new alliance is a 
blow to Western efforts to cultivate talks intended to end the war. The 
formation of the Islamic Front highlights the growing insignificance of 
the rebels’ Supreme Military Council, created with encouragement by 
the West to empower more moderate forces over the extremists. It is 
reported that some members of the council have joined the alliance, 
although there are conflicting reports as to whether they have left the 
council or not. While the Islamic Front is an attempt at unification of 
rebel forces, there are fears that it may do further damage to the 
rebellion by deepening factionalised support for the fighters. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Country Outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020131124e9bm00025) 
EIU reports that the attacks in Iraq have a clear sectarian tone, that the 
relationship between the government and its security forces, and the 
Sunni community are at a low point and these trends have been 
exacerbated by the Syrian civil war. “The Economist Intelligence Unit 
expects the political situation in Iraq to remain highly unstable with the 
risk of a further escalation in violence as militant groups continue to 
exploit political divisions.” 
26/11/2013   Following the announcement 
of the date for the Geneva II 
talks, EU HR/VP Catherine 
Ashton affirms her strong 
support for a political 
solution to the war in Syria: 
“The EU has been a strong 




efforts. The EU has also been 
working to create conditions 
conducive to holding the 
conference among all 
important stakeholders. I 
strongly support the call of 
the UNSG that the eight 
weeks ahead of us should be 
used to build up confidence 
among the parties through the 
cessation of violence, 
humanitarian access, release 
of detainees and return of 
Syrian refugees and internally 
displaced people to their 
homes.” 
29/11/2013  HRW reports that four journalists have been killed in Mosul since 
October 2013 and that ISIS has a strong presence there. According to 
interviews with Mosul residents, “the central government’s policies of 
conducting mass arrests and unlawful detentions in the area have 
ostracized the population”. A local journalist told HRW: “Mosul has 
two governments … By day, it’s the local government, but at night, it’s 
al-Qaeda”. Another observed: “Mosul’s journalists are caught between 
two fires … If they are not targeted by terrorists, they’re targeted by 
the government, which considers all Mosul residents terrorists”. 
 
Nov 2013  The ICG reports that Syrian rebels are divided over the brutality and 
growing power of ISIS. Seven Islamist rebel groups merged into the 
“Islamic Front” on 22 November to counter ISIS’ influence. Kurdish 
militias continued their campaign against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in 
northeastern Syria and managed to gain control over 19 towns and 
villages. On Iraq, the ICG reports that at least 169 people were killed 




On 25 November, France offered weapons and counter-terrorism 
training to the Iraqi government. 
03/12/2013  Robert F. Worth and Eric Schmitt (NYT) write that an increase in 
sectarian violence across the Middle East has created an opportunity 
for jihadist groups in the region to establish a base in Syria, and pose a 
threat to Europe and Israel. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has 
signalled that he views Syria as a potential base. Worth and Schmitt 
explain that this increased Sunni jihadist insurgency may mean that the 
U.S. will have to intervene, especially in Syria, and as such readjust 
their strategy. Increased Islamic militancy in the region has been 
facilitated by sectarian violence and the collapse of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The sectarian tensions, in particular, is what is driving 
the surge in radicalisation and militancy. Worth and Schmitt report that 
“there are signs of cross-pollination among some of the jihadist groups 
around the region”, explaining that Al-Qaeda affiliates from Yemen 
and the Arabian Peninsula have regular contact with groups in 
Lebanon and the Sinai Peninsula. The authors highlight that a point of 
growing concern is the large quantity of Muslims who have travelled 
from the West to fight in Syria, and the potential terrorist threat they 
pose if they return home. 
 
10/12/2013  Anne Barnard (NYT) documents the numerous journalists and activists 
who have been abducted by Islamist extremist fighters in Syria. 
Among them are Razan Zeitouneh, a secular Syrian human rights 
lawyer, and Spanish journalist, Javier Espinosa. Activists are facing a 
battle on two fronts: against the government and Islamic extremists. 
International aid agencies have been facing both security challenges 
and bureaucratic obstacles in their quest to deliver assistance. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – Allies of prime minister break away 
ahead of elections” (Document EIUCP00020131212e9ca0001p) 
Two of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s allies have defected to compete in 




criticised for the increasing presences and influence of religion in 
politics. “The defections add force to criticisms of Mr Maliki from 
opponents who accuse him of sectarianism.” 
11/12/2013  Michael R. Gordon, Mark Landler and Anne Barnard (NYT) report 
that the U.S. has temporarily suspended non-lethal aid to Syrian rebels 
after the Islamic Front, a coalition of Islamist fighters who broke off 
from their moderate counterparts, seized warehouses of equipment 
supplied by the U.S. The incident is clouded with confusion as it is not 
clear how it unfolded. The Islamic Front claim they were guarding the 
warehouse from Al-Qaeda affiliated extremists while others dismiss 
this claim as a ruse. The increased infighting between the rebels has 
diverted their attention from their battle against the regime, and their 
factionalising now poses a question of whether the U.S. should engage 
with Islamist forces who are playing an increasingly significant role in 
the battle against the regime, in order to realise their goal of a political 
solution to the civil war. Andrew J Tabler, Syria expert at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, states that “it puts the [US] 
administration into a situation of having to choose between supporting 
moderate groups or effective ones”. 
HR/VP Catherine Ashton and 
the EU adopt a Joint 
Communication in which 
they set out the steps that the 
EU is taking to enhance its 
comprehensive approach to 
external conflicts and crises. 
[The document does not 
make special mention of 
Syria or Iraq.] 
13/12/2013  Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that twenty five prisoners held on 
terrorism charges have broken out of a prison in Baghdad, which 
makes it the fourth publicly announced prison break in Iraq since 
autumn 2012. It is suspected that the prisoners were aided by some 
prison guards who have been held by Iraqi security forces and are 
under investigation. Eleven of the escapees have been found. The 
incident underscores the declining security within Iraq and the rising 
sectarian tensions since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011. One of 
the most remarkable prison breaks in Iraq took place in July, in which 
Al-Qaeda operatives coordinated attacks on two prisons and freed 
hundreds of inmates who later went to fight for ISIS. Adnan reports 
that violence continues in Baghdad: a car bomb in a Sunni majority 




four. Further, sixteen Iranian workers and three Iraqi were killed by 
gunmen in the north of Baghdad. The Iranian workers were in Iraq to 
work on a gas pipeline running between Iran and Iraq. 
16/12/2013  EIU “Iraq: key developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020131218e9cg00008) 
“The political situation in Iraq will remain highly unstable. Militia and 
insurgent groups will continue to exploit political divisions and 
deficiencies in the security forces. Spillover from the Syrian civil war 
is adding to insecurity.” 
 
Remarks by EU HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton upon 
arrival at FAC meeting: “We 
have done everything we can 
to provide the sort of support 
that is going to be necessary 
for the people. That's 
primarily humanitarian 
support. (…) But the political 
process that needs to happen 
is something that for the last 
years we have consistently 
said has got to be a priority. 
(…) now that we've got a 
date, the most important thing 
is to get people there and to 
get an agreement to stop 
fighting and an agreement to 
get aid properly through to 
people, and an agreement to 




The EU announces a 
Regional Development and 
Protection Programme for 
refugees and host 
communities in Lebanon, 
14 
 
Jordan and Iraq in response to 
the Syrian refugee crisis. It 
contributes EUR 12.3 million 
to finance a wide range of 
measures. 
18/12/2013  EIU “Iran/Iraq politics: quick view – Iranian pipeline workers killed 
near Baqub” (Document EIUCP00020131219e9ci0002e) 
15 Iranian workers were killed in an attack by insurgents on 15 
December while building a gas pipeline to supply Iraq. Officials have 
blamed ISIS although no group has claimed responsibility yet. “The 
attack is unlikely to have a negative effect on bilateral relations, and in 
fact may contribute to even closer ties as both work to prevent attacks 
by militant groups.” 
 
After discussing the 
humanitarian situation in 
Syria with UN leaders, 
President of the EC José 
Manuel Barroso states: ‘We 
have just signed the largest 
ever contracts for 
humanitarian aid between the 
Commission and our UN 
partners. I am proud that we 
can today commit 147 million 
euros to UNHCR, the World 
Food Programme and 
UNICEF. At the same time, 
we all know that a definitive 
solution for the conflict and 
for the dramatic humanitarian 
situation we are facing can 
only come from political 
negotiations. (…) So, my 
appeal to all the leaders in 
Europe is the following: if 
one year ago we knew how it 
would be today, what could 
have been the decisions then? 
I am sure that if we could 
have that focus, the decisions 
15 
 
could have been much more 
ambitious. If we don't 
recognise the really 
exceptional nature of this 
crisis, one year from now it 
will be a much worse 
situation. (…) We have a 
moral responsibility to act 
because solidarity is at the 
core of our European values. 
But we also have an interest 
to act because this is a crisis 
in our own neighbourhood, 
and we know the 
consequences will be very 
dramatic if we are not able to 
articulate a much more 
comprehensive response. We 
also have a pragmatic stake in 
the fate of so many millions 
of refugees and displaced 
people right on our doorstep.’ 
The EU’s contribution 
include EUR 63 million to the 
UNHCR for providing 
humanitarian assistance to 
Syrians who have been 
displaced by the war. 
 
Barroso and UN leaders also 
call for a humanitarian 
ceasefire so that aid workers 
16 
 
can deliver assistance to local 
communities in Syria. 
19/12/2013  Amnesty International documents serious human rights abuses in ISIS-
run detention facilities in northern Syria, including in and around 
Raqqa, Aleppo and Idlib province. It also sheds light on the rules ISIS 
has established in the areas it controls, including flogging and 
summary executions. Based on ten interviews conducted with former 
detainees who had been held by ISIS between May and November 
2013, Amnesty International argues that most abuses, such as 
abductions, arbitrary detention and torture, amount to war crimes. It 
reports that children have also been held in ISIS prisons. The former 
detainees have reportedly “asked that the world should wake up to the 
plight of those now suffering under ISIS in northern Syria”. Amnesty 
International argues that ISIS’ power has grown significantly since 
April 2013. It sheds light on how ISIS consolidated its influence in 
Raqqa and beyond since the spring of 2013. 
 
Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that suicide bombers have attacked Shia 
pilgrims undertaking a trek to the city of Karbala. The suicide bombers 
were able to carry out their attacks despite increased security measures 
taken by the government forces to protect Shia pilgrims. Sectarian 
divisions in Iraq continue to deepen and there are concrete concerns 
that the civil war in Syria will spill over into the country. Adnan writes 
that one Shia pilgrim declared that they would not be deterred by the 
attacks and that “Al-Qaeda wants to form its state, and we will not 
allow it. We are waiting for our Shiite leaders to give us orders to fight 
them”. 
 
Anne Barnard (NYT) reports that the leader of the Nusra Front, Abu 
Mohammad al-Jolani, frames the war in sectarian terms with his 
objective being the establishment of an Islamic State in Syria. The 
Nusra Front has most recently been overtaken in terms of strength by 
Statement by the 
spokesperson of EU HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton pledging 
EUR 12 million to the 
OPCW’s Special Trust Fund 




ISIS, yet they are viewed as a less extreme alternative to ISIS by many 
Syrians in the opposition. Jolani has announced that the Nusra Front 
will do what it takes to prevent negotiations in the upcoming peace 
talks which he views as only reviving al-Assad’s regime. Due to a 
change in perceptions that the Syrian civil war could be dominated by 
extremists, U.S. officials have stopped calling for the complete 
removal of Assad. Those who are critical of the US’ Syria policy claim 
that the rise of such extremist groups is due to the failure of the U.S. to 
arm the Free Syrian Army sufficiently. 
 
EIU “Iraq/Kuwait politics: quick view”  
(Document EIUCP00020131220e9cj0001b) 
The president of Kuwait’s National Security Bureau has expressed 
concern over the “rapidly growing instability” in Iraq which could 
have spill-over effects into Kuwait. “Sheikh Thamer's comments are a 
reminder of the continuing disruption that non-state actors can inflict 
on Iraq's bilateral relations with its Gulf neighbours.” 
 
EIU “Iraq: country outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020131221e9cj0000u) 
EIU expects that the political situation in Iraq will remain highly 
unstable and is at risk of increasing violence as militant groups are 
exploiting political divisions within the country. Specifically, “in 
response to attacks on Shias by Sunni militants, some Shia militias are 
remobilising and, if the security forces prove unable to protect Shia 
neighbourhoods, there is a real danger of a Shia backlash.” 
21/12/2013  Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that 18 Iraqi soldiers, including a high-
ranking Iraqi commander, were killed by suicide bombers and roadside 
bombs during an operation targeting an ISIS training camp. The camp 
was hit by rockets while the soldiers stormed the camp. Iraqi PM Nouri 
al-Maliki has released a statement saying that more forces are to be 




iron fist. Sectarian violence has persisted in Fallujah, three Shia 
pilgrims were killed in the south of Baghdad, a Sunni shop owner and 
his son were killed in a Shia majority neighbourhood in west Baghdad, 
and Sunni civilians were executed outside of their homes in southwest 
Kirkuk. 
22/12/2013  Emile Hokayem of the IISS writes for NYT that the rise of extremism 
in Syria and the increased number of Western jihadists travelling there 
is leading Western officials to consider engaging with President Assad, 
which Hokayem identifies as only exacerbating the problem. 
Cooperation with the regime would create an obstacle to fostering local 
partners against the extremists in Syria, along with justifying Sunni 
suspicions that the West had been collaborating with Assad all along. 
Consequently, more Syrians would turn to Jihadi groups. Engagement 
with Assad could allow Western intelligence officials to gain access to 
information on Western jihadis in the country along with potentially 
disrupting extremist activity, yet, Hokayem claims that viewing Syria 
primarily as a counterterrorism operation would be a “monumental 
error”. Assad would use this opening to manipulate Western support at 
the detriment of his domestic opposition. Hokayem recommends that 
“the best counterterrorism strategy remains the empowerment of 
mainstream Syrian rebels as part of the broader, more assertive policy 
that the White House has repeatedly rejected”. Failure by Western 
actors to sufficiently equip and train Syrian rebels has led to their 
failure to contain extremists, such as ISIS, which is growing in size, 
capability and ambition. Consequently, some rebel fighters have joined 
extremist groups out of lack of alternatives to fight the Assad regime. 
 
23/12/2013  HRW‘s Emma Daly reports about the abduction of Spanish journalists 
Javier Espinosa and Ricardo Garcia Vilanova by ISIS. Both have been 
held since September 2013, with ISIS refusing to negotiate their 
release. At least 30 journalists are reported missing in Syria, making it 
“the most dangerous country in the world for the media”. Daly 
highlights that it is “hard to keep track of numbers, since many outlets 
The EC grants an additional 
EUR 30 million to boost aid 




and families choose to keep quiet about the missing in the hope of 
negotiating a return”. The FSA’s Supreme Military Council has said 
“that most people going after the journalists were outside their 
control”. Daly concludes that “the world cannot learn about the horrors 
in Syria … when journalists can’t do their jobs”. 
25/12/2013  Michael R. Goodman and Eric Schmitt (NYT) report that a surge in al-
Qaeda backed territorial gains, mostly by ISIS, in western Iraq and 
Syria has jolted the U.S. to rush aid at the request of Iraqi PM Nouri al-
Maliki. ISIS has been making significant advancements owing to 
several factors. An Iraqi politician claims that in addition to playing on 
sectarian tensions fuelled by Maliki’s policies, ISIS is self-financing by 
extorting money from shopkeepers in Ramadi. Following the departure 
of U.S. forces from Iraq, the group has taken advantage of the vacuum 
to rebuild their forces in Iraq and move into Syria. Some experts 
suggest that the indiscriminate violence against both Shias and Sunnis 
who reject ISIS may result in a Sunni backlash. Washington maintains 
that the aid they are providing will be sufficient to combat ISIS, 
however experts claim that the lack of armed drones will significantly 
limit the Iraqi security forces’ ability to counter ISIS. President Obama 
has sought congressional approval to lease and eventually sell Apache 
helicopters to Iraq, however, delays due to bureaucratic procedures and 
resistance from some lawmakers has led to Maliki turning to Russia for 
assistance. 
 
26/12/2013  HRW’s Erin Evers argues that new U.S. weapon deliveries won’t 
address Iraq’s challenges, such as the rise of ISIS. These measures are 
“missing the point” as there is “little evidence that Iraq’s failure to 
improve security in the country stems from a lack of weapons, but 
rather from its short-sighted approach to corruption and sectarian 
politics, and a counterterrorism strategy that targets Sunni Iraqis 
amounting to collective punishment”. She further highlights how 
corrupt the Iraqi security forces are, how this has facilitated prison 




28/12/2013 Iraqi security forces 




killing his brother and 
five of his guards 
during a raid on his 
home in Ramadi. 
Alwani had backed 
anti-government 
protests and was a 
prominent supporter 
of Sunni activists who 
had set up a camp 
near Ramadi. In 
response, 44 members 
of the Iraqi parliament 
submit their 
resignation over the 
next two days and call 
upon the army to 
release Alwani and 
withdraw from 
Anbar’s cities. The 
arrest and the 
demolishing of 
protest camps across 
Anbar province by 
Iraqi security forces 








offensive on Sunni 
militants in Anbar 
was ‘a disaster 
waiting to happen’, 
given that Shia-Sunni 
tensions had long 
been stoked by Iraqi 
PM Maliki’s 
polarising policies.] 
30/12/2013  EIU “Iraq politics: quick view – prominent opposition PM arrested” 
(Document EIUCP00020131231e9cu0000c) 
Ahmed al-Alwani, an MP for the Muttahidoon faction of the Iraqiya 
bloc, and a prominent critic of al-Maliki was arrested on 28 December. 
His home was raided and resulted in several casualties. “The incident 
will reinforce Sunni perceptions of persecution by the government and 
security forces. It will also complicate efforts to win support from 
Anbar tribes to combat al-Qaida in Iraq, whose resurgence has made 
2013 the bloodiest year since 2007.” 
 
31/12/2013 ISIS uses the 
explosion of violence 
between Sunni tribes 
and security forces in 
Anbar’s cities and the 
brief withdrawal of 
the Iraqi army to 
surge into Fallujah 
and Ramadi from the 
Western desert. It 
seizes control of 
The Editorial Board of the NYT writes that arms alone will not resolve 
the increasing violence in Iraq. The Obama administration must ensure 
that PM Nouri al-Maliki honours the democratic processes of 
government and ceases sectarian-driven policies. The Editorial Board 
writes that “Mr. Maliki has been central to the disorder” within Iraq 
and that although American officials offer assurances that the PM has 
finally understood that cooperation with Sunnis and Iraqi Kurds will 
strengthen his position against the extremists, the authors are not 
convinced that the PM will keep to his word. “The United States has a 
strategic interest in Iraq’s stability, which undoubtedly at risk, making 




several police stations 
in Fallujah and 
Ramadi the next day. 
[Note: ISIS it does not 
fully capture Fallujah 
in early January, as 
often claimed. ICG 
reports that these 
claims were “greatly 
exaggerated” by ISIS 
and Iraqi PM Maliki. 
More than 100 people 
are killed on 3 
January in clashes 
between ISIS, 
government forces 
and local tribes. 
Relevance: ISIS’ 
Anbar campaign 
shows how it is 
exploiting Sunni-Shia 
tensions and a 
security vacuum in 
Anbar province.] 
essential. But even the most lethal weapons will not have much 
positive effect if Mr. Maliki and other Iraqi leaders bicker rather than 
unite the country around shared goals through credible democratic 
processes”. 
Dec 2013  The ICG reports that increasingly powerful Jihadi groups have 
marginalised Western-backed rebel groups in Syria. On 5 December, 
ISIS abducted more than 50 Kurdish civilians from Jarabulus and 
Manbij near Aleppo. The month of December saw significant clashes 
between ISIS and the Ahrar al-Sham Islamist coalition. ISIS reportedly 
beheaded at least three Alawites in Adra, near Damascus, during a joint 
offensive with Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front. On Iraq, the ICG 




Attacks continued to target Iraqi security forces (e.g. on 21 December 
when 18 were killed in an ambush) and Shia neighbourhoods (e.g. a 
series of bombings in Baghdad on 30-31 December which killed 23). 
The Iraqi government closed its border with Syria on 25 December 
prior to the launch of an operation to counter ISIS in Anbar province. 
The ICG reports that 44 Iraqi members of parliament resigned over the 
demolishing of Sunni protest camps and arrest of al-Alwani. According 
to UN reports, 2013 became the deadliest year since 2008 with at least 
7818 civilians killed. 
02/01/2014  Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango (NYT) report that ISIS is threatening to 
fully capture Fallujah and Ramadi. Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango write 
that the battle in the Anbar province along with fighting that has 
erupted in Beirut is proof of the effect of the Syrian civil war on an 
increase in sectarian violence and destabilisation in the region. The 
fighting in Anbar was triggered when PM Nouri al-Maliki ordered a 
prominent Sunni lawmaker to be arrested and then protest camps in 
Fallujah and Ramadi to be taken apart. Any Sunni tribesmen fighting 
alongside Baghdad are doing so reluctantly, based on the calculation 
that “the government is the lesser evil than Al-Qaeda”. U.S. officials 
are trying to push for cooperation between Maliki and his Sunni critics. 
As the fighting rages on in Anbar province, it seems clear that fears of 
a spillover from the Syrian civil war have come true and Anbar is 
fertile ground for ISIS’ activities as it borders Syria and tribal loyalties 
are blurred between the two countries. 
 
03/01/2014  HRW calls for an investigation of violence in Anbar province during 
the demolishing of Sunni protest camps and the arrest of al-Alwani on 
30 December. HRW argues that “government statements before the 
clashes and the deployment of the army seemed intended more to 
provoke violence than prevent it”. HRW also highlights that this was 
not at all an unexpected development as Iraqi authorities “had 
repeatedly threatened to remove the protesters in Ramadi and other 




Counterterrorism Service had reportedly referred to government 
operations against ISIS in Anbar on his Facebook page with “I swear 
to God I will kill those dogs and those who are with them. I will wipe 
them out.” The Iraqi state news agency had also reported two days 
before the incident that 30 armoured vehicles had been deployed 
outside of the protest camp in Ramadi which has existed for about a 
year. 
 
Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango (NYT) report that ISIS has captured 
Fallujah and planted their flag atop several government buildings. As 
ISIS’ insurgency is gaining strength and their fighting with Iraqi 
government forces, sectarian tensions remain high. ISIS’ 
advancements look to be a substantial “step toward realizing the long-
held goal of transforming Iraq and Syria into one battlefield for the 
same cause: establishing a Sunni Islamist state”. They report that the 
Iraqi government is frustrated with the drawn-out bureaucratic process 
associate with receiving assistance from the U.S. and have turned to 
Russia for support. 
 
Christine Hauser (NYT) reports on the ongoing fighting between ISIS 
and Iraqi government forces in Fallujah and Ramadi, which have 
become centres of Sunni extremism since the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Iraq in 2011. She describes videos that have been released 
which show ISIS fighters and Anbar tribal fighters positioning in the 
area.  
 
EIU “Iraq/Syria economy: Quick View – Iraqi oil Supply Line to Syria 
Uncovered” (Document EIUCP00020140104ea130000t) 
A Reuters investigation has uncovered that Syria is importing a 
significant percentage of its crude oil from Iraq. “Iraq has taken a far 
more agnostic approach to the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad than 
has the West and some of its Arab counterparts, reflecting the wariness 
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of the Iraqi Shia-led government towards the Sunni-dominated Syrian 
opposition and the implications of the merger of al-Qaida's Iraqi and 
Syrian wings.” 
04/01/2014  Ben Hubbard, Robert F. Worth and Michael R. Gordan (NYT) write 
that amid the vacuum left following the withdrawal of the US, a post-
American Middle East is emerging in which there is no credible force 
to contain the escalating sectarian tensions. These tensions are 
exacerbated by the sectarian-driven proxy activities of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia in the wider region, and in Syria in particular. The absence of 
U.S. forces coupled with the sectarian policies of Iraqi PM Nouri al-
Maliki provided the prime opportunity for ISIS to rise as a defender of 
Sunnis in both Iraq and Syria.  
 
05/01/2014  Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango (NYT) report that Iraqi government 
forces have managed to regain parts of Ramadi, whilst the insurgents 
(mostly affiliated with ISIS) retain majority control over Fallujah. 
Blurred and shifting alliances are complicating the situation in Anbar 
province as some Sunni tribesmen have started to switch allegiances 
from the Iraqi government to ISIS which highlights the disillusionment 
of Sunnis in Iraq. The NYT reports that the U.S. has expressed support 
of the Iraqi government, although their assistance will most likely not 
include American presence on the ground. 
 
06/01/2014  Anne Barnard and Rick Gladstone (NYT) write that Syrian insurgents 
have rejected their onetime ally, ISIS, as too extreme, and have moved 
to expel the group from Raqqa. There is an unconfirmed video of 
Ahrar al-Sham, releasing 50 prisoners from a makeshift ISIS prison. 
An Ahrar al-Sham fighter has invited ISIS fighters who “have been 
misled by their own commanders” to join Syrian groups opposing 
ISIS. The group’s continued mistreatment of their fellow insurgents in 
Syria has resulted in violent rebel infighting. The loss of Raqqa would 
be a significant blow to ISIS. 
 





EIU reports that the escalation of sectarian tensions in Anbar created 
an opportunity for ISIS to intensify their efforts and that they have now 
consolidated their position in Fallujah. “Iraqi forces are likely to 
formally retake Fallujah, given their superior military hardware. 
However, the ensuing battle could further alienate Sunnis, unless Mr 
Maliki is able to work more closely with local tribal militias and make 
some political gestures to Sunnis. Anbar is likely to remain highly 
unstable for months and it might be impossible to hold the April 
elections in much of the province”. 
07/01/2014  Ben Hubbard and Anne Barnard (NYT) report that Abu Mohammed 
al-Jolani, leader of the Nusra Front, has called for a cease in the 
internal conflict between the armed opposition of Bashar al-Assad, 
namely rebel forces and ISIS, and proposed the establishment of an 
Islamic court to handle these issues. He emphasised that the infighting 
would strengthen Assad’s forces and provide them with an opportunity 
to regain territory.  
 
Yasie Ghazi and Tim Arango (NYT) write that while fighting 
continues in Fallujah and Ramadi, the mood among Iraqi civilians and 
tribesmen is significantly shifting toward support of the Sunni 
insurgents opposed to the government. PM Nouri al-Maliki’s heavy-
handed retaliation for Sunni protests in Anbar, his strategy of labelling 
all Sunni activities as terrorism, as well as the presence of Iran-backed 
militias in Iraq have further exacerbated sectarian tensions. The 
conflict in the province has reached a complex point in which civilians 
are no longer able to distinguish who the gunmen on their streets are 
affiliated with. 
 
Robert F. Worth (NYT) draws on an interview with a Saudi national 
who went to Syria to fight with Jihadi groups but left after he became 




flags” rather than pursuing pure jihad. The interviewee tells Worth that 
the Syrian rebels like Saudi fighters because they are most willing to 
carry out suicide attacks. He also explained that the fact that Assad was 
starting to use Sunni fighters on the front line was creating an issue for 
the rebels who do not want to fight them as their real fight is with Iran. 
08/01/2014  Ben Hubbard (NYT) reports that infighting between ISIS and other 
rebel groups has intensified following a number of incidents which had 
outraged the latter. Such incidents include the killing of a rebel leader 
and a rebel doctor, and the seizure of a former Syrian army base by 
ISIS which other rebels had been using since last year. Hubbard writes 
that the increased infighting has led to the rebels pushing ISIS out of 
several key areas, including Aleppo. This infighting is also curtailing 
U.S. efforts to hold a peace conference in Geneva on 22 January. 
Hubbard explains that analysts identify the distinguishing factor 
between the Nusra Front and ISIS as their approach rather than their 
ideology. The former is open to compromise with other groups in the 
Islamic landscape whilst the latter is not, hence the growing hostility 
towards ISIS. 
 
EIU “Middle East and North Africa: Key Political Issues”  
(Document EIUCP00020140109ea1800055) 
EIU forecasts that the conflict in Syria will persist in 2014 and that the 
opposition forces will mostly likely not be able to topple the Assad 
regime. It estimates that there is a possibility of an old war reigniting in 
Iraq. The relationship between the Sunni community and Shia 
government and security forces is at an all-time low, and the sectarian 
conflict which has been influenced by the Syrian civil war has 
contributed to ISIS’ rise. 
 
09/01/2014  Based on witness statements, HRW describes the situation in Fallujah 
and Ramadi in detail. It reports how Anbar’s residents are trapped in a 
three-front war and exposed to “unlawful methods of fighting by all 




mortar shelling and 13.000 Anbari residents have fled to the Erbil area. 
Based on witness statements, HRW reports that ISIS entered Fallujah 
and Ramadi on 1 January. “In Fallujah, witnesses said, they went to 
each of the city’s five police stations, where they released prisoners 
and took weapons from police, who immediately surrendered. The 
fighters set the police stations and city government building on fire. 
The fighters then headed to Fallujah’s main checkpoint in the eastern 
part of the city, manned by the army and local police, and based 
themselves in an industrial area close to the checkpoint. When SWAT 
and army forces returned to Anbar, they surrounded Ramadi and 
Fallujah. They controlled entry and exit points and prevented fuel and 
food from being taken into the cities but allowed several hundred 
people to flee areas of heavy fighting.” On 6 January, Maliki ordered 
the army not to fire on residential neighbourhoods in Fallujah. He 
announced on 8 January that the army will launch no further military 
operations in Fallujah as long as tribal fighters continue to fight ISIS. 
According to witness statements, 500-600 ISIS fighters were present in 
five of Ramadi’s neighbourhoods on 5 January where they were 
fighting local groups and SWAT fighters while the army remained 
outside of the city. HRW reports that “infighting between tribal armed 
groups over whether to cooperate with government security forces” 
was hampering the fight against ISIS in Ramadi. 
 
Mark Landler (NYT) reports that the U.S. is set to resume non-lethal 
military aid to the Syrian opposition through the Syrian Military 
Council in the hope that it will encourage opposition groups to attend a 
peace conference on 22 January, known as Geneva II. Analysts suggest 
that this will not be enough to salvage the peace talks. U.S. aid had 
been suspended in December 2013 following the seizure of 
warehouses of equipment by the Islamic Front. Given the blurred lines 
between the groups operating in Syria, it will be difficult for the U.S. 
to ensure that its aid does not fall into the hands of extremists.  
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11/01/2014  Serge Schmemann (NYT) writes that ISIS’ gains in Fallujah and 
Ramadi pose a risk to Iraq’s neighbordering countries. Schmemann 
argues that the situation in Fallujah “has now assumed the burden of a 
bloody question mark over the entire American war in Iraq”. 
 
EIU “Syria/Iraq Politics: The Jihadists may have gone too far” 
(Document EIUCP00020140114ea1b0000z) 
EIU documents that ISIS is under attack from “rebels of all stripes” 
who are only united in their dislike of the group. There are reports that 
ISIS may have opened a third front in Lebanon. “Weakened central 
control in Syria and Iraq has opened space for ISIS brand of 
extremism, and the sectarian politics of both Mr Maliki and Bashar 
Assad’s Syrian regime have prompted some hapless Sunnis to embrace 
the group. And yet few actually agree with its radical ideas.”  
 
12/01/2014  Anne Barnard (NYT) discusses the reasons for the current infighting 
between ISIS and other Syrian rebels. “Nusra’s leaders and supporters 
accuse ISIS of the grave error of focusing too soon on building a 
radical Islamic state, the ultimate goal for both groups, at the expense 
of the war against Mr. Assad.” She argues that Syrian rebel infighting 
has reverberated beyond Syria and has many other facets, such as a turf 
war and meaning of the future of jihadism. She suggests that the Nusra 
front could be the main beneficiary of the situation. 
 
The NYT Editorial Board writes that three years on, the Syrian civil 
war has complexified and reinforced the proxy war and rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The U.S. and other powers do not have 
sufficient influence on this matter, and the upcoming peace conference 
will be a futile attempt at negotiations. The rise of ISIS continues to be 
alarming, despite its withdrawal from some of the areas it had seized in 
Syria. It is argued that while the resumption of non-lethal U.S. aid to 
Syria carries the risk that this equipment may fall into the hands of 




trying to recruit and train Americans and other Westerners to carry out 
attacks in the United States”. 
13/01/2014  Based on interviews with Syrian refugees in Kurdistan and Turkey, 
HRW reports how ISIS is violating women’s rights in areas under their 
control in northern and northeastern Syria. 
 
Anne Barnard (NYT) writes that ISIS has succeeded in retaking 
significant sections of territory in northern Syria, including Raqqa. It is 
reported that the group has set up checkpoints in the Al Baba 
neighbourhood in search of rebels and their collaborators which has 
prompted some to believe that ISIS is working with the regime. 
Infighting between rebel groups has distracted them from their fight 
against Bashar al-Assad and has provided an opportunity for Assad’s 
forces to advance toward eastern Aleppo. They have managed to regain 
a crucial Aleppo industrial neighbourhood and gains of the remaining 
area would result in the city becoming completely besieged. John 
Kerry and Sergey Lavrov have announced that Assad is considering 
opening humanitarian aid routes and committing to local cease-fires 
ahead of the Geneva II peace talks. Barnard is sceptical of how these 
cease-fires would work given that the rebels are currently fighting 
among themselves.  
 
15/01/2014  According to Alison Smale (NYT), European intelligence officials, 
social workers, teachers and police officers report that there has been a 
surge in recruitment efforts by Islamist radicals through seemingly 
harmless conversations and gradual indoctrination. The greatest 
concern is that these young individuals will be trained in using 
weapons and explosives in Syria and may carry out attacks once they 
return home.  
Speaking at the Kuwait 
pledging conference for the 
Syria crisis, EU 
Commissioner Kristalina 
Georgiva states: “Today on 
behalf of the European 
Commission I pledge $225 
million (€165 million). You 
have already heard the 
generous pledges of five of 
our EU member states. In 
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addition, another eighteen 
member states are joining our 
collective effort to bring 
relief to the Syrian people. 
Taken together, the EU 
pledge, the Commission and 
its member states, totals $753 
million. This brings our 
funding to $3.5 billion since 
the beginning of the crisis. 
These funds will provide food 
and clean water, medicines 
and shelter to the Syrians and 
their host communities who 
most urgently need 
humanitarian assistance.” 
 
The EC releases a 
communication to other EU 
institutions on “Preventing 
Radicalisation to Terrorism 
and Violent Extremism: 
Strengthening the EU’s 
Response”. This discusses the 
situation of European foreign 
fighters in Syria, among 
others, and proposes various 
preventive measures. 
16/01/2014  According to Nick Cumming-Bruce (NYT), UN human rights chief, 
Navi Pillay, has reported that Syrian rebel groups, and ISIS in 
particular, have carried out mass executions of civilians and fighters 




Pillay says this amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity. It 
is reported that ISIS fighters carried out mass executions upon both 
their retreat from Raqqa and their subsequent seizure of the city. 
Numerous bodies were also discovered in a children’s hospital in 
Aleppo which had served as a base for ISIS. 
 
In a detailed commentary for ECFR, Rania Abouzeid writes that Syria 
is facing an “uprising within an uprising” as fighting between rebel 
groups and ISIS erupted on 3 January in northern Syria. The seemingly 
coordinated decision to confront ISIS by numerous groups at the same 
time over several locations, and how quickly ISIS was pushed back 
initially, has been surprising. Foreign fighters have been the main 
target of rebel groups and many are reportedly fleeing to Turkey as a 
result. Abouzeid explains that some believe that rebel clashes with 
ISIS were purposely planned to take place just before the Geneva II 
talks on 22 January to signal that there are armed rebels within Syria 
disassociated with extremists with whom the international community 
can engage with. The Islamic Front (IF) and Jabhat al-Nusra are most 
likely to reap the highest benefit from ISIS’ short-term loss of 
territories (they have already regained some lost areas), as they are 
stronger and better organised than other groups. Al-Nusra has recruited 
foreign fighters fleeing ISIS and is now considered as a more moderate 
alternative. Meanwhile, Western officials are beginning to realise that 
they will require to engage with the IF if some sort of agreement is to 
be reached at the Geneva II talks, although IF sources report that they 
are reluctant to be seen collaborating with Western governments. 
17/01/2014  EIU “Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa economy: EIU’s latest 
assumptions” (Document EIUCP00020140118ea1h0002z)  
EIU predicts that there may be an international intervention in the 
Syrian civil war which is likely to be prolonged. The increase in 
sectarian violence in Iraq has the potential to disrupt economic 




20/01/2014  Kareem Fahim and Yasir Ghazi (NYT) report that negotiations 
between jihadist militants and local leaders in Fallujah have failed, 
causing many to flee the city, fearing further escalations of violence. 
Iraqi PM, Nouri al-Maliki, under pressure from his government and 
Sunni leaders, has declared that he will not mobilise the army to storm 
Fallujah. He has instead given authority to Sunni leaders to lead 
negotiations and armed tribal Sunni militiamen to fight the militants. 
There is concern that Maliki’s approach is proving ineffective as 
residents of Fallujah report that the militant gunmen are patrolling the 
streets and enforcing Islamic edicts. The situation bears the risk of a 
return of sectarian violence reminiscent of the U.S. occupation.  
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Parties shy away from pre-election coalitions” 
(Document EIUCP00020140121ea1k0000n) 
Major political parties in Iraq are running independently, therefore 
creating a wider field for voters to choose from, creating the possibility 
for better cross-sectarian cooperation at a political level. However, this 
may mean that government formation may take longer and that Iraq 
may be inherently unstable. 
At a first meeting of the 
Cooperation Council between 
the EU and Iraq, HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton states: “The 
EU is doing all it can to 
support Prime Minister Al 
Maliki and his Government in 
their efforts to confront 
terrorism and address security 
challenges, particularly in the 
west of Iraq. (…) I also 
mentioned the EU’s concern 
at the execution of 40 persons 
yesterday, reiterating our firm 
position against capital 
punishment. Regional 
instability and the conflict in 
Syria are contributing to 
tensions inside Iraq, making it 
even more urgent to address 
the root causes of violence 
through an inclusive political 
process. April's general 
elections will be a crucial test 
for Iraq's democracy, and I 
hope that the country's 
political leaders will seize 
this opportunity to promote 
dialogue and compromise.” 
 
The EU announces 
approximately EUR 75 
34 
 
million of development 
support to Iraq between 2014-
2020 for the purpose of rule 
of law and institution 
building. Commissioner 
Andris Piebalgs states: “the 
EU is confident that the Iraqi 
authorities will work towards 
a successful transition to 
democracy and long term 
stability for the benefit of all 
of Iraq’s citizens”. 
 
The FAC releases its 
conclusions on Syria. It calls, 
among others, for confidence 
building measures such as 
agreements on local 
ceasefires, the lifting of 
sieges, or the release of 
arbitrarily detained prisoners. 
21/01/2014  In its annual report, HRW discusses how sectarian tensions have 
deepened in Iraq, with ISIS carrying out “nearly daily attacks against 
civilians, making 2013 the bloodiest of the last five years”. It accuses 
the Iraqi government of responding to “largely peaceful 
demonstrations with violence and to worsening security with draconian 
counterterrorism measures”.  
 
EIU “Iraq: Key developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140122ea1l0001o) 
“The political situation in Iraq will remain highly unstable. Militia and 




deficiencies in the security forces. Spillover from the Syrian civil war 
is adding to insecurity.” 
22/01/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – negotiations continue over forming 
KRG government” (Document EIUCP00020140123ea1m00026) 
A deadlock in negotiations in forming a cabinet for the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) has been causing widespread frustration 
but seems to be nearing a conclusion. 
Remarks by EU HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton at the 
Geneva II Conference on 
Syria: “We have to ensure 
that there is agreement on a 
political transition. (…) The 
population of Syria is 
stretched beyond these limits 
and even small progress 
would be welcome if not 
enough: eg. more 
humanitarian access to those 
trapped in conflict zones. (…) 
We have the ambition in the 
European Union to help in all 
possible ways. (…) I repeat it, 
it is so important to include 
women in the process”. 
23/01/2014  Ben Hubbard (NYT) reports that in an audio recording, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, leader of Al-Qaeda, has called for a halt to infighting 
between Islamist brigades in northern Syria and has recommended the 
establishment of Islamic courts to settle disputes. ISIS fighters and 
rebel brigades have been battling for 15 days which has reportedly 
resulted in almost 1400 deaths. Zawahiri said the rebels should refocus 
on the cause of defeating Bashar al-Assad. 
 
25/01/2014  Ben Hubbard (NYT) writes that ISIS went rogue from Al-Qaeda after 
defying orders from Ayman al-Zawahiri to withdraw from Syria to 
Iraq. This signals Al-Qaeda’s transformation from a corporation to a 
franchise model utilised by diverse militant groups which loosely use 




define ‘Al-Qaeda’ and consequently how to combat the threat it poses. 
The civil war in Syria has compounded the complexities of how to 
characterise militant groups. ISIS, which has publicly snubbed the 
leader of Al-Qaeda, has thousands of foreign fighters. The Nusra Front 
remains loyal to Zawahiri while also preserving relations with the 
wider rebel movement. Currently, none of the militant groups affiliated 
with Al-Qaeda have turned their focus to attacking the West and some 
analysts argue that it is best to approach the different groups with a 
local focus. Others contend that such groups always return their focus 
to fighting a wider international battle which poses a threat to the 
West. 
28/01/2014  Ben Hubbard, Clifford Krauss and Eric Schmitt (NYT) report that the 
oil and gas resources of Syria have predominantly fallen under control 
of jihadist groups which are using the income to fund their battles. ISIS 
and the Nusra Front have benefited significantly from the proceeds of 
the oil and gas fields. ISIS is selling fuel to the Assad regime, 
bolstering claims by opposition leaders that the group is covertly 
coordinating with the government, while the Nusra Front is also 
exchanging fuel with the government for electricity and relief from 
airstrikes. It is reported that the militants have resorted to primitive 
methods to extract product from crude which is causing local 
environmental and health issues, and trade networks have been 
established to smuggle the oil into Iraq and Turkey. Oil production in 
Syria has steadily decreased over the years, accelerated by the civil 
war. The battle for control of these resources has become a major point 
of chaos within the oil rich regions of Syria. ISIS is thought to be 
sustaining “its operations through a combination of oil revenues, 
border tolls, extortion and granary sales”. U.S. officials are not 
convinced that ISIS and Assad are cooperating, yet it is believed that it 






EIU “Iraq: Country outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020140129ea1s00009) 
EIU predicts that the political situation in Iraq will remain highly 
unstable and there is a risk of further escalation in violence. 
Specifically, “the loss of central government authority over Fallujah, 
even if it proves only temporary, has created one of the most serious 
crises faced by the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Reclaiming control 
of the city could exacerbate sectarian tensions further.” 
29/01/2014  Myriam Benraad (ECFR) asserts that the capture of Fallujah and parts 
of Ramdai by ISIS demonstrates both its tactical capabilities, and its 
territorial ambitions which call the Iraq/Syria border into question. 
ISIS’ successes in Iraq can be linked to rising Sunni resentment against 
PM Maliki’s repressive response to their protests, and some Sunni 
tribal sheikhs who feel betrayed by the Iraqi government and the U.S. 
Maliki is pursuing the recapture of territories lost to ISIS through force 
and has been counting on the support of some Sunni tribes who have 
joined him in the fight against ISIS. Benraad concludes that the threat 
of ISIS will not be sufficiently quashed through force alone and there 
is a high risk that the situation will be further polarised, as ISIS has 
shown that it utilises fragile socio-economic conditions to boost its 
recruitment. 
 
30/01/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: New provinces plan could harden sectarian 
divisions” (Document EIUCP00020140131ea1u0000x) 
EIU reports that Iraq’s cabinet announced on 21 January plans to carve 
our four new provinces. It is suggested that there may be political 
motivations behind this decision on al-Maliki’s part, as he may win 
support from those who support the plans for new provinces. 
“Although the proposal has been welcomed by some of Iraq’s 
disenfranchised minorities, it risks entrenching the already stark ethnic 
and sectarian divides that have fuelled violence in recent years.” 
 
31/01/2014  Joe Cochrane (NYT) writes that at least 50 Indonesians have gone to 




likely to increase given the appeal of Syria to Indonesian extremists 
who view the war as a sign “linked to predictions in Islamic 
eschatology that the final battle at the end of time will take place in 
Sham”. The report states that humanitarian missions to Syria by 
Indonesian Islamic organisations have been providing money and 
medical aid to jihadists. The two most significant points of concern for 
Indonesia is that first, the foreign fighters may inspire others to 
radicalise and follow in their footsteps once they return home and tell 
their stories. Second, perceptions and actions by Indonesian jihadists 
may have consequences for sectarian tensions in Indonesia. 
Jan 2014  The ICG reports that more than 100.000 Iraqi civilians were displaced 
during the month due to the fighting in Anbar province. According to 
UNHCR reports, 65.000 fled fighting in Fallujah and Ramadi during 
the week of 18-24 January alone. ICG claims that after local groups 
reportedly regained control of Fallujah, the government no longer 
distinguished between residents and militias, announced Fallujah to be 
in the hands of ISIS and called for national and international support to 
fight ISIS. It claims elsewhere that Iraqi government forces “regained 
control of areas west of Baghdad” on 29 January. According to Iraqi 
government estimates, 1013 people were killed in January which 
amounts to the highest death toll since April 2008. The Iraqi 
government also reportedly executed 26 on terrorism charges on 21 
January. On Syria, ICG reports that clashes between ISIS and other 
rebel groups intensified after 1 January, when the Islamic Front 
accused ISIS of killing a rebel commander and “being worse than the 
Assad regime”. While ISIS lost control of its bases in Idlib and west of 
Aleppo, it consolidated its presence east of Aleppo and in Raqqa 
province. On 27 January, ISIS rejected a reconciliation initiative by 
other Syrian rebel groups. According to the SOHR, ISIS and other 
rebel groups suffered a high number of casualties (estimated 1400) in 
rebel infighting between 1 and 23 January. ICG also reports that ISIS 




03/02/2014  Ben Hubbard (NYT) reports that Al-Qaeda’s central leadership has cut 
ties with ISIS. Al-Qaeda has cut with a group that has tarnished their 
brand, whilst ISIS emerges as a strong force. ISIS’ expansion and 
economic independence allows it to endure without the backing of Al-
Qaeda. The break between the two groups signals the decline of Al-
Qaeda’s clout in the region. Hubbard also writes that Lakhdar Brahimi, 
the UN special envoy for Syria is resigning in an apparent concession 
to the Syrian government in order to boost incentives for negotiations. 
 
04/02/2014  Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that violence has continued in Baghdad 
and Anbar province. Two rockets targeted diplomatic and government 
offices in Baghdad, killing over a dozen people, Katyusha rockets 
killed a soldier in the international zone, and car and suicide bombings 
killed fifteen people. Two local Sunni tribesmen who were members of 
the Awakening Council were found executed. The clashes are 
predominantly between Iraqi security forces and ISIS. A curfew has 
been set in Ramadi, while gunfire continues. The head of the Iraqi 
security forces has announced that operations in Anbar will continue 
despite the upcoming elections in April as “it is a military battle and 
not a political one”. 
 
05/02/2014  According to HRW, ISIS claimed responsibility for the execution of 
four Iraqi SWAT members near Ramadi. It also reports how SWAT 
forces reportedly ousted ISIS from one of Ramadi’s neighbourhoods 
on 30 January but that fighting was continuing in other parts of Ramadi 
and that “accounts of fighting in and around Fallujah have been 
inconsistent”. 
 
Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that ISIS has made significant gains in 
Saladin province in Iraq, which neighbours Anbar, in a move that some 
believe is to distract governmental forces and divide their attention. 
PM Nouri al-Maliki is preparing for a counter-offensive in Saladin and 
has announced that “the battle is about to end in Anbar”. ISIS has 




zone which holds governmental and diplomatic offices has been 
attacked for two days in a row. 
 
Michael R. Gordon and Duraid Adnan (NYT) report that U.S. military 
officers have been advising Iraqi officials and military commanders in 
its strategy to combat ISIS in Anbar. Under pressure from U.S. 
officials, the Maliki government is to build ties with Sunni tribes, 
giving them the same benefits as Iraqi soldiers, to lead the offensive 
against ISIS in key Sunni cities such as Fallujah. This move is in 
recognition that a predominantly Shia army leading combat in a 
majority Sunni city could escalate sectarian violence. US State 
Department official on Iraq, Brett McGurk, says that there are 
currently around 2000 ISIS fighters in Iraq who are heavily armed and 
advancing with the goal to seize Baghdad as their base of operations. 
Iraqi forces currently face a military challenge as they operate with 
limited air power while they wait for U.S. military assistance to arrive, 
which will not be in time for their battle in Fallujah. 
 
David D. Kirkpatrick and Eric Schmitt (NYT) report that there has 
been a rise in terrorist attacks in Egypt which is a direct consequence 
of President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster and the sectarian violence raging 
in the region. The sudden increase and effectiveness of the attacks 
signals that it may be down to a flow of Egyptian Jihadi fighters 
returning home from Syria to take up arms against the government. 
Several suicide bombings by returning foreign fighters have already 
occurred. It is believed that these jihadists are operating under Sinai-
based militant groups such as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis which has proved 
to have the necessary resources and capabilities to carry out strategic 
and organised attacks. Al-Qaeda and ISIS have been posting 
propaganda videos in encouragement of Egyptian jihadism. Upon 
inspection of videos of attacks carried out in Egypt, analysts believe 
that the weapons being used are advanced versions which have been 
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commonly used in Iraq and Syria, indicating that Ansar Beit al-Maqdis 
may be receiving firepower from the international jihadist movement. 
06/02/2014   The EP adopts a resolution on 
the situation in Syria. It refers 
to many evidential claims 
about the situation on the 
ground and reiterates, among 
others, the importance of 
confidence-building 
measures. The EP stresses 
“that the crisis in Syria 
requires a coherent common 
approach by the EU and its 
Member States in the field of 
humanitarian aid delivery and 
beyond”. 
07/02/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – Electoral lists confirm political 
fragmentation” (Document EIUCP00020140209ea2700015) 
EIU asserts that the coalitions announced in Iraq matches their forecast 
of a more fragmented political landscape. This could result in new 
forces in Iraqi politics and some electoral surprises. 
 
10/02/2014  Duraid Adnan and Tim Arango (NYT) report that ISIS has set up 
training camps in the mountainous Diyala province in Iraq and is 
utilising Mosul as a centre of financing through extortion and other 
schemes. Their suicide attacks are predominantly funded by this 
money. 
FAC conclusions on Iraq: 
“The EU reaffirms its 
commitment to assist Iraq in 
its transition to democracy, 
recalling that the unity and 
territorial integrity of Iraq are 
essential elements in building 
a secure and prosperous state 
for all its citizens and in 
bringing stability to the whole 
region. (…) The EU renews 
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its call on all of Iraq’s 
political and religious leaders 
to engage in dialogue and to 
speak out against 
sectarianism and violence. It 
encourages the Government 
of Iraq to reinforce the rule of 
law and take decisive 
measures to promote 
inclusiveness and advance 
reconciliation (…). The EU 
(…) encourages the 
Government of Iraq to 
strengthen cooperation 
between its security forces 
and local Anbar tribes. (…) 
The EU expresses its support 
to the Iraqi authorities in the 
fight against terrorism and is 
ready to cooperate with Iraq 
on a comprehensive response 
to this global threat that is 
compliant with human rights 
and international 
humanitarian law.” 
11/02/2014  Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that ISIS has extended its reach in Iraq 
beyond Anbar province and carried out a deadly rampage in Mosul. 
ISIS fighters struck an army unit, beheading five soldiers, shooting 
nine and torturing and then hanging one. These types of attacks are 
becoming more common as government forces tighten their cordon 
around the Anbar province, the militants are escaping to Mosul as well 




them. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees says that up to 
300,000 people have fled Anbar province as the conflict has escalated. 
12/02/2014  Tim Arango and Eric Schmitt (NYT) write that a series of prison 
breaks in Iraq have resulted in hundreds of former inmates joining and 
leading ISIS which is spurring a new wave of Sunni jihad across the 
region. The breakouts signal the increasing demand for experienced 
fighters by ISIS. One former inmate explains that he was given a 
choice by ISIS leaders to stay in Iraq and fight or leave with them for 
Syria. The prison breaks have fuelled conspiracy theories that Nouri al-
Maliki and Bashar al-Assad’s government are acting in concert to 
orchestrate the escapes to bolster their ‘war on terrorism’ policies. 
Moderate Syrian rebels believe that ISIS may be a pawn of the Assad 
regime. The Iraqi government has done little to allay fears that they 
had a hand in the prison breaks and MPs claim they were blocked from 
investigating the prisons for at least a week. The significant rise of 
ISIS has resulted in Western officials becoming even more reluctant to 
intervene in Syria as the conflict has transformed from one against the 
Syrian regime to a much more complex multi-pronged battle.  
 
EIU “Iraq: key developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140214ea2c0000a) 
EIU predicts that continued Sunni frustrations over their 
marginalisation by the Iraqi government, and tensions between the 
Kurdistan regional government and central government will continue 
to undermine political stability. Further, EIU expects PM al-Maliki’s 
State of Law coalition to perform strongly in the upcoming 
parliamentary elections, however, the formation of a new government 
may be delayed due to political divisions. 
 
14/02/2014  Anne Barnard (NYT) reports that a deadlock continues in the second 
round of Syrian peace talks in Geneva, while the Syrian regime pressed 
ahead with military campaigns to retake rebel-held areas and struck 




peace talks, the U.S. and Russia, over the crisis in Ukraine exacerbated 
the efforts of establishing a transitional government in Syria. Russian 
officials criticised Western actors for only focusing on regime change, 
whilst the Syrian opposition delegation offered a 24-point proposal for 
a delegation government which Western officials refused to read. The 
opposition claimed that their violence in Syria is defensive in the face 
of brutal attacks from both the regime and ISIS. U.S. officials are 
reviewing policy options to respond to the escalating humanitarian 
crisis in Syria, which could include increasing military aid or even 
military force. 
17/02/2014   EU announces EUR 12 
million in financial support to 
help destroy Syrian chemical 
stockpiles. Commissioner 
Andris Piebalgs states: “The 
European Commission is 
looking forward to a fruitful 
cooperation with the OPCW 
and the UN on this matter and 
hoping that the destruction of 
chemical weapons will be a 
step closer to bringing an end 
to the conflict in Syria.” 
19/02/2014  Commentary by Maurice Fraser (ECFR): “So let ‘act tough’ be our 
guiding principle. But, just as important, we need to ‘think big’. We 
need something to match the scale of the challenge which the people of 
the Middle East are now facing if Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and, 
eventually, Syria, are to build something existentially better for 
themselves. We need something to match the American vision and 
ambition for Europe after World War II, with the Marshall Plan and 




statesmen and stateswomen ready to act tough and think big? If they 
are already there, let them step forward. Now.” 
21/02/2014  Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that 21 people were killed and 65 injured 
in at attack on the Shia town of Musayyib, south of Baghdad, in Iraq. 
Iraqi security officials have said that “the shells had been fired from a 
Sunni area near Nasayyib where security forces were conducting a 
weeklong search for fighters” from ISIS.  
 
23/02/2014  Ben Hubbard (NYT) reports that the leader of Ahrar al-Sham was sent 
to Syria by Al-Qaeda to mediate rebel infighting and was killed in a 
suicide attack. Opposition activists claim the attack was undertaken by 
ISIS. Clint Watts of the Foreign Policy Research Institute believes that 
this move by ISIS was a clear warning to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
that “ISIS is in Syria for the long haul and there will be no 
remediation”. 
 
Ben Hubbard and Karim Shoumali (NYT) write that the Western-
backed Syrian Supreme Military Council (SMC), a central body of top 
opposition commanders, is dysfunctional two years after its creation. 
Drawing on 20 recent interviews, the authors explain that the 
opposition movement in Syria is handicapped by infighting which 
distracts from the fight against the regime. The Council has served as a 
conduit for foreign military support although this aid has been 
insufficient and has led its brigades to seek support from wealthy 
Syrian and Persian Gulf patrons, lending legitimacy to regime claims 
that the SMC is a foreign-backed plot. Hubbard and Shoumali also 
report that there is infighting over the misuse of and misdistribution of 
arms between the opposition groups.  
 
24/02/2014  EIU “Iraq” country outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020140226ea2o0000c) 
“The loss of government authority over Fallujah, even if it proves 
temporary, has created one of the most serious crises faced by the 
7th EU-Brazil Summit, Joint 
Statement: “We believe that 
the only solution to the 
conflict is a Syrian-led 
political transition that meets 
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prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Reclaiming control of the city could 
exacerbate sectarian tensions further.” 
 
the legitimate aspirations of 
the Syrian people, based on 
the full implementation of the 
30 June 2012 Geneva 
Communiqué.” 
Feb 2014  ICG reports that ISIS executed senior figures in Syrian rebel groups 
(Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqour as-Sham) affiliated with the Islamic Front in 
two separate suicide bombings on 1 February. The killing of the Ahrar 
al-Sham leader, reportedly by ISIS, came after Jabhat al-Nusra had 
given ISIS a deadline (1 March) to accept mediation or face expulsion 
from Syria. ICG refers to the SOHR’s estimate (27 February) that 3300 
had been killed in rebel infighting since January. On Iraq, ICG reports 
that the army continued to besiege Anbar, continued the shelling of 
Fallujah and Ramadi, that ISIS brought down an army helicopter on 22 
February and that government forces regained control of Sulayman 
Beg and surrounding areas on 22 February after more than a week of 
fighting. Car bombings across Iraq continued. In and around Baghdad, 
at least 114 were killed in three attacks on 5, 18 and 27 February. 
 
04/03/2014   After meeting with an Iraqi-
Syrian delegation of civil 
society representatives, EU 
decision-makers conclude 
that supporting the “We are 
All Citizens” campaign is a 
promising strategy to address 
sectarianism in Iraq and 
Syria. 
05/03/2014  Somini Sengupta and Nick Cumming-Bruce (NYT) report that a 
commission of inquiry into the human rights abuses in Syria which has 
been established by the UN has criticised Assad’s regime and allied 
militias of systematic murders and abuses, and the Security Council of 




war. The report details government tactics of sieges, withholding of 
water, food and medical care, and bombardments as violations of 
international law. The members of the inquiry have called on the 
Security Council to refer the warring actors in Syria to the ICC, 
however the U.S. and Russia are reluctant to do so. The commission is 
currently compiling a list of individuals suspected of being war 
criminals. They report the use of chemical weapons, mainly sarin, on 
multiple occasions. The findings are based on 563 interviews with 
Syrians who had fled the conflict as they were barred from entering 
Syria for their investigation.  
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – violent stalemate continues in 
Fallujah” (Document EIUCP00020140306ea350001h) 
EIU reports that a violent stalemate is set to continue in Fallujah, 
whilst clashes with militants continue outside of Fallujah, in parts of 
Ramadi and smaller towns across the province. It is unclear who the 
balance of power lays within Fallujah. “There is little sign of an 
imminent resolution to the Fallujah crisis, and the stalemate could 
continue until after the elections, unless Mr Maliki decides to gamble 
on a risky assault in an attempt to project a strongman image to win 
votes.” 
10/03/2014  HRW reports about human rights abuses by Iraqi security forces, 
especially against prisoners and in retaliation for ISIS’ ‘Breaking the 
Walls’ campaign. HRW claims that “as many as 1000 prisoners 
escaped” during the Abu Ghraib and Taji prison breaks in July 2013. 
HRW further reports that severe fighting is ongoing in Anbar which 
has caused a humanitarian crisis and prevented the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to residents of Fallujah and Ramadi and to internally 
displaced persons. 
 
11/03/2014  Katrin Bennhold (NYT) writes that Shiraz Maher of the ICSR says that 
the Britons fighting with jihadists in Syria are not fighting with the 




Islamic caliphate. It is just as dangerous to compare foreign fighters to 
idealists as it is to assume that all of them will pose a terrorism threat 
when they return to Britain. Treating them this way may in fact 
increase the risk of radicalisation, Maher explains. 
12/03/2014   In response to the rapidly 
growing number of internally 
displaced persons fleeing 
Anbar province, the EU 
increases its humanitarian 
assistance to Iraq by EUR 3 
million. 
13/03/2014   EU Commissioner Kristalina 
Georgieva travels to northern 
Iraq to meet with Kurdish 
authorities, Syrian refugees 
and EU humanitarian 
partners. She states: “I take 
advantage of my visit here to 
call for an end to the violence 
in the region, unlimited 
access to those in need, 
respect for International 
Humanitarian Law, and most 
important of all, a sustainable 
political solution to the crisis. 
I also appeal to all the 
generous hosting countries to 
keep their borders open. It is 
vital that to avoid a further 




access to those in need inside 
Syria is improved.” 
15/03/2014   Statement by EU HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton on 3rd 
Anniversary of the Syrian 
Uprising: “The only solution 
to the crisis is a political one: 
the establishment of a 
transitional governing body, 
and a genuine Syrian-led 
inclusive political process to 
establish a democratic and 
pluralistic Syria. (…) We call 
on all parties, especially the 
Syrian government, which 
bears the primary 
responsibility for the 
humanitarian tragedy, to 
swiftly fulfil all obligations 
imposed on them by UNSC 
resolution 2139, and call for a 
robust use of the review 
mechanism to enforce 
compliance.” 
18/03/2014  Nick Cumming-Bruce (NYT) reports on the recent findings of an 
investigation on human rights abuses in Syria. The report documents 
the severe circumstances in which Syrians are dying of starvation 
because of blockades and seizures, and the death of inmates in a 
government-controlled prison due to systematic torture and lack of 
basic necessities such as food and sanitation. The panel has compiled a 
list of perpetrators, including names of military commanders and 




Commissioner for Human Rights. The panel has also reported on the 
mass executions of civilians and rival opposition combatants 
undertaken by ISIS in Syria. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Key Developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140319ea3i0000l) 
The political situation in Iraq will remain highly unstable and 
insurgents will continue to take advantage of political divisions and 
weaknesses of the security forces. “Sunni disgruntlement over their 
perceived marginalisation by the government, and tensions between 
the central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, will 
continue to undermine political stability.” 
21/03/2014  Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that 37 people were killed and 8 soldiers 
kidnapped in a series of attacks across Iraq. A suicide bomber blew up 
a police station in the Diyala province, followed by gunmen shooting 
from speeding SUVs. In Samarra, gunmen in SUVs seized an army 
unit, killed 5 soldiers and kidnapped 8. Consequently, a curfew was 
imposed on the city. In Anbar, a suicide bomber attacked a funeral for 
a leader of the local Sunni Awakening council, killing 13 people and 
wounding 37. In Tikrit, a roadside bomb killed a commander and two 
guards of the army’s Fifth Brigade. Car bombs in a market in Kirkuk 
killed 5 civilians and wounded 15. It is claimed that these attacks were 
carried out by ISIS. 
 
22/03/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: As bad as it gets” (Document 
EIUCP00020140323ea3m0000p) 
As the election draws closer, community divisions are getting even 
deeper. The rift between al-Maliki and the government of Iraq’s 
autonomous Kurdish region are as bad as ever. Al-Maliki has labelled 
all protestors in Anbar as ISIS members. “It is unclear whether Mr 
Maliki and his generals will contain, let alone defeat, the Sunni 




increasingly minded to ignore the writ of the central government; some 
seek autonomy, if not secession.” 
24/03/2014  EIU “Iraq: Country Outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020140326ea3o0000q) 
EIU predicts that the situation in Iraq will remain highly unstable with 
risk of escalation of violence. The deteriorating security situation in 
Anbar is contributing to sectarian conflict. 
 
25/03/2014  Eric Schmitt (NYT) writes that dozens of Pakistani Al-Qaeda 
operatives have travelled to Syria in recent months in what U.S. 
intelligence and counterterrorism officials fear is in an effort to use 
Syria as a base to organise attacks against the U.S. and Europe. It is 
believed that Syria is an attractive base for these militants as it is a 
haven from drone attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Intelligence 
assessments indicate that ISIS leadership has devised a long-term plan 
to recruit and train foreign fighters to conduct attacks against the West. 
However, not all of the US’ counterterrorism partners agree with the 
assessment that there is a coordinated plan to attack the West. It is 
unlikely that U.S. policy will change based on this new assessment 
although President Obama and his allies will have to consider the 
possibility that Syria may become the next Afghanistan. The U.S. 
secretary of Homeland Security has declared that “Syria has become a 
matter of homeland security”. The U.S. and its European allies are 
working closely to track foreign fighters returning home. It is believed 
that many of the Al-Qaeda operatives from Pakistan and Afghanistan 
are in the east and northwestern areas of Syria. These operatives have 
significant power over recruitment and training, although analysts 
believe that the Nusra front is not prioritising Western targets for now, 
however, it would turn its attention to the West should it feel its 
ideology was under direct threat. 
 
26/03/2014  Myriam Benraad (ECFR) writes that both despite and because of a 
recent standoff between the Iraqi government and Sunni protestors in 




upcoming elections in April. The persistent sectarian violence and 
instability in Iraq has resulted in the increased estrangement of Sunnis 
and a population fatigued and disinterested in politics. Maliki has been 
successful in exploiting divisions between Sunnis, who lack a united 
leadership, to enlist them in the fight against ISIS alongside the army. 
Hi re-election would only heighten resentment toward his government 
as it is anticipated that Maliki would continue with repression and 
autocratic rule. The combination of a lack of Sunni unity, a fragmented 
Shia political landscape, persistent violence and a low turnout at 
elections would result in favourable conditions for Maliki’s re-election. 
He presents himself as the only viable option in the context of a 
security vacuum. Benraad asserts that “any form of sustainable 
progress would first and foremost require an effective political 
rehabilitation of the Sunnis”. 
27/03/2014   In a memo, the European 
Commission details the EU’s 
Syria policy and comments 
on latest developments on the 
ground. 
28/03/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Election commissioners resign”  
(Document EIUCP00020140329ea3s0003e) 
All members of Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission 
(IHEC) resigned on 25th March in objection to efforts to block 
candidates from standing in the upcoming parliamentary election. 
“Unless a compromise is found soon that enables the IHEC to continue 
operating-as the electoral candidate lists need to be published to enable 
campaigning to begin-it will be difficult to hold the election as planned 
at the end of April.” 
 
30/03/2014  Anne Barnard (NYT) reports that journalists Javier Espinosa and 
Ricardo Garcia Vilanova, have been reunited with their families after 
being held by radical Islamist militants in Syria for six months. The 




Syrian journalists and activists, and a dozen foreign journalists are 
missing or held by insurgent groups in Syria, while approximately 40 
Syrian journalists are being held by the government. Kidnapping has 
become so widespread that many news organisations have ceased 
reporting on the ground while aid agencies have struggled to do their 
work. 
Mar 2014  On Syria, the ICG reports that ISIS rejected al-Nusra’s ultimatum to 
accept mediation and that it withdrew from Idlib and Latakia 
provinces, concentrating its fighters in eastern Aleppo and Raqqa. ISIS 
seized a town in Al-Hasakah province in northeastern Syria on 30 
March where it reportedly killed 50 rebels. On Iraq, ICG reports about 
the ongoing fighting in Anbar, with ISIS still controlling Fallujah. It 
also reports about criticism that the Iraqi government is not seriously 
trying to solve the crisis – with MPs claiming that Maliki is not waging 
war on terrorism but against Anbar and its people. According to UN 
reports, 400.000 have been displaced in Anbar since the beginning of 
ISIS’ campaign. ICG further reports that bombing attacks across Iraq 
continued: among other deadly incidents, at least 80 were killed on 25 
March including 41 soldiers. 
 
01/04/2014  Masood Farivar writes for the NYT on the foreign fighters in Syria, 
drawing on his personal experience fighting alongside the Afghan 
Mujahedeen in the 1980s. He describes the foreign fighters he 
encountered as joining their fight for numerous reasons, but that their 
embrace of martyrdom was a point of disgust for Farivar and his 
Afghan comrades. Regarding the fears of Western states of terrorist 
attacks by foreign fighters when they return home, Farivar asserts that 
the caricatures created by Western experts of these militants overlooks 
the complexities of the conflict in Syria and the varied and intersecting 
motives. He advises that “before summarily prosecuting the fighters 
upon their return from Syria, as Britain is considering, or revoking the 
United States citizenship of fighters with dual citizenship (as some 




association. For most, a deradicalization program, such as those run by 
Saudi Arabia, could help reintegrate them into civilian life”. 
 
EIU “Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa economy: EIU’s latest 
assumptions” (Document EIUCP00020140402ea410001p) 
EIU predicts that as the international focus is elsewhere, namely the 
crisis sparked by the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the war in Syria 
will be extended as Assad will use the opportunity to continue military 
operations against rebel groups. Consequently, “the war in Syria will 
act as a crucible for regional sectarian violence and has sparked a 
heightened round of violence in both Iraq and Lebanon”. 
03/04/2014   Remarks by EU HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton at a 
European Parliament debate 
on foreign and defence 
policy: “The failure of 
international cohesion has 
prevented serious pressure 
being brought to bear on 
Assad to bring the conflict to 
an end. (…) The risk of 
regional instability – in 
particular impacts Lebanon, 
Jordan and Iraq - and the 
growth of terrorist and 
extremist groups such as Al-
Qaida. This is an ever present 
problem.” 
05/04/2014  The NYT reports that 17 Iraqi soldiers have been killed by ISIS in an 
explosion after seeking cover in a booby-trapped house following 
attacks by ISIS gunmen near Fallujah. The Interior Ministry reported 




07/04/2014  Jihad Yazigi (ECFR) argues that the Syrian civil war is providing 
incentives to prolong it for those benefitting economically from it. He 
presents four stages of decline of Syria’s economy marked by the 
outbreak of the conflict, the imposition of Western sanctions which 
outlined the increasing international isolation of the Syrian economy, 
the expansion of the conflict into Damascus and Aleppo, and the 
seizure of the northeast of Syria by the opposition in Spring 2013. 
Support from international partners, such as Russia and Iran, and 
domestic backers have allowed regime-controlled areas to remain 
resilient. The Syrian economy is fragmenting as different areas 
controlled by different forces has fostered growing decentralisation. 
This disconnect between areas has created new power centres led by 
local stakeholders. There is ongoing and increasing competition by all 
sides, as well as intra-rebel fighting for resources such as oil and grain. 
A solution the Europeans could pursue in the face of this fragmentation 
is to “empower the capacity of local councils across the country” and 
embrace the decentralised political system as a means of “working 
towards a new national consensus from the bottom up”.  
 
08/04/2014   European Commission 
Overview identifies the return 
of radicalised European 
foreign fighters from Syria as 
a significant risk to the 
security of the EU and its 
members. 
09/04/2014  EIU “Iraq Economy: Quick View – parliament remains divided over 
2014 budget” (Document EIUCP00020140410ea4900018) 
EIU reports that the draft 2014 budget has been held up in parliament 
due to boycotts against the Iraqi Prime Minister, poor turnout by MPs 
and opposition from Sunni MPs who are unhappy with the 
government’s actions in the Anbar province which they believe 
Summary of a discussion 
between the EU delegation to 
Syria and international civil 
society organisations 
regarding the EC’s (DEVCO) 
support for Syria: Gaps in the 
EU’s response to the crisis in 
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marginalised the Sunni community. This highlights the heightened 
political factionalism and sectarian tensions in Iraq. 
Syria are highlighted which 
include the protection of 
minorities in the context of 
the polarisation of the 
conflict. The inflexible and 
time-consuming EU 
procedures are identified as 
not appropriate in a volatile 
conflict environment. 
Additionally, it is concluded 
that “there should also be 
strategic thinking on how to 
build up capacities of local 
authorities and support forms 
of local self-government.” 
10/04/2014  Ben Hubbard (NYT) writes that Jordan has become the staging ground 
for Syrian rebels and their foreign backers on Syria’s southern front. 
The military aid provided to the rebels by the United States is covert, 
although the Military Operations Command in Amman is an open 
secret. Here, rebels receive ammunition and weapons, and the CIA 
coordinates its training of rebel fighters. The aid, however, has been 
limited and many rebels complain that they are not receiving enough to 
survive or combat Assad’s regime properly. Some believe that this 
may be part of an American conspiracy to prolong the war. The rebels 
feel that their foreign backers are more interested in conflict 
management rather than their victory. Their continued reliance on the 
Military Operations Command is out of desperation rather than due to 
clear value added to their fight. Despite recent reports, the southern 
front of Syria is relatively controlled due to the efforts of outside 
powers to contain the rise of extremism and preserve stability in 
Jordan. 
 




EIU provides detailed outline of the fractious political scene in Iraq 
head of the parliamentary election on 30th April.  
“Across Iraq election campaigning in April will be characterised by a 
strong emphasis on sectarian affiliations, which is only likely to 
sharpen sectarian tension. Exacerbating the situation, Iraq is also 
suffering from spillover from the Syrian civil war, which is pitting a 
largely Sunni opposition against a Shia-supported government, but 
domestic factors cannot be glossed over.” 
12/04/2014  Ben Hubbard (NYT) writes that an estimated 800-1200 Jordanians 
have joined jihadist groups in Syria. One third of these fighters are 
from the city of Zarqa. Drawing on accounts of Jordanian fighters, 
Hubbard explains that most of the men join the jihad believing they are 
following a noble path of establishing an Islamic state. They often 
leave without telling their families, who are left devastated by their 
loss. The violent strategies of the Syrian government and the inaction 
of the international community is another motivating factor behind 
their decision to go to Syria. Analysts say that “Jordan’s stagnant 
politics and economy encourage marginalized, devout men to seek 
glory on foreign battlefields”. The increasingly sectarian nature of the 
Syrian civil war has fuelled the jihadist mobilisation in Zarqa. Every 
few weeks, families in the city hold a “martyrs wedding” for the 
fighters who die, as they view their martyrdom as a cause for 
celebration. 
 
13/04/2014  Duraid Adnan (NYT) reports that less than a week after the eleventh 
anniversary of the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue and two weeks 
before parliamentary elections in Iraq, a series of explosions around the 
country resulted in 25 fatalities. On the same day, ISIS gained control 
of a main road linking the capital with the norther provinces and 
kidnapped 5 people, including an oil executive. 
 
14/04/2014  Nick Cumming-Bruce (NYT) reports that the UN human rights chief, 
Navi Pillay, condemned the systematic and routine torture tactics 
FAC conclusions on Syria: 
The EU reiterates that only a 
58 
 
employed by the Syrian regime. Her report documents the use of 
torture in government detention facilities and draws on 38 interviews 
conducted by investigators. There are several cases in which detainees 
have died under torture. The report also outlines that armed opposition 
groups have begun to use torture as of 2013 and have been targeting 
children identified as pro-regime. It is believed that those most at risk 
of detention by groups such as the Nusra Front and ISIS were activists 
and those trying to document the abuses.  
political solution will end the 
conflict in Syria and is 
determined to engage with 
third countries to effectively 
deal with terrorism and the 
financing of foreign fighters. 
Any elections in Syria outside 
of the framework of the 
Geneva Communique will be 
a “parody of democracy”. 
15/04/2014  Tim Arango and Duraid Adnan (NYT) report that the Iraqi government 
has declared Abu Ghraib a ‘hot zone’ and has moved 2400 prisoners 
from its infamous prison to other prisons in central and northern Iraq 
due to fears that it could be overrun by ISIS. It is not clear whether the 
closing of the prison is permanent. Fighting has persisted in Anbar 
province while the Iraqi security forces who have held off on a full-out 
assault have made minimal gains. Fighting has moved closer toward 
Abu Ghraib. 
The EP’s Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE) engages with 
a study on preventing and 
countering youth 
radicalisation in the EU. 
16/04/2014  Anne Barnard and Karam Shoumali (NYT) report that Jordanian 
warplanes fired at three vehicles trying to cross the border from Syria 
into Jordan after they ignored demands from security forces to stop. It 
is unknown who the vehicles belonged to. This was a rare incident as 
the Jordanians have sought to keep a low profile in the Syrian conflict 
despite it being an open secret that Amman accommodates an 
international operations room which provides military aid to rebels. 
Jordan has struggled with the influx of Syrian refugees and hundreds 
of Jordanians have crossed over to Syria to join radical Islamist groups. 
An activist in southern Syria told the NYT that the vehicles had 
belonged to a Syrian rebel group. He explained that the Jordanians 
have become increasingly sensitive about their border as ISIS tries to 




warning to the Nusra Front who have recently tried to attack the Nasib 
border crossing.  
17/04/2014   The EP calls, among others, 
“for the protection of all 
vulnerable communities [in 
Syria], inter alia by allowing 
humanitarian access and 
lifting all sieges of populated 
areas, including the Old City 
of Homs”. It “reiterates its 
call for the establishment of 
safe havens along the 
Turkish-Syrian border, and 
possibly within Syria, and for 
the creation of humanitarian 
corridors by the international 
community”. 
22/04/2014  Mustafa Aykol writes in NYT that although Turkey miscalculated the 
crisis in Syria and may have unwittingly contributed to the chaos, its 
intent was not malicious. Aykol describes Erdogan’s foreign policy as 
”idealism tainted by excessive emotion, ideology and delusions of 
grandeur”. He says that Turkey now fully recognises the threat posed 
by radical jihadists within the opposition. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – violence high ahead of election” 
(Document EIUCP00020140423ea4m0000x) 
EIU reports that violence in Iraq is at its highest level before an 
election since 2005. Most of the violence is concentrated in areas 
where ISIS is active. The group has threatened to target polling centres 
and voting card distribution points and has warned people not to vote. 
It is likely that there will be a low voter turn-out. 
Statement by the 
spokesperson of the EU 
HR/VP Catherine Ashton on 
the announcement of 
presidential elections in 
Syria: elections organised by 
the regime outside of the 
framework of the Geneva 
Communique of 2012 ignores 
the basics principles of 
democracy and undermines 
efforts for a political solution 
to the Syrian crisis. 
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23/04/2013  Anthony Dworkin (ECFR) writes that “a role for the International 
Criminal Court in Syria seems fitting given what has happened there, 
but it will not change the dynamics of the conflict”. The increasing 
European effort to refer Syria to the ICC for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity is a stark reminder of how few options the EU has to 
facilitate change in Syria or end the conflict. Dworkin explains that 
some Europeans believe that the referral would further impede any 
political solution to the conflict as President Assad would be less 
willing to leave office and expose himself to possible prosecution. 
Further, if the ICC fails to gain jurisdiction it would diminish the 
Court’s relevance. It is also unlikely that Security Council members 
China and Russia will support the resolution. However, as there is 
currently no solution to a political transition in sight, there is nothing to 
lose from an assertive effort for accountability for the atrocities taking 
place in Syria. 
 
24/04/2014  Alan Cowell (NYT) reports that British police are to work with 
charitable organisations to prevent British Muslims travelling to Syria 
amidst growing concern that these individuals will commit terrorist 
attacks upon returning home. 40 people have been arrested in the first 
3 months of 2014 on charges related to jihadist activities Syria in 
comparison to 25 for the whole of 2013. Approximately 400 Britons 
have joined Jihadi groups in Syria. Scotland Yard’s role in counter-
efforts has been criticised by some Muslim leaders who say it may 
dissuade Muslims to participate in these efforts.  
 
Somini Sengupta (NYT) reports that the Syrian government and rebel 
groups are continuing to block humanitarian aid to besieged towns in 
violation of the legally binding resolution passed by the Security 
Council on 22 February. The report singles out the regime forces, and 
two extremist groups, ISIS and the Nusra Front, as the prominent 
forces violating international humanitarian law. The Security Council 




is unlikely to support any punitive action, in allyship to the Syrian 
regime. 
25/04/2014  Tim Arango and Duraid Adnan (NYT) report that ISIS has claimed 
responsibility for the bombing of a political rally held by a Shia 
militant group, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, in Iraq. The incident highlights two 
concerning factors: “the merging of the civil war in Syria with Iraq’s 
own strengthened Sunni insurgency and the rising influence of Iran”. 
The group is campaigning for seats in parliament and was welcomed 
into Iraq’s political system by PM Nouri al-Maliki a few years ago. 
Asaib Ahl al-Haq is currently fighting in both Iraq and Syria, and is 
leading a recruitment effort for Syria, funded by Iran who also trains 
the fighters. The group has been previously involved in sectarian 
fighting in Iraq and its remobilisation has sparked fears of rising 
sectarian tensions within the country and has highlighted the weakness 
of Iraqi security forces. Asaib Ahl al-Haq presents itself as the 
protector of Iraq’s Shias. 
 
28/04/2014  ICG reports in detail about the situation in Fallujah since December 
2013 and argues that “the potential for miscalculation, or calculated 
escalation, is enormous”. It argues that ISIS’ rise is a symptom, not the 
cause, of poor governance in Iraq which is driving instability. 
According to ICG, ISIS’ initial claim in early January 2014 that it had 
seized control of Fallujah “was greatly exaggerated: while it raised its 
black flag above some administration buildings in the city centre, 
locals blocked most of their forays and forced them to retreat to the 
outskirts”. ICG claims that by mismanaging the crisis, the Iraqi 
government gave Fallujah residents little choice but to form an alliance 
of convenience with ISIS. The army’s siege of Fallujah allowed ISIS to 
renew its support base in Iraq: “with a high profile from the fighting in 
Syria and superior weaponry, they once again have become a magnet 
for the country’s disaffected”. ICG also suggests that by initially 




the crisis to escalate, Maliki rescued his chances in the 30 April 
parliamentary elections. 
 
Note that last previous ICG report on Iraq was on 14/08/2013, nothing 
was published in-between. 
 
Tim Arango and Duraid Adnan (NYT) report that the battle between 
ISIS and government forces rages on. ISIS controls much of Anbar and 
even held military parades in Fallujah in celebration. Experts fear that 
an ISIS-held territory stretching from Aleppo through Anbar province 
to Baghdad is likely. Sunni turnout in the election will most likely be 
limited as very few polling stations have been set up in Anbar and ISIS 
has threatened Sunnis not to vote, and Sunni candidates to step down. 
The NYT explains that the arming of Sunni tribes in the region by the 
U.S. may have exacerbated the situation, creating space for 
confrontations between tribes and weapons falling into the hands of 
ISIS. It is said that some of these tribes have sided with the extremists 
after witnessing their strength and in the face of a weakening of Iraqi 
security force. The NYT writes, “the greater fear, though, is that there 
is no way back this time, that the sectarian division of the nation will 
become entrenched as the government concentrates its forces on 
protecting its seat of power in Baghdad”. 
30/04/2014  In a detailed report, ICG analyses growing tensions between ISIS and 
Turkey. Regarding the situation along the Syrian-Turkish border, ICG 
claims that ISIS “gained control of two thirds of the (Syrian) border 
towns and gates” in early 2014. It reports that ISIS “has attacked 
Turkish NGO workers inside Syria and killed their Syrian employees”. 
Many of its kidnappings of foreign journalists have not been made 
public for security reasons, and Turkish intelligence negotiated the 
release of a Turkish journalist in early January. Further, ISIS “has 
gained ground to the east, including through attacks on the Syrian 




authorities have become much more sensitive to the transnational 
threat ISIS poses after tensions between ISIS and Turkey heated up in 
March 2013. ISIS fighters and Turkish soldiers engaged in border 
clashes in October 2013 and January 2014, and Turkish security forces 
were wounded in a raid on a suspected ISIS safehouse in Istanbul in 
late March 2014. 
 
Note that last previous ICG op-ed on Syria was on 19/11/2013, nothing 
was published in-between. 
 
Eric Schmitt (NYT) writes that a new report released by the U.S. State 
Department has found that there has been an increase in autonomous 
Al-Qaeda affiliates which are focusing on local and regional objectives 
and taking less direction from AQ’s central leadership, which has 
become decentralised. Tina S. Kaidanow, State Department 
counterterrorism coordinator, explains that this shift poses a new threat 
for U.S. interests, as they must not only understand the dynamics of the 
core AQ directives, but also of local contexts which may signal the 
direction of AQ affiliates. 
Apr 2014  ICG reports that rebel infighting continued in eastern Syria where ISIS 
launched an unsuccessful attack on the town of Abu Kamal near the 
Iraqi border on 14 April. On Iraq, ICG reports that ISIS tightened its 
grip on Fallujah and started providing basic services. In early April, 
ISIS pushed eastwards towards Baghdad and established a presence in 
Abu Ghraib city. ICG accuses the government of continuously using 
the Anbar crisis to marginalise Sunni opposition and gather domestic 
and international support. ISIS’ suicide bombings continued, among 
others at a Shia political rally in Baghdad on 25 April, killing 33. 
 
03/05/2014  HRW reports that ISIS has claimed responsibility for deadly attacks on 
a Shia election campaign rally and on polling centres in Iraq. On 
election day, suicide bombs were also launched in Tikrit and Kirkuk. 




crisis in Anbar and indiscriminately targeting civilians. It reports that 
ISIS remains in and around Fallujah and on the outskirts of Ramadi. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Alas, it may make little difference”  
(Document EIUCP00020140504ea530001z) 
EIU reports that parliamentary elections have gone ahead in Iraq and 
predicts that the al-Maliki’s coalition will win most of the votes but not 
enough to govern on its own. “A troubling new feature is the growth of 
Shia militias operating outside the official army command, but 
probably with the say-so of Mr Maliki, determined to take on the Sunni 
guerrillas, no matter if civilians in the way get killed. The tit-for-tat 
killings, which caused bloody mayhem in 2006-08, have returned with 
a vengeance.” 
05/05/2014   The EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator suggests new 
initiatives at the European 
level to address the threat of 
foreign fighters more 
effectively, namely the 
creation of a Syria Strategic 
Communications Advisory 
Team and of an EU web 
portal to list, publicise and 
coordinate humanitarian 
volunteering opportunities 
regarding Syria within the 
EU. 
 
Following the parliamentary 
elections in Iraq, the EU 
expresses its confidence that 
the vote counting will be 
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“leading to the swift 
formation of a truly 
representative government, 
able to address the many 
challenges facing Iraq”. 
07/05/2014  HRW reports that the Iraqi army has not yet entered Fallujah but on 6 
May, 3500 Iraqi soldiers and 750 pro-government militia began an 
offensive on surrounding towns. HRW reports that journalists are 
blocked from entering Anbar and that it is relying on Facebook 
messages by residents and hospital employees. 
 
15/05/2014  Anne Barnard (NYT) reports that a car bomb has killed at least 43 
people and injured dozens more in an apparent attack by ISIS on the 
Tawhid Brigade, part of the Islamic Front, on the Syrian side of the 
Bab al-Salam crossing bordering with Turkey. Clashes between ISIS 
and other insurgents have persisted in Syria. The Syrian Observatory 
for Human Rights has reported that the heavy infighting caused mass 
displacement, with 6000 people driven from their homes in the 
province of Deir ez-Zor where the insurgents have been clashing over 
oil resources. 
 
21/05/2014  In an opinion piece for the NYT Jonathan Stevenson argues that the 
U.S. must go beyond diplomacy on Syria and step up its covert 
military assistance to opposition rebels to secure U.S. interests. 
Stevenson explains that the rise of ISIS and its split from Al-Qaeda has 
primed it to seek closer relations with other affiliates such as Al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula. Any cooperation between the two groups 
would pose a threat to U.S. security given the power of both 
organisations. So far, the Yemen-based group has been constrained by 
U.S. forces in the country, yet an alliance with ISIS would provide 
them a new base in Syria and as such a prime opportunity to target the 
US. Stevenson recommends that “Washington could consider creating 
a trusted elite force of heavily vetted and trained opposition fighters 




capable moderate groups against radical jihadis and possibly form the 
core of a stabilization force in Syria”. This, he argues, will signal U.S. 
determination to counter jihadist extremism to Iran and Russia, while 
possibly enhancing diplomatic efforts and securing U.S. security at 
home. Further, “American overt assistance raises the price of military 
engagement for Iran and Hezbollah, making them more likely to come 
to the bargaining table”. 
24/05/2014 A French-born 
jihadist who spent 
over a year fighting 
for ISIS in Syria 
opens fire at the 
Jewish museum in 
Brussels, killing four 
people. [Relevance: 
This is the first ISIS-
inspired terrorist 
attack carried out in 
Europe by a returning 
foreign fighter. The 
attack highlights that 
ISIS is stepping up its 
external operations 
and that foreign 
fighters who return 
from Syria to Europe 
pose a concrete, 
rather than abstract, 
threat.] 
 The EU highlights that EUR 
9 million have been 
contributed through its 
Development Cooperation 
Instrument to support Syria’s 
public health system to cope 
with the large influx of Iraqi 
refugees. 
27/05/2014  Drawing on reports by Fallujah residents, HRW claims that “ISIS has 
planted improvised explosive devices along the main highway and 




Further, ISIS has reportedly taken over parts of Fallujah’s hospital. 
HRW also reports that ISIS claimed responsibility for nine car 
bombings in Shia areas of Baghdad which killed at least 34. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Key Developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140529ea5r0000k) 
EIU states that it is unclear whether the next Iraqi government will be 
able to reduce violence in the country which depends on increased 
levels of cooperation between political elites. 
28/05/2014  Ben Hubbard and Shreeya Sinha (NYT) report that President Obama 
has requested that Congress authorise up to $5 billion to aid countries 
“on the front lines” in the fight against terrorism in light of the rise of 
new jihadist groups in the MENA. The NYT outlines the areas and 
countries the foremost of these groups operate: Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Syria, North Africa, Nigeria, and Somalia. ISIS and the Nusra Front 
are identified as the two main extremist groups in Syria, which has 
become “the world’s largest magnet for international jihadists”. The 
growing influence of the various affiliates across these regions, who 
finance themselves through activities such as kidnapping-for-ransom, 
are posing a new kind of challenge for U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  
 
David D. Kirkpatrick and Eric Schmitt (NYT) discuss the growing 
threat to the U.S. from decentralised Al-Qaeda affiliates in the MENA. 
“More than 5,000 independent Islamist militias have sprung up over 
the last four years in Syria alone.” As these groups are chiefly focused 
on local objectives, the question of how to counter them is a complex 
one. Most of these groups do not have a concrete objective on global 
jihad and U.S. policy could unwittingly encourage such notions. For 
instance, Ahrar al-Sham has expressly conveyed its focus on ousting 
President Bashar al-Assad and establishing an Islamic government, 
rather than concentrating its efforts on global jihad. Washington’s 
backing of Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki has fuelled sectarian-based 
EU Commissioner Kristina 
Georgieva says that a silent 
war rages on in Syria: 
“200.000 Syrians have died 
due to a lack of access to 
healthcare” (…) “which is in 
fact more than the estimated 
162,000 people who have 
died as a direct result of 
warfare”. (…) “All parties to 
the conflict must allow 
unhindered access for 
principled humanitarian aid, 
including medical assistance, 
to reach the most vulnerable 
people in all areas of the 
country, including hard-to-
reach and besieged areas, by 
all possible channels 




conspiracies of U.S. support for Shias in the region. Yemen based Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has stood out among other affiliates 
for its express ambition to target US mainland.  
 
Daniel Levy (ECFR) writes that the Ukraine crisis has “been received 
in the Middle East with a collective ‘I told you so’”. The tensions in 
Ukraine will have the most ramifications in the region for Syria. The 
West may demonstrate its hard power in a stand against Russia through 
an expansion of its military activities within Syria, although Levy 
states that Western military operations have not been changed by 
events in the Donbas region or the Black Sea so far. Most likely, a 
protracted stand-off between Russia and the West may provide an 
opportunity for various players in the region to exploit this tactical 
advantage, however, most significantly, it adds an undesirable layer of 
uncertainty and instability to a region already on the brink of 
combusting. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Country Outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020140529ea5s00037) 
“As things stand, the results make Mr Maliki favourite to secure a third 
term as prime minister, but a broad coalition of Shia, Sunni and 
Kurdish opponents could also reach a majority. As a result, the process 
of coalition-building may be protracted.” 
29/05/2014  Drawing on conversations with two Western foreign fighters in Syria, 
Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura (NYT) explains some of the motivations 
and outlooks of Westerners fighting in Syria. Both men expressed their 
disgust at the West’s failure to stop killings in Syria, and their desire 
for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Syria. One said he 
planned to die in Syria while the other suggested that Western 
governments were right to be concerned about the return of foreign 
fighters and to expect a response to their attacks in the Middle East. 
Both jihadists were contacted via social media and messaging 
The Council decides to 
extend its economic sanctions 
on Syria until 1 June 2015. 
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applications. It is thought that British and French fighters make up 
most Western fighters in Syria. Analysts say that some who do not 
travel to Syria for jihad but for purely humanitarian purposes end up 
being radicalised. 
May 2014  ICG reports that ISIS gained ground in eastern Syria (Deir ez-Zor 
province) throughout the month of May. It also reports that deadly 
bombings across Iraq continued which killed at least 172. According to 
ICG, the Iraqi army escalated the fight against ISIS and local militia in 
and around Fallujah by using indiscriminate force (barrel bombs). ISIS 
reportedly clashed not only with previously allied local militia in 
Fallujah, after being accused of kidnapping, beating and disarming 
local fighters, but also with other local groups in eastern Anbar over 
the sale of gas and other commodities. 
 
01/06/2014  Scott Sayare (NYT) reports that French authorities have arrested a 
returning fighter from Syria for the killings carried out at the Jewish 
Museum in Brussels. The suspect is 29-year-old Frenchman Mehdi 
Nemmouche who has an extensive criminal history and whom prison 
officials had flagged as a radicalised Islamist to authorities 3 weeks 
before he left for Syria. It is believed that Nemmouche is linked to ISIS 
although it is unknown whether the group helped him with the attack 
or if it was carried out through his own volition. Nemmouche was 
carrying an assault rifle and revolver, along with a GoPro with a piece 
of white fabric with the insignia of ISIS. It is said that the jihadist was 
radicalised during his time in prison and his arrest has raised questions 
about the effectiveness of authorities in tracking potential suspects 
travelling to and from Syria. It is thought that at least 3000 Europeans 
have fought or are fighting in Syria, more than 700 of them being 
French.  
 
EIU “Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa economy: EIU’s latest 




EIU reports that the war in Syria shows no signs of abating and that 
Assad’s government is growing more confident about its chances of 
survival as highlighted by Assad’s announcement that he will run for 
president in the June election which EIU believes he will win. “The 
war in Syria is leading to an increase in regional sectarian violence, 
including in Iraq and Lebanon”. 
04/06/2014 ISIS begins its 
advance on Mosul as 
part of its northern 
Iraq offensive, and 
also launches parallel 
attacks on Samarra 
(125 km north of 
Baghdad) and Tikrit 





and the weakness of 
the Iraqi security 
forces.] 
Melissa Eddy (NYT) reports that two Lebanese brothers and a German 
man have been arrested in Germany on charges of being involved in a 
radical Islamic group fighting in Syria. One of the brothers is a 
returning foreign fighter who had joined ISIS– he was arrested on his 
way to return to Syria with military equipment, medicine and money. It 
is believed that around 300 Germans are fighting in Syria, and that the 
dozen who have returned pose a terrorist threat. Officials say the 
radicalised fighters have the skills to build bombs and orchestrate 
attacks, although there is no indication of any concrete plans. 
EEAS statement on the 
presidential elections in 
Syria: “The election on 3 
June cannot be considered as 
a genuinely democratic vote. 
(…) We call on the regime to 
re-engage in genuine political 
negotiations that will produce 
conditions allowing for a real 
expression of the will of the 
Syrian people." 
05/06/2014  Amnesty International reports about a raid on a northern Syrian village 
on 29 May in which 15 civilians, including 7 children, were summarily 
executed. The executions, likely carried out by ISIS, happened after 
nearby clashes between ISIS and YPG forces had escalated. Amnesty 
International fears that “these civilians were killed as retribution for 
their perceived support of the YPG, either directly or indirectly 
through their Yazidi Kurdish landowners, or because they were 
mistaken for Yazidi Kurds”. It further reports: “The fighting between 
ISIS and YPG is believed to have been sparked by a disagreement over 




which is under YPG control. On the same day as the summary killings 
took place, crops belonging to Yazidi Kurds in al-Tleiliye and its 
vicinity were set on fire”. 
 
Kareem Fahim (NYT) writes that hundreds of ISIS militants stormed 
the Iraqi city of Samarra in an attempt to take control of the city. The 
Iraqi army and special forces launched a counteroffensive and 
managed to take back most neighbourhoods although ISIS retained 
partial control over at least two neighbourhoods. “The attack also 
raised the specter of deadly sectarian incitement, as the heavily armed 
militants took up positions within a mile of a hallowed Shia shrine in 
the city that has served as a focal point for strife in the past”. The loss 
of Samarra would have been a ruinous blow to the Iraqi government 
after failing to route the militants in Fallujah and Ramadi.  
07/06/2014  Kareem Fahim (NYT) reports that ISIS attacked a university in 
Ramadi on the third day of intensifying violence in Iraq. This was part 
of a series of lightning attacks in major cities across the country. 
Although government forces have been able to recover most of the 
territory seized by ISIS during these three days, “the scope of the 
attacks appears to have taken officials by surprise, while also 
signalling that the insurgency is gaining strength and expanding its 
reach”. In a sign of exasperated efforts of the Iraqi government in the 
standoff in Fallujah, the army has backtracked on its pledge not to 
harm civilians and has started to indiscriminately shell the city. The 
surge in violence has significantly raised the death toll in Iraq. 
 
09/06/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – ISIS asserts itself beyond Fallujah” 
(Document EIUCP00020140610ea690000l) 
EIU reports that ISIS has stepped up its operations and is attempting to 
extend its territorial control inside and outside of Anbar province. 
Taking advantage of the post-election power vacuum in Iraq, ISIS has 




Anbar. They have also killed the leader of a pro-government Sunni 
militia. 
11/06/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: ISIS takes Mosul”  
(Document EIUCP00020140612ea6b0001x) 
EIU reports that ISIS took control of Mosul on 10 June and is 
advancing towards Baghdad. They believe that ISIS’ offensive on 
Mosul was a result of both long-term planning and opportunism whilst 
the Iraqi government was preoccupied with post-election negotiations 
and exposing the state’s weaknesses. EIU states that this is a potential 
turning point in Iraq and that the response of Iraq’s divided forces will 
determine whether ISIS will be able to continue expanding its 
operations. “ISIS appears to have launched offensives in many of the 
intervening cities such as Baiji and Tikrit and may launch another 
attempt on Samarra.” 
Joint statement following the 
third ministerial meeting of 
the EU and the League of 
Arab States (LAS) on the 
security situation in Iraq: both 
organisations call on the Iraqi 
government and regional 
government in Kurdistan to 
cooperate to restore security 
in Mosul and the broader 
Nineveh province. In a 
declaration, ministers call for 
a ceasefire in Syria and stress 
the urgent need for a political 
process to end the crisis. 
They urge the international 
community to better assist 
countries hosting Syrian 
refugees. 
12/06/2014  As ISIS makes significant territorial gains, HRW reports that the group 
has been carrying out systematic abuses on civilians and fears that they 
will do the same in the newly-controlled territories. Further, HRW 
documents abuses by Iraqi government forces, including targeting 
civilian objects and torture, in their fight against ISIS and anti-
government groups. 
 
Amnesty International reports that thousands of Syrian civilians are 
living under sieges imposed by security forces loyal to Assad and other 
non-state armed groups which amount to war crimes. “Amnesty 
International received reports from several sources in Yarmouk that the 
Commissioner Kristalina 
Georgieva states that a new 
humanitarian crisis is 
underway in Iraq. “The roots 
of this latest crisis are 
complex and include the 
alienation of the beleaguered 
Sunni Arab population, a 
state of generalized violence, 
opportunistic armed 
opposition groups and a spill 
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armed groups were at times blocking access to areas where 
distributions were carried out. The armed groups also threatened other 
residents with violence.” 
over effect from the terrible 
war raging in Syria”. 
13/06/2014  HRW comments that ISIS is operating as a ‘shadow state’ in Mosul 
and is collecting ‘jihad tax’ from businesses. The Iraqi security forces 
are both corrupt and incapable of confronting ISIS, and civilians do not 
trust them. Sunni tribal militias are currently fighting alongside ISIS as 
their hatred of PM Maliki is greater than their disdain for the jihadist 
group. Without meaningful governmental reform, the threat of ISIS 
will not be quelled. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – ISIS advances towards Baghdad” 
(Document EIUCP00020140614ea6d0000r) 
EIU reports that ISIS and allied forces are advancing on Baghdad. Iraqi 
forces are reportedly abandoning their position in the face of ISIS. 
Further, ISIS has taken over Baiji which holds Iraq’s largest oil 
refinery. “Currently ISIS and Naqshbandi forces are advancing down 
towards Taiji, while other ISIS units are mobilising in southern and 
western Baghdad.” 
 
14/06/2014  HRW reports that ISIS executed 15 civilians in northern Syrian on 29 
May 2014. “Residents and local Kurdish officials gave two possible 
motives for the attack. One was that ISIS took revenge on the villagers 
because it suspected them of supporting the YPG. The other was that 
ISIS thought the village was inhabited by Yazidis, a small 
predominately Kurdish sect that many Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq 
perceive to be infidels.” 
 
16/06/2014  A team of ECFR experts discusses the ten global consequences of the 
Ukraine Crisis. The authors assert that to reduce dependence on Russia 
for energy resources, Europeans will inevitably turn their attention to 
the Middle East. They highlight the new pipeline options via Turkey 
which may be a promising opportunity for oil from the Kurdish (and 





EIU “Iraq Politics: ISIS pushes on but resistance has increased” 
(Document EIUCP00020140617ea6g0001o) 
EIU reports that ISIS has continued to gain territory over the weekend, 
including the key city of Tel Afar on 15 June which is in a strategic 
position between Iraq and Syria. Tel Afar has a large Turkoman 
population who are likely to be in extreme danger as Shia Muslims. 
“The flashpoint between Kurds and ISIS could well be the Sinjar 
region, between Tel Afar and the Syrian border (the main city on the 
Syrian side is Al Hasakah, where ISIS is active). Sinjar is mainly 
inhabited by Yazidis, a Kurdish speaking non-Muslim minority, and 
Peshmerga forces are projecting into this area.” EIU reports that the 
Iraqi army has disintegrated and Shia militias are rapidly mobilising, 
some even returning from fighting in Syria, to confront ISIS in Iraq. 
The Iraqi government is yet to present a united front in the face of 
ISIS.  
17/06/2014  ECFR writes that Bashar al-Assad’s so-called victory in the Syrian 
presidential election in June emphasises his staunch hold on power. 
Although not though democratic means, Assad aimed to gain 
legitimacy through these elections which further enhances his 
domination in Syria. Coupled with the recent seizure of Mosul by ISIS, 
it is argued that Assad will use an anti-terrorist narrative to depict his 
opposition to terrorists and stoke fears of a jihadist takeover in Syria to 
boost domestic support. Assad’s re-election will hinder efforts for a 
credible transition government and consequently the civil war will not 
end any time soon. It is likely that violence in Syria and regional 
confrontation will intensify. 
 
19/06/2014  HRW highlights the abuses in PYD-run enclaves in Syria. It provides 
detailed background on the Kurdish role in the Syria civil war and the 
abuses and attacks that they have faced from ISIS. 
Following the displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of 
people as a result of ISIS’ 
expansion in Iraq, the EU 
increases its humanitarian 
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assistant to Iraq by EUR 5 
million. 
20/06/2014  ICG outlines that the surge of jihadi activity in Iraq is an outcome of 
deteriorating and poor governance coupled with increasing 
sectarianism in the country. These two factors must be addressed to 
avoid further advancements by ISIS, and the U.S. and Iran must focus 
on encouraging this rather than rushing into military intervention. PM 
Maliki’s hardline policies targeting Sunnis has resulted in increased 
polarisation. The government has been weakened by its continued 
marginalisation of Sunnis, whose grievances have been suppressed. 
The ICG states that they have consistently warned that this trend would 
result in a worsening of the crisis, and the fall of Mosul and western 
Iraq into ISIS’ hands has been a direct result of this trend. The ICG 
advises that there should not be a kneejerk response to this surge of 
jihadi activity as they believe that ISIS is not as close to seizing 
Baghdad as it is being reported. The group do not have a long-term 
plan past establishing an Islamic State and this is their major downfall. 
Yet, it is clear that ISIS’ successes in Iraq and Syria have a direct 
impact on each other. Baghdad’s policies have facilitated and 
empowered ISIS in Syria where they have gained oil and arms which 
in turn has allowed them to gain ground in Anbar. The ICG 
recommends that the U.S. and Iran desist from the constant 
reinforcement of PM Maliki and engage in meaningful restructuring of 
the currently malfunctioning government. Furthermore, PM Maliki 
must reconfigure the armed forces instead of relying on Shia militias 
which further exacerbate the sectarian tensions within the country. 
 
HRW comments that Iraq is on the brink of civil war as PM Maliki has 
enlisted the help of Shia militias, known for their human rights abuses, 
in the fight against ISIS. This will further deepen sectarian tensions 
within the country. To confront a threat like ISIS, “no counter-




political approach that bridges the sectarian divide. The government 
needs to convince moderate Sunnis that they have a place in the future 
Iraq.” 
21/06/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: A Winning Hand” (Document 
EIUCP00020140624ea6l0000k) 
EIU reports that senior Kurdish individuals in Erbil contacted their 
counterparts in Baghdad to warn them of ISIS’ advancements two days 
before the capture of Mosul, but to no effect. Since ISIS’ move toward 
the south there has been little to no communication between Erbil and 
Baghdad. 
 
22/06/2014 ISIS captures two key 
border crossings to 
Syria and Jordan in 
Iraq’s Anbar 
province. It also 
seized Qaim border 
crossing to Syria and 
four strategically 
located towns in 
Anbar over the 
previous two days. 
[Relevance: the 
events suggested that 
Iraq had lost control 
of its border with 
Syria, might be losing 
control of its border 
with Jordan, and that 
ISIS was occupying 
most of Anbar.] 
HRW reports that ISIS is recruiting children in Syria through the offer 
of free schooling, which includes weapons training. Some children are 
joining as they are following their relatives or friends whilst others join 
out of not having any other schooling options due to living in a battle 
zone. 
 
23/06/2014  EIU “Iraq: Key Developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140624ea6n0001b) 
EEAS statement on the 
removal of chemical weapons 
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EIU believes that it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to capture 
Baghdad and that the south of Iraq will remain relatively secure. 
However, ISIS’ further advancements through Iraq pose a significant 
challenge to the future political and territorial integrity of Iraq. 
 
EIU “USA Politics: Quick View – Iraq requests US assistance against 
Sunni militia” (Document EIUCP00020140624ea6n0001s) 
The U.S. will deploy 300 military advisors to Iraq to aid the army in 
executing a counter-offensive against ISIS. “The U.S. would like to 
bolster the government in Baghdad (albeit one divested of Mr Maliki) 
and weaken ISIS without strengthening the regime of Bashar al-Assad 
in Syria. But delivering on these ambitions will be extremely difficult.” 
 
from Syria: “Today's 
development marks the 
fulfillment of the main goal 
of this operation: the removal 
of the entire chemical 
weapons stockpile from 
Syria, so that the risk of 
having them used again is 
eliminated.” 
 
Remarks by EU HR/VP 
Catherine Ashton following 
the FAC meeting: The 
situation in Iraq is not only a 
major security crisis, but also 
a serious humanitarian 
disaster. EU ministers remain 
committed to Iraq’s 
sovereignty and unity and 
will continue to support the 
government’s efforts against 
terrorism as this is essential 
for the security of the whole 
region. 
 
Press release on main results 
of FAC meeting. The Council 
supports its Member States in 
the prevention of kidnapping 
for ransom by terrorist 
groups, and efforts to secure 
the safe release of hostages 
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without payment. “It calls on 
the Iraqi government to make 
every effort to protect all 
civilians, ensure a response to 
the needs of the affected 
populations, provide essential 
services and facilitate the safe 
and unhindered passage for 
civilians fleeing the violence 
and safe access for 
humanitarian actors to all 
affected populations. The EU 
acknowledges the burden 
placed on the Kurdistan 
region and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government, which 
are hosting a large number of 
IDPs, and trusts that it will 
continue to respond to IDP 
needs. (…) It reiterates its 
support to the Iraqi 
authorities in the fight against 
terrorism and emphasises that 
the security response needs to 
be combined with a 
sustainable political solution 
by the Government of Iraq 
involving all Iraqi leaders and 
communities in a spirit of 
national unity, putting their 
differences aside to jointly 
combat this threat and to 
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restore security and the rule 
of law.” 
 
The EU strengthens its 
sanctions against the Syrian 
regime. 12 ministers of the 
Syrian government are now 
added to the list of those 
sanctioned. 
24/06/2014  Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy (ECFR) warn that ISIS’ 
continuous seizure of territory through Syria and Iraq “poses a grave 
threat to regional and international security” and “could thrust Iraq – 
and the wider region – into an unprecedented sectarian civil war”. 
They recommend a carefully measured response from the EU which 
does not solely focus on counterterrorism (CT). A purely CT approach 
would legitimise PM Maliki’s military approach and diminish the 
prospect of necessary political reforms, further exacerbating sectarian 
tensions at a time where a political deal is desperately needed. The 
international community should encourage the formation of a more 
inclusive system of governance which allocates meaningful authority 
to Sunnis to allow for the alleviation of entrenched polarisation and 
distrust. Finally, international actors should encourage regional players 
such as Iran and Gulf states to encourage domestic groups to work 
together. The authors explain that regional support of a deal in Syria is 
possible considering the current crisis in Iraq. 
 
HRW comments that residents of Iraq’s northern al-Hamdaniyah 
district are fearful that ISIS’ standoff with Peshmerga forces will not 
last and that they will be its next target. The district is a religiously 
diverse one and there are fears that minorities will be abducted or 





EIU “Iraq: Country Outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020140625ea6o0003v) 
EIU reports that ISIS’ continued advances in Iraq pose a fundamental 
challenge to the territorial integrity of Iraq. Shia militias and volunteers 
have joined the Iraqi army in their counter-offensive against ISIS, and 
the U.S. and Iran are to provide additional support. 
 
EIU “Iraq Economy: The impact on the oil sector of ISIS’ advances” 
(Document EIUCP00020140625ea6o0005g) 
EIU reports that ISIS has control over a couple of small oil-producing 
fields north of Tikrit which they may use as for financing purposes. 
ISIS has a significant impact on the oil sector infrastructure. They are 
reportedly now in control of the oil refinery complex in Baiji city. But 
the refinery is likely to be damaged and ISIS will need to transport 
crude from other fields which may lead to fuel shortages and price 
rises across northern Iraq. 
25/06/2014  HRW argues that Iraq’s security forces are overstretched and 
crumbling, justifying the government’s co-peration with brutal Shia 
militias in the fight against ISIS. Sunni Baathist groups have joined 
ISIS in the battle in Iraq. These deep sectarian divides were ignited by 
PM Maliki’s discriminatory policies which alienated potential Sunni 
allies, and now ISIS fighters backed by Sunni militias “are gleefully 
finishing off the job that Maliki started: destroying the state”. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – ISIS consolidates its position in 
Anbar” (Document EIUCP00020140626ea6p00024) 
The disintegration of the Iraqi army in parts of Anbar has enabled ISIS 
to consolidate its control in the province. “Tribal militias are 
particularly strong in Anbar province and will be key to the battle for 
control. The alliances are prone to shift, as happened in 2008 when 




Many have shifted their position again (now backing ISIS) because of 
disillusionment with the government and ISIS’ renewed momentum.” 
26/06/2014  HRW has identified 3 execution sites used by ISIS, 2 of which they 
have located. They believe that ISIS transports its prisoners by truck to 
the sites. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Kurdish Calculations”  
(Document EIUCP00020140627ea6q0000t) 
EIU writes that the advance of ISIS through Iraq presents the KRG 
with an opening to strengthen its bargaining power over long-running 
disputes over territory, oil exports and budget transfers with the Iraqi 
central government. The Peshmerga have filled the vacuum left by the 
collapsing Iraqi army, consequently allowing them to secure long-
disputed territories that Kurds have argued should be a part of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. EIU identifies Suleiman Beg and the Rabia border crossing 
with Syria as potential flashpoints for a Peshmerga-ISIS battle. 
Although, the Peshmerga currently offer the most credible military 
force in Iraq fighting against ISIS, EIU explains that unless the KRG 
addresses the concerns of the non-Kurdish populations it is protecting, 
there is a risk of insurgency. 
 
EIU “Iraq/Syria Politics: Quick View – Assad aircraft hit ISIS targets 
in Iraq” (Document EIUCP00020140627ea6q00009) 
EIU reports that Bashar al-Assad carried our airstrikes against ISIS 
targets within Iraq which Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki says he was not 
consulted on but welcomed this nonetheless. EIU reports that a picture 
published by ISIS of one of its commanders shaking hands with the 
Egyptian leader of Jabhat al-Nusra indicates a possible merger between 
the two rivals which will have significant implications for the balance 
of power in Syria and will facilitate ISIS in advancing through areas 




27/06/2014 ISIS announces the 
establishment of a 
caliphate, which 
would span from 
Aleppo in northern 
Syria to Diyala 
province in eastern 
Iraq. It proclaims its 
leader, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, as caliph. It 
renames itself 
“Islamic State” and 
claims that all Jihadi 
groups worldwide 
should accepts its 
supreme authority. 
ISIS calls on all able 
Muslims worldwide 
to emigrate to the 
caliphate. 
[Relevance: The 
move, motivated by 
ISIS’ military 
victories, challenged 
the legitimacy of al-
Qaeda. It enhanced 
ISIS’ appeal among 
radicalised Muslims 
globally, including 
huge numbers of 
converts to Islam.] 
Mark Leonard (ECFR) writes that the geopolitical struggle between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia sets the current dynamics of the region. Leonard 
says that “the United States is no longer the main definer of order but 
rather a resource that Iran and Saudi can use in their struggle against 
one another”. The rise of ISIS and the decline of US influence in Iraq 
may bring the two powers to act in concert against a common enemy. 
Such bilateral cooperation would be necessary to stop the violence. 
Drawing on conversations with analysts, Leonard explains that Tehran 
may be open to such cooperation, however, he believes that such a 
bargain between the two powers is some way off. “The potential 
rewards still outweigh the risks of the struggle, particularly for Saudi 
Arabia, which sees the conflicts as a means of reversing Iranian 
hegemony in Syria and Iraq”. 
 
Julien Barnes-Dacey (ECFR) comments that there is a growing 
symbiosis between the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. While ISIS is 
viewed as the key unifying force behind the two conflicts, a regional 
cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is also exacerbating the issue. 
“Syria is ground zero for this struggle but Iraq is in many ways seen as 
more important”. Sectarian tensions have been utilised as a means of 
mobilisation to exert influence in the two conflict zones by Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. The threat of ISIS has been used by both Damascus and 
Baghdad to divert attention from domestic grievances and their 
military cooperation is likely to increase. However, although key 
actors view Syria and Iraq as one battlefield, domestic actors are 
motivated by country specific grievances and they are the shaping 
force of the events in each nation. Although both conflicts originate 
from grievances regarding political and sectarian representation which 
have manifested similar results of armed conflict and the rise of ISIS, 
they are directed by differing political economies. One further 
difference is that a majority population is in battle against a minority-




discontent of a minority Sunni population against a majority Shia rule. 
Meaningful progress rests on local grievances being addressed through 
domestic deals. Barnes-Dacey asserts that it is likely that Assad and 
Maliki will use the threat of ISIS to garner greater support of their 
military operations by external backers, which “will only further fuel 
the fragmenting rather than unifying dynamics of the two conflicts”. 
 
EUISS underlines that the knock-on effects of terrorism in the Arab 
world are being felt across the Mediterranean. While recognising the 
“shared interest in ensuring that terrorism and violent radicalisation be 
eliminated from the region”, the EU has consistently stressed that the 
fight against terrorism must not come at the expense of civil liberties 
and human rights.  
 
HRW reports that ISIS is continuing its targeting of Shias and 
minorities in Iraq following its capture of Mosul. Residents of villages 
north of Mosul have explained that ISIS fighters announced over 
speakers that Shias must leave and then separated Shias from Sunnis. 
Shias were taken and the residents believe that they have most likely 
been killed. 
30/06/2014  HRW reports that ISIS abducted 153 children who are predominantly 
Kurdish and are forcing lessons in Sharia and jihadist ideology on 
them. HRW suggests that this may be a recruiting tactic. 
 
June 2014  ICG reports that ISIS has made significant territorial gains over the 
month of June in north western Iraq, including Mosul and Tikrit, and 
has declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in these areas. 
PM Maliki’s allies and hundreds of thousands of civilians have fled the 
region, whilst others have celebrated these gains as ‘liberation’ from 
central government control. Meanwhile, Kurdish forces have gained 
control of Kirkuk. Maliki has stated that he has been granted 
‘unlimited powers’ by the cabinet to combat jihadi militants and retake 




there are reports that the government has lost control over key border 
crossings with Syria and Jordan. The U.S. has deployed drones and 
plans to send 300 military advisors, and Iran has sent 2000 troops to 
assist the Iraqi government. 
On Syria, ICG reports that President Assad’s orchestrated re-election 
on 3 June demonstrates his steady consolidation of control of 
Damascus, Homs and in between, and that regime forces have regained 
control of Kasab, a town bordering Turkey. However, there are clear 
limitations as the return of pro-regime Shia foreign fighters to Iraq can 
deplete pro-regime forces. The ICG states that northern rebels have 
reported a modest increase in military support from foreign backers, 
yet observers are concerned about the stability of such inter-state 
cooperation. The death toll has continued to increase as the fighting 
between ISIS and other rebels persist in Deir ez-Zor, and ISIS has 
gained control over the city’s key entrance most of its western 
countryside. The regime struck several ISIS targets, including their 
headquarters in Raqqa, killing 50 people. The ICG reports that anti-
ISIS militants, including Jabhat al-Nusra, has set aside their ideological 
differences and formed a local alliance to cooperate in their battle 
against ISIS.  
01/07/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – Parliament fails to appoint speaker” 
(Document EIUCP00020140702ea7100034) 
EIU reports that the Iraqi parliament failed to reach an agreement on a 
speaker after meeting for the first time on 1 July, despite the fact that 
Iraq faces a significant crisis in the face of the advancements of ISIS 
and the threat of Kurdish secession.  
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – KRG President threatens 
referendum” (Document EIUCP00020140702ea7100035) 
EIU reports that the president of the KRG, Masoud Barzani, has made 
a statement to the BBC in which he claims independence as the right of 




effectively already partitioned the country. EIU explains that the 
advancements of ISIS have allowed the KRG to take control of most of 
the disputed territories in Iraq and that in the event of a referendum, the 
results would almost certainly rule in favour of independence. 
02/07/2014  ICG’s Peter Harling details that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
has made limitless use out of his ‘war on terror’ policy to isolate 
Sunnis and weaken the state to an unfathomable extent. By labelling 
Sunni opposition as ‘terrorists’ and responding to their demonstrations 
with a hardline approach, Maliki has created a sectarian, corrupt and 
ineffective security apparatus. Harling states that the support of the 
U.S. and Iran has enabled Maliki doing so, despite clear signs of an 
impending threat as armed Sunni groups and Shia militia started to 
revive. Yet, the key issue of the crisis is “how power is exercised in 
Iraq, and the nature of its institutions” as this is what enables Maliki to 
proceed as he does. Harling explains that the more Maliki fails at 
ending the crisis and sectarianism increases, the more he consolidates 
his position. Harling argues that it was Maliki’s own actions which 
have helped create the space for jihadist forces to surge. 
 
Andrew Hammond (ECFR) explains what the establishment of a 
caliphate means in practice. Hammond states that ISIS leader, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi’s announcement as the state’s ‘caliph’ signals that 
ISIS is using the Ottoman caliphate as a reference point. It is highly 
unlikely, as with previous caliphates, that any Muslims outside of its 
territories will pledge allegiance to the new Islamic State. Its 
establishment will have the most implication for Iraq in which it has 
established a base for its operations. Consequently, Gulf states have 
little to worry about, especially as ISIS commentary has not indicated 
any of these states are a potential target. Hammond asserts that ISIS is 
the product of a specific sectarian moment in the politics of the Middle 
East, with particular focus on Shiism and Western neo-imperialism. 




structures of Iraq and Syria, it does not indicate the fall of these 
countries to a “new era of Islamic empire”. 
05/07/2014  EIU “MENA Politics: Tethered by history”  
(Document EIUCP00020140706ea7500013) 
EIU writes on the interconnected fate of Arab countries and the failures 
of the Arab Spring. It explains that the civil wars within the region 
have empowered jihadist groups such as ISIS, which highlights the 
dire circumstances which Arab politics have reached. EIU discusses 
different arguments for why such a condition has come about in Arab 
politics. It highlights that “Islamists exploit class resentment to expand 
their base; governments stoke sectarian strife to justify their security 
apparatus”, which is most obvious in the cases of Syria and Iraq.  
 
08/07/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – Iraqi forces make slow progress in 
retaking Tikrit” (Document EIUCP00020140709ea7800058) 
EIU reports that the Iraqi security forces launched a counteroffensive 
against ISIS on 26 June to retake lost territory. However, although they 
hold much larger manpower than ISIS they performed poorly. Iraqi 
security forces focused their attention on Shia heartlands, Samarra and 
Baghdad, rather than Sunni-inhabited territories.  
 
09/07/2014  Myriam Benraad (ECFR) writes that ISIS is “the world’s wealthiest 
terrorist group” with funds of millions of dollars making its defeat 
dependent on sufficient socioeconomic reforms by the next Iraqi 
government. Benraad explains that the jihadists have cultivated a 
comprehensive war economy that is central to their strategy. They have 
been acquiring resources in Iraq and more recently in Syria since the 
U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003. Alongside the exploitation of oil 
resources and raw material, the group has employed tactics such as 
looting banks, selling electric power, trafficking antiquities, and taxing 
local businesses in order to become self-sufficient. They are reported to 
have the highest paid members. For this reason, the capture of 




subsistence. It is said that each oil and gas field that the Islamic State 
has control over provides it with millions of dollars. 
 
HRW reports that Iraqi PM Maliki’s new media restrictions as part of 
his ‘war on terror’ policy go beyond the confines of international law 
and give precedence to pro-government journalism. These new media 
laws “will hinder efforts to resolve Iraq’s dire political, economic and 
security crisis. Balanced reporting and open debate, rather than 
enforced cheerleading, are much more likely to help the country step 
back from the brink.” 
10/07/2014  ICG’s Joost Hiltermann writes that the advance of ISIS through Iraq 
has provided Iraqi Kurds an opportunity to take control of areas in 
northern Iraq, namely Kirkuk, which they have long claimed as their 
own. He explains that Kirkuk holds a fundamental economic value due 
to its vital location as it lies on top of one of Iraq’s largest oil fields. 
Until recently, these oil revenues have been reaped predominantly by 
Baghdad. The completion of a new pipeline between Iraqi Kurdistan 
and Turkey has now provided the Kurds with an opportunity to ship 
Kurdish oil to Turkey without having to gain permission from Baghdad 
first. Hiltermann details that if the Kurds are able to establish buyers 
for their oil whilst the Iraqi government continues to malfunction under 
the strain of the sectarian war, it will be a significant step towards 
Kurdish independence – which would include Kirkuk. Yet, there are 
some obstacles, namely resistance from the U.S. and Turkey. 
Hiltermann draws attention to the fact that ISIS is “virtually at the city 
gates” of Kirkuk and although they are currently focused on the Shias, 
this could change in any given moment and cooperation through an 
inclusive national pact between the Kurds and Baghdad is as urgent as 
ever, otherwise the conflict may be endless. 
 
11/07/2014  HRW reports that Iraqi security forces have executed at least 255 
Sunni prisoners since 9 June 2014 in what appears to be revenge 




countries engaged in Iraq should halt military assistance to the Maliki 
government and that an international inquiry into violations of human 
rights and laws of war must take place. 
 
EIU “Iraq/Kuwait Politics: A growing threat: the Islamic State and 
Kuwait” (Document EIUCP00020140712ea7b00020) 
EIU reports that Kuwait has deployed troops to the Iraqi border, falling 
short of direct military intervention, as it faces both an internal and 
external threat from ISIS. EIU explains that a weak and unstable Iraq 
poses a risk of spillover into Kuwait. Furthermore, the civil war in 
Syria has resulted in Kuwait becoming a hub for fundraising for Syrian 
opposition forces which has created an increasing strain on sectarian 
sentiments within Kuwait. 
12/07/2014  EIU “Iraq/Syria Politics: Caliphornia dreamin’” (Document 
EIUCP00020140715ea7c00019) 
EIU explains that ISIS has employed “a mix of ruthlessness, astute 
publicity and clever tactics” to exceed expectations. Their 
advancements in Iraq and Syria have followed a pattern of recruitment 
of allied tribal groups and local militias whom they court with money 
and weapons and later assassinate once they have served their purpose. 
Those who refuse to pledge allegiance to ISIS face the same fate. EIU 
reports that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the self-declared leader of the 
Islamic caliphate, faces significant hurdles as surveys conducted in 
Syria and public announcements made by leading Sunni clerics show 
that there is little support of the caliphate or recognition of its 
legitimacy. 
 
14/07/2014  Amnesty reports about a significant increase in sectarian tension since 
ISIS took control of Mosul. ISIS’ choice of targets for its killing and 
abductions seems to lean toward ethnic and religious minorities (Shia, 
Yazidi, Christians) which is prompting a mass exodus of these groups. 
Iraqi government forces are also carrying out abuses and revenge 




at times can have influence over ISIS, to obtain information or 
negotiate the release of those abducted.”  
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: The growing rift between the Kurds and Nouri al-
Maliki”  
(Document EIUCP00020140715ea7e00028) 
EIU reports that tensions between the Kurds and Iraqi PM Nouri- al-
Maliki are escalating as the PM has accused the Kurds of colluding 
with ISIS, resulting in Kurdish ministers boycotting the federal 
cabinet. The takeover of the oilfields in Kirkuk by KRG forces on 11 
July have further deepened the rift between the Kurds and Baghdad. 
These increased tensions make the secession of Iraqi Kurdistan an even 
more likely possibility, which will in turn have severe consequences 
for Iraqi efforts to recapture territory lost to ISIS without the aid of the 
Peshmerga. 
15/07/2014   Commissioner Kristalina 
Georgieva welcomes UNSC 
Resolution 2165 on 
humanitarian access inside 
Syria as “a step forward”. “I 
sincerely believe that the 
Resolution will expand the 
delivery of life-saving 
assistance by the most direct 
routes to those in greatest 
need and in particular across 
four international border 
crossings. It will speed 
assistance to nearly three 
million people, among them 
children, women and the 
elderly, who have not 
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received regular relief aid for 
many months. From now on 
UN agencies will be able to 
travel across borders without 
receiving the prior 
authorisation of the 
Government of Syria.” 
18/07/2014  EIU “Iraq: Key developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140719ea7i00027) 
EIU argues that the declaration of a caliphate by ISIS poses a major 
challenge to Iraq’s political and territorial integrity. EIU predicts high 
levels of violence and sectarian killings in the north and west of Iraq as 
it is doubtful that the government will be able to regain territory lost to 
ISIS. However, the south, including its oilfields, will remain more 
secure as it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to gain control of 
Baghdad. EIU also expects the KRG to push forward with its goal of 
independence as it continues to make territorial gains. 
 
19/07/2014  HRW documents the killing, kidnapping and threatening of religious 
and ethnic minorities (particularly Shia Shabak, Shia Turkmen, Yazidis 
and Assyrians) by ISIS since its capture of Mosul. “ISIS seems intent 
on wiping out all traces of minority groups from areas it now controls 
in Iraq”. 
 
20/07/2014  HRW argues that Iraq’s leaders have a long way to go, and little time 
left, to make the reforms needed to restore the rule of law. For Iraq to 
survive, its leaders need urgently to take back the reins of power from 
the militias. HRW reports about atrocities committed by ISIS and the 
faltering efforts of Iraqi security forces to gain control, and the overall 
continued destabilisation of Iraq. 
 
21/07/2014  ICG’s Noah Bonsey writes that ISIS has gained the resources and freed 
up the manpower required to retake ground in and around Aleppo 
following its recent success in Deir ez-Zor province. The simultaneous 




weakened them. Bonsey writes that the Syrian rebels “lack the 
organization and resources to halt the regime's progress in severing 
rebel supply lines” which will ultimately benefit ISIS. He explains that 
ISIS has taken advantage of the backlash against the authoritarian and 
sectarian driven actions of the Iraqi government which has driven 
many to support the group, and they now aim to exploit similar 
grievances in Syria. Bonsey states that U.S. support of the rebels is a 
key variable and that the U.S. must now make take tough decisions in 
Syria in order to follow through on a coherent policy which will 
support the rebel forces and limit ISIS’ expansion. 
22/07/2014  HRW reports that Iraqi security forces have carried out indiscriminate 
air strikes while trying to retake areas controlled by ISIS. It argues that 
“governments that are helping Iraq in its military campaign should pull 
back their aid until Iraqi forces and any other groups supporting them 
end their indiscriminate attacks on civilians”. 
EU reinforces sanctions 
against the Syrian regime. 
The EC has targeted three 
additional people and nine 
entities. 
 
25/07/2014   EU statement on the election 
of a new Iraqi President: “The 
EU now calls on all Iraq's 
political leaders to work 
towards the speedy formation 
of a new government under a 
leadership seeking national 
participation and broad 
national reconciliation.” 
26/07/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Nearly all gone” (Document 
EIUCP00020140729ea7q00008) 
EIU writes that ISIS is evicting or killing the last remaining Christians 
in Mosul. Christians residing in the city were first told that they were 
to convert to Islam, pay a special tax, or leave by 18 July, however, the 
decision was overturned and they were informed by loudspeaker that 




ISIS members spray painted the letter ‘N’ for Nassarah, meaning 
Christian, on their homes and declared them the property of the Islamic 
State. The majority of Christians from Mosul have now fled to either 
the east of Iraq or the north of Kurdistan.  
28/07/2014  EIU “Israel Risk: Alert – Increased threats from the Islamic State 
(IS)?” (Document RSKW000020140730ea7s0000f) 
EIU reports a moderate probability and high impact of a risk for Israel 
from ISIS’ campaigns. This risk assessment is based on the increased 
activity of radical Islamists within Jordan following the successes of 
ISIS in Iraq. This is coupled with ISIS’ declaration that it will soon 
move on to Jordan. EIU writes that another risk for Israel is that if ISIS 
is able to make similar rapid territorial gains in Syria as in Iraq, this 
would result in the group reaching the borders of Israel-occupied 
Golan Heights. 
EU counterterrorism 
coordinator, Gilles de 
Kerchove, says that the 
terrorist threat from returning 
foreign fighters is of foremost 
concern for governments, as 
underlined by the attack at the 
Jewish museum in Brussels. 
29/07/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – Christians driven from Mosul” 
(Document EIUCP00020140730ea7t00009) 
EIU reports that on 28 July France offered to grant asylum to those 
who have been forced out of Mosul. It is believed that the majority of 
displaced Iraqi Christians who had first moved to Syria have emigrated 
to Europe following the outbreak of the civil war. 
The EU increases its 
humanitarian and 
development assistance to 
Syria by EUR 50 million and 
approves EUR 125 million to 
neighbouring countries to 
deal with the flow of 
refugees. 
31/07/2014  HRW reports about a serious escalation in sectarian violence and 
documents the intensifying armed conflict between Iraqi security 
forces and Sunni insurgents, as well as government-backed kidnapings 
and killings of Sunni civilians since the fall of Mosul. It calls for a halt 
of military assistance of the Iraqi government. 
 
July 2014  On Iraq, ICG reports that PM Maliki has refused calls of stepping 
down following the parliamentary elections in April. Tensions between 
Maliki and the KRG have intensified in the wake of the Kurdish 
seizure of Kirkuk. KRG President Barzani has announced that he 




whilst Maliki has accused the KRG of providing safe havens for 
terrorists, including ISIS. There has been no tangible progress by the 
army and political leadership in response to ISIS’ gains in the 
northwest of Iraq. ISIS has reportedly executed, bombed and detained 
Sunni rivals in areas under its control.  
On Syria, ICG reports that ISIS has gained territory, oil and manpower 
in the eastern province of Deir ez-Zor. The group has also seized a gas 
field east of Homs, as well as regime bases in Raqqa and Hassakeh 
provinces, killing hundreds in the process. The ICG relays observers’ 
concerns over the setbacks of the moderate opposition who are facing 
their most dangerous situation since the start of the uprising and are 
disorganised and poorly armed. There are fears that this could allow 
ISIS to recapture territory in Aleppo’s northern countryside and push 
further west. Regime forces have made progress in encircling the 
rebels in Aleppo. ICG reports that Jabhat al-Nusra has sought to gain 
ground in the Idlib province at the expense of other rebels. 
01/08/2014  Amnesty International reports that ISIS’ territorial expansion in 
northwestern Iraq has resulted in a resurgence of sectarian tensions and 
mass displacement of communities. 
 
EIU “Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa economy: EIU’s latest 
assumptions” (Document EIUCP00020140802ea810001t) 
EIU predicts that Iraq will face territorial disintegration given ISIS’ 
advancements unless the government receives outside assistance. 
Nouri al-Maliki’s resistance to step down as Prime Minister may result 
in increased resentment towards him which may push moderate Sunnis 
towards supporting ISIS. EIU does not expect that the Iraqi army will 
be able to counter ISIS effectively to a point where the reassertion of 
the Iraqi government would be possible. 
 





EIU writes that ISIS’ siege of the Turkish consulate in Mosul on 10 
June, which now serves as its headquarters, reveals Turkey’s 
weakening role in the region. “A mix of hubris, pro-Sunni sectarianism 
and bad judgment on the part of the Islam-inspired Justice and 
Development (AK) party, has drained the country of its soft power”. 
Syrian Kurds have accused Turkey of allowing ISIS fighters to use its 
territory along the border as a base in its fight against them. EIU 
reports about increasing concerns that Turkey may become ISIS’ next 
target. 
03/08/2014 ISIS storms the Iraqi 
town of Sinjar, 
executing many 
Yazidi men and 
abducting women and 
children. It lays siege 
to Mount Sinjar 
where tens of 
thousands of Yazidis 
remain trapped. 
[Relevance: After ISIS 
had increasingly 
targeted ethnic 
minorities in northern 
Iraq since its capture 




attention, marked the 
beginning of the 





04/08/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: The Islamic State holds sway for now” 
(Document EIUCP00020140805ea840000o) 
EIU writes that the key to defeating ISIS may be in the hands of the 
wide-ranging Sunni groups who already oppose ISIS or may turn 
against them if the political conditions improve once a new 
government is formed in Baghdad. ISIS is the prevailing force in Iraq, 
forcing some groups to cooperate with it but their relations are fluid, 
meaning militias may cooperate with ISIS in one area and clash with 
them in another. There are various Jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq 
which envisage establishing an Islamic state, but their tactics and 
leadership differ from that of ISIS. While the Sunni tribal militias may 
be the most likely force to be able to defeat ISIS, having considerable 
manpower, they lack organisation and are divided. The key message 
from such groups is that they are cooperating with ISIS out of 
frustration with the Sunni persecution they have faced at the hands of 
the Iraqi government. Their call for autonomous Sunni regions could 
result in borders being drawn along sectarian lines. EIU calculates that 
there could be an uprising against ISIS if frustrations with its tactics 
continue to grow. However, the success of such an endeavour is 
considered unlikely unless Sunni groups form an alliance with the Iraqi 
government. 
EEAS statement on the 
situation in northern Iraq: 
“We call on the Government 
of Iraq and the Government 
of the Kurdistan Region 
(KRG) to urgently restore 
their security cooperation in 
order to confront ISIL” and to 
ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to 
those in dire need. 
06/08/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View – Islamic State routs Kurds from 
Sinjar” (Document EIUCP00020140807ea8600007) 
EIU reports that ISIS has captured the major northern Iraqi town of 
Sinjar, carrying out mass executions of the predominantly Yazidi 
population. Much of Sinjar’s population has fled to the mountains. 
Sinjar’s geographic location makes it difficult to protect the population 
and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces are overstretched in their 
counteroffensive against ISIS in Nineveh, Sinjar and the Mosul Dam. 
The Iraqi government’s refusal to transfer funds to the Kurdish 
Regional Government has resulted in its inability to pay the Peshmerga 




07/08/2014 U.S. President Barack 
Obama announces the 
authorisation of 
targeted airstrikes 
against ISIS in Iraq, 
to help break ISIS’ 
siege of Mount Sinjar 
and prevent an ISIS’ 
offensive on Erbil. 
ISIS seizes Mosul 
Dam, which provides 
electricity to Mosul 
and water to a large 
area around it.  
[Relevance: the U.S. 
government had spent 
nearly USD30 million 
on repairing the 
Mosul Dam and had 
warned that, if it 
failed, “a 65-foot 
wave of water would 
be unleashed across 
areas of northern 
Iraq”. It was 
considered highly 
likely that ISIS would 
use it as a strategic 
weapon, after having 
done so with the 
Fallujah Dam in May 




decision to launch 
airstrikes against ISIS 




08/08/2014  EIU “Iraq/USA Politics: Quick View – The U.S. announces air strikes”  
(Document EIUCP00020140809ea880000d) 
EIU reports that considering Kurdish forces retreating from territory 
around Mosul following unexpected advances by ISIS, the U.S. has 
approved air strikes in response. It had previously stated that it would 
not take such action unless there were signs of political unity in Iraq. 
However, this response was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in 
Sinjar and to protect U.S. interests in Erbil. Thousands of Yazidis 
remain trapped on Mount Sinjar. ISIS has control over the towns of 
Qaraqosh, Tal Kayd, Bartella and Karamlesh, in addition to advances 
south of Erbil. 
 
EIU “Iraq/Syria Politics: Fighting on multiple fronts”  
(Document EIUCP00020140810ea8800009) 
EIU writes that the enormous gains made by ISIS over the past two 
months has transformed the conflict in Syria. The group has employed 
a two-pronged tactic of terrorising its adversaries and co-opting local 
populations under its control and has boosted its military capabilities 
through capture of large supplies of weapons from the Iraqi and Syrian 
armies. ISIS’ success has enhanced its recruitment, including foreign 
fighters, as well as a large pool of finances put forward by fundraisers 
in the Gulf, namely Kuwait. The main battle fronts involving ISIS are: 
Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Hasakeh, Aleppo, Homs-Palmyra and Damascus. 
EIU reports that intra-rebel tensions are rising in Syria, and that despite 
the entrenched tensions between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, they are 




advancements are a setback for the Syrian regime, which has been 
taken aback by the group’s effectiveness and ruthlessness. Previously, 
ISIS had advantaged the Assad regime by weakening rebel forces. 
“Ultimately IS could overreach itself and find itself facing too many 
enemies. However, for the time being it is still very much on the 
offensive”. 
09/08/2014  HRW reports that over 150,000 Yazidis are fleeing Sinjar and 
surrounding towns as they can no longer count on the protection of 
Peshmerga forces who say they have no orders to fight. “The ISIS 
strategy since capturing Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, a month ago, 
is becoming increasingly apparent: to clear the area between Mosul 
and the Tigris river to the west of non-Muslim minorities” 
 
11/08/2014  Julien Barnes-Dacey (ECFR) writes that Nouri al-Maliki’s refusal to 
step down as Prime Minister of Iraq risks the country falling into a 
second devastating crisis alongside ISIS’ expansion. U.S. military 
strikes will only be effective in defeating ISIS if meaningful political 
reform, by a government led by an alternative to Maliki, redistributes 
power to Sunnis and motivates them to switch sides and fight against 
ISIS. The deep sectarian polarisation in Iraq must be addressed if ISIS 
is to be defeated. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Country Outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020140812ea8b00012) 
EIU writes that ISIS has captured almost one third of Iraqi territory and 
that Iraqi security forces will focus on defending Baghdad and Samarra 
with the support of Iran and the U.S. In light of ISIS’ advances, there is 
mounting pressure on PM Maliki to step down for a new, more 
palatable candidate. Yet, it is unlikely that he will do so given that his 
coalition and allies hold around one third of parliamentary seats. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Key Developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140812ea8b0001n) 
French Foreign Minister 
Laurent Fabius writes to 
HR/VP Catherine Ashton 
urging the EU to “mobilise” 
to equip Iraqi Kurds in their 
battle against ISIS. 
 
Italy requests a meeting of 
European foreign minister to 
discuss arming Iraq’s Kurds 
in their fight against ISIS. 
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EIU states that a violent de facto partition of Iraq into three sections is 
likely if the new government is unable to unite the Sunnis, Kurds and 
Shias against ISIS. EIU believes it is unlikely that ISIS will be 
successful in capturing Baghdad or southern Iraqi territories which is 
the main source of the country’s oil exports. However, Kurdish forces 
are overstretched and have begun to make tactical retreats, although 
they are now to be supported by US airstrikes. EIU reports that the 
latest gains by ISIS puts minority groups at particular risk. 
12/08/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140813ea8c0000h) 
EIU reports that Haider al-Abadi of the Dawa party has been 
nominated as Iraq’s next prime minister. His nomination has received 
widespread international and domestic support, including from 
President Obama and the Kurdistan Alliance. EIU writes that al-Abadi 
was backed by a loose coalition of Shia parties, the National Alliance, 
after indications that Nouri al-Maliki could be considering a coup due 
to positioning security forces in key areas of Baghdad following 
protests by his supporters. 
 
The EU increases its 
humanitarian aid to Iraq by an 
additional EUR 5 million. 
 
EEAS statement following an 
extraordinary meeting of the 
Political and Security 
Committee: there is 
unanimous agreement on the 
need for increased 
international coordinated 
humanitarian support in Iraq 
as well as a need to consider 
the request from Kurdish 
authorities for military 
support from EU member 
states, which will be 
deliberated in coordination 
with the Iraqi government. 
13/08/2014  Francois Godement (ECFR) argues that European inaction on ISIS will 
result in catastrophic consequences for both the Middle East and 
Europe. Godement criticises the passivity of the EU and its member 
states and says that their shrinking military budgets do not serve as an 




implications for Europe. Iraq’s oil resources are tentative at best, 
meaning an enormous price rise may be on the horizon. Europe also 
faces a large and continuous influx of refugees fleeing the Syrian civil 
war and persecution from ISIS, whom they will have to provide 
asylum to. Further, the threat of returning jihadists has already been 
exposed in the attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels. Godement 
writes that Europe’s “inaction will bring shame and contempt for 
Europe, and make it an easy target for strongmen everywhere”. 
 
Julien Barnes-Dacey (ECFR) writes that “without a policy to defeat 
ISIS in Syria, any approach in Iraq is doomed to failure”. The 
designation of a new PM in Iraq, Haider al-Abadi is a starting point for 
a strategy against ISIS. However, in order to succeed, he must be 
willing and capable to form an inclusive government which shares 
meaningful power with Sunnis and garners Kurdish support. This will 
be difficult given the entrenched polarised nature of Iraq. Yet, the only 
way to peel Sunni support of ISIS and gain much-needed military 
assistance from the U.S. is to offer profound Sunni participation in a 
new government and federalisation. This cannot be viewed solely from 
an Iraqi lens. Any setback of ISIS in Iraq will mean that they will 
regroup in Syria and continue destabilising Iraq. One promising option 
in Syria is to use regional and international consensus to create a 
negotiated path based on a common interest which would exclude 
Bashar al-Assad as the driver of extremism.  
14/08/2014  Julien Barnes-Dacey (ECFR) writes that Europe’s response to the 
unfolding crisis in Iraq has been slow despite warning signs “flashing 
brightly”, such as the surge into Fallujah and Ramadi by ISIS last 
January. The slow edge towards unity on arming the Kurds may have 
an immediate impact in halting ISIS’ advancements towards Erbil and 
protecting the Yazidis. However, this will not have any profound 
impact on the wider battle against ISIS who are focused on the Shia 




without regarding Syria is also doomed to fail. The defeat of ISIS will 
only be possible when a cross-sectarian coalition is formed in Baghdad 
which will in turn need Western military backing. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140816ea8e00022) 
EIU reports that following significant gains made by ISIS in Iraq in the 
first week of August, the U.S. and France are providing military 
assistance to Kurdish Peshmerga forces. This move comes despite 
previous reluctance to work with the Kurds who have stated their 
interest in independence. However, they have been the predominant 
force to hold the line for two months after the fall of Mosul to ISIS, 
and they are now overextended and undersupplied. The U.S. has 
carried out airstrikes and sent 130 military advisors to Erbil to consult 
on the humanitarian situation in Sinjar. France has announced that it 
was making its first arms shipment on 13 August. EIU writes that this 
assistance will boost the morale and effectiveness of Peshmerga forces 
who are being joined by Kurdish forces from Syria, Turkey and Iran.  
15/08/2014   The FAC assesses the 
situation in Iraq as a result of 
the rise of ISIS, welcomes the 
decision by EU members to 
provide military material to 
the Kurdish regional 
authorities and invites the 
EEAS to ensure a stronger 
presence in Erbil. The FAC 
further calls for strong 
support of the UN Assistance 
Mission in Iraq. 





EIU reports that on 17 August, Peshmerga forces recaptured the Mosul 
Dam and regained some Christian towns in the Nineveh Plains in Iraq 
from ISIS. The Mosul Dam is a key piece of infrastructure and at 
extreme risk of collapse, which would flood major cities in the Tigris. 
“The Kurds have also begun receiving arms from various European 
states and greater co-operation with the Iraqi army”. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Maliki steps aside”  
(Document EIUCP00020140819ea8i0001b) 
EIU writes that Nouri al-Maliki has finally accepted the nomination of 
Haider al-Abadi as the new Iraqi prime minister, after being abandoned 
by his allies. EIU suggests that Maliki will seek a senior government 
position to gain political immunity whilst Abadi is forming the new 
government but that his presence in government would only hamper 
unity efforts. Abadi is viewed as a more pragmatic and moderate 
alternative to Maliki. Yet, it remains to be seen whether he is prepared 
to make the necessary concessions to persuade Sunni Iraqis to join the 
fight against ISIS, and to convince the Kurds to recommit to the Iraqi 
state. 
20/08/2014  Ellie Geranmayeh (ECFR) writes that Iranian backing of new Iraqi PM 
Haider al-Abadi is not an indication of a U-turn on Baghdad. Abadi’s 
political background is similar to that of Nouri al-Maliki and so it will 
not change much in the Tehran-Baghdad relationship. The Iranians 
recognise that in order to avoid a complete disintegration in Iraq, an 
inclusive government must be formed to ensure that ISIS’ presence in 
the country does not become permanent, and it seems Abadi’s more 
moderate tone may be able to achieve this. 
 
HRW reports about U.S. journalist James Foley’s execution which 
ISIS claimed was in retaliation for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. 
Foley became the first U.S. citizen to be killed by ISIS. 
Italian foreign minister 
Federica Mogherini says that 
“the Vatican can help provide 
aid in Iraq to Kurdish 
refugees fleeing militant ISIS, 
which is a threat to the 
European Union and the 
whole world”. She further 
argues that military assistance 
to Iraq to counter ISIS is 
“indispensable in the 
immediate term but hardly 
represents a long-term 
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solution to this, like all 
crises”.  
21/08/2014  Emma Bonino writes for ECFR that the EU must create a new 
structure, appoint a Commissioner for the Mediterranean, and adopt a 
new Mediterranean policy to meet the challenges posed by the 
countries of the Southern Mediterranean. Bonino asserts that the EU 
must abandon its system of spheres of influence and forego the use of 
one single policy for all its eastern and southern neighbours. 
Implications of the conflicts and tensions in countries such as Syria, 
Ira, Egypt and Libya will be security, migration and oil supply, which 
the EU can only effectively counter if it strengthens its position in the 
region.  
 
22/08/2014  Speaking with Kurdish civilians besieged by ISIS in Kobane, Amnesty 
International estimates that 200,000 people are currently trapped there. 
ISIS has cut off electricity and water to Kobane. Residents are trying to 
flee but finding it hard to enter Turkey. Amnesty is “investigating 
reports of abuses at the Turkish border” against refuges from Kobane 
and elsewhere in Syria. 
 
25/08/2014  EIU “Middle East and North Africa Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140827ea8p00001) 
EIU reports that representatives of Saudi Arabi, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar 
and the UAE have met in Jeddah under the ‘Friends of Syria’ initiative 
to discuss Syria and Iraq. The inclusion of Qatar is notable as it is 
facing disciplinary action from the Gulf Cooperation Council for its 
association with the Muslim Brotherhood and is a diplomatic rival of 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt for this very reason. The meeting garnered 
little outcome with regard to how to confront ISIS and prevent Iran 
from being considered a crucial regional actor by Western powers. 
 
26/08/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140827ea8q00007) 
EIU reports that on 22 August a Shia militia massacred Sunni 




the Iraqi Diyala province. The province holds one of the most mixed 
populations in Iraq and has recently been flooded with Shia militias in 
response to the danger of ISIS in the area. It is thought that the attack 
was in retaliation for a nearby bombing of militia, presumed to be by 
ISIS. As a result, two main Sunni parties have stopped participation in 
the ongoing talks on government formation. The attacks further 
heighten the feeling of persecution of Sunnis in Iraq. 
 
EIU “France Politics: The limits of French foreign policy” (Document 
EIUCP00020140828ea8q0000x)  
EIU writes that President Francois Hollande has been 
“uncharacteristically decisive” on action against the rapidly expanding 
ISIS, providing military assistance to the Peshmerga and supporting 
asylum applications from Iraqi Christians. However, EIU explains that 
“any meaningful progress in Iraq requires some sort of settlement in 
Syria” given the expansion of ISIS across Iraq’s borders. Hollande’s 
deep opposition to the Syrian regime makes him an unsuitable 
candidate in the case of any accommodation of Bashar al-Assad in 
efforts to confront ISIS. 
27/08/2014  EIU “Germany Politics: Contours of a more assertive foreign policy 
emerge” (Document EIUCP00020140828ea8r0002p) 
EIU writes that German foreign policy is becoming more assertive and 
gaining a more interventionist outlook. In recent weeks, the governing 
coalition has suggested arming Kurdish Peshmerga fighters combatting 
ISIS in Iraq. 
 
28/08/2014  HRW reports that the key tool of ‘naming and shaming’ human rights 
abuses does not work with ISIS and that they relish in their 
primitivism. Consequently, considering the genocide of Yazidis and 
executions of western journalists, only political action at the highest 
levels has the capacity to prevent mass killings. 
 
29/08/2014  Richard Gowan (ECFR) writes that the crisis in Iraq highlights the lack 
of strategic foresight of European governments and that they should 
Commissioner Kristalina 
Georgieva’s statement on the 
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have taken heed of past warnings. Only a few politicians and foreign 
policy analysts argued that the EU had long-term interest in Iraq, and 
the ECFR occasionally highlighted the need for Europe to assist Iraq in 
establishing a stable future. Gowan asserts “that the EU needed to 
invest in long-term conflict prevention strategies for Iraq” and draws 
on a piece he wrote in January 2008 in which he argues that pulling out 
of Iraq without a medium-term strategy to stabilise the country would 
have enormous strategic consequences for Europe on all fronts, and 
that Iraq would descend back into violence with destabilising effects 
for the region. Consequently, European policymakers must now 
formulate long-term strategies for restoring security in Iraq and learn 
from past mistakes. 
 
Amnesty International discusses the mass displacement of targeted 
religious and ethnic minorities since ISIS’ expansion in northern Iraq 
in June 2014, and how ISIS pursues a campaign of ethnic cleansing.  
 
EIU “Denmark Politics” (Document EIUCP00020140830ea8t0000i) 
EIU reports that Denmark is to make a military contribution to the 
international endeavour to combat ISIS following a joint request from 
the Iraqi and U.S. governments. Its military aid will go to the 
Peshmerga fighting ISIS in northern Iraq. 
number of refugees fleeing 
the Syrian crisis reaching a 
record of 3 million: “With so 
many crises erupting 
simultaneously around us, 
with so much suffering, there 
is a risk that the victims of the 
Syrian crisis and their needs 
will slip from the public eye. 
On behalf of the European 
Commission, I pledge that we 
will continue to keep the 
focus and draw attention to 
the victims of the Syrian 
crisis”. 
30/08/2014  EIU “World Politics: It ain’t half hot here, mum”  
(Document EIUCP00020140903ea8u00006) 
EIU writes that since its declaration of a caliphate, ISIS’ recruitment 
has surged, attracting a high number of foreign fighters from Europe, 
with Britons making up one of the largest groups of Western fighters. 
It is believed that ISIS’ attraction for western fighters is its global 
outlook, although the motives of these fighters “are as varied as their 
passports”. EIU argues that the most plausible explanations are the 
search for identity and boredom at home. ISIS fighters post their lives 
on social media and have labelled their base in Syria as 
Conclusions of a special 
European Council meeting: 
“The European Council 
underlines the importance of 
coordinated action by 
countries from the region to 
counter these threats. It urges 
all Iraqi leaders to form a 
truly inclusive government as 
a first political response to the 
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“FiveStarJihad”, yet they are not averse to carrying out violent attacks, 
battles, and suicide missions. Getting to Syria is generally easier for 
these fighters than returning home as Western authorities have some 
information on who has gone and will scrutinise and monitor them 
when they return. It is reported that some Western fighters have 
become jaded with the battle and are longing to return home. EIU 
suggests that Western countries face the threat of lone-wolf attacks. 
De-radicalisation programmes have had mixed results, while 
programmes to deter individuals from turning to extremism achieved 
better results. Peter Neumann of the ICSR asserts that a softer 
approach toward returning fighters may benefit Western nations as 
“chastened returning fighters may become the very people to persuade 
more young men to forgo the fight”. 
 
EIU “Syria/Iraq Politics: Handsome ransoms”  
(Document EIUCP00020140903ea8u00007) 
EIU reports that ISIS has begun to demand payment for the release of 
Western hostages this year as rebel groups in Syria turned against the 
group. It suggests that the international focus on this issue may push 
other groups who also undertake kidnappings to alter their tactics as 
demonstrated by Jabhat al-Nusra who released an American journalist. 
The kidnapping of Westerners by ISIS reached its height in 2013. The 
group has “netted multi-million-euro ransoms from several European 
governments”. 
present crisis, and stands 
ready to support the 
Government of Iraq in the 
pursuit of the necessary 
reforms.” ISIS’ activities and 
the establishment of a 
caliphate are seen as a direct 
threat to the security of 
European countries. The 
European Council calls for 
quicker implementation of 
EU measures to prevent 
radicalisation and achieve 
efficient information-sharing 
to dissuade and disrupt 
foreign fighters. 
 
EU HR/VP Catherine Ashton 
echoes these remarks at an 
informal meeting of EU 
foreign ministers. 
Aug 2014  On Iraq, ICG reports that ISIS has taken control of Sinjar, killing 
scores of Yazidis, and taking an unknown number hostage, whilst 
approximately 200,000 have fled and thousand are trapped in the 
Sinjar mountain range under siege by ISIS. In response, the U.S. has 
renewed its military action to prevent ‘genocide’ and protect US 
personnel and assets, with particular focus on containing the advance 
of ISIS toward Erbil. The U.S. also delivered arms to the Kurdish 




the siege in Sinjar. On 14 August, PM Maliki stepped down after Iran, 
US and Saudi Arabia, along with half of Maliki’s State of Law 
coalition put their support behind Haider al-Abadi for PM (Dawa 
Party). 
On Syria, ICG reports that the northern armed opposition are faced 
with a weakening position as ISIS captured a series of towns in the 
north of Aleppo whilst the advancement of the regime continued in the 
city. Fighting between ISIS and the Syrian regime has intensified – the 
regime is continuing its airstrikes on territories held by ISIS near 
Aleppo whilst the group has reportedly seized an army base in Raqqah, 
consequently fatalities have significantly increased. Furthermore, ISIS 
has reportedly executed 700 members of the al-Sheitat tribe in the Deir 
ez-Zor province in retaliation to an anti-ISIS uprising. The ICG reports 
that a local Jabhat al-Nusra chief was assassinated on 2 August as 
frictions between al-Nusra and former rebel allies intensify. 
01/09/2014  HRW documents that both ISIS and Iraqi government-backed militias 
are conducting savage tactics and killings.  
 
HRW reports that there is credible evidence that ISIS used ground-
fired cluster munitions in the Syrian town of Kobane in recent weeks 
but are uncertain how ISIS acquired those. 
 
EIU “Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa economy: EIU’s latest 
assumptions” (Document EIUCP00020140902ea9100014) 
EIU predicts that ISIS will be able to consolidate its position in Iraq 
and Syria, maintaining a significant risk to regional stability in 2014-
15. The group’s successes against Peshmerga and Iraqi military forces 
will likely boost its ability to recruit marginalised youths. EIU assigns 
a high risk to Iraq breaking apart due to the challenges PM Haider al-
Abadi faces in quelling sectarian tensions and forming a government in 





EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140903ea910001w) 
EIU reports that a joint operation of Iraqi, Kurdish and militia forces 
has been successful in lifting ISIS’ siege of the predominantly Shia 
Iraqi town, Amerli. There were fears that ISIS would commit a 
genocidal massacre in the town. The operation was assisted by US air 
strikes and British, French and Australian humanitarian aid. “This 
broad coalition allied against ISIS was one of the most significant 
elements of the operation, which was also one of the first instances of a 
recapture of territory from IS, aside from the recent Kurdish 
counteroffensive near Mosul.” There has been increasing international 
support to arm the Kurdish fighters, and the next target for recapture 
form ISIS will likely be the majority Sunni town of Suleiman Beg. 
02/09/2014  HRW has identified three new mass execution sites. It believes that 
these additional locations, vehicles and captured men that they have 
identified through new videos released by ISIS suggests that the death 
toll will continue to rise. 
 
Amnesty International reports that ISIS has carried out ethnic 
cleansing on a historic scale in northern Iraq. The 30-page report 
outlines the mass abductions and killings carried out by ISIS with 
focus on Kocho, Qiniyeh and Jdali villages in Sinjar region. Amnesty 
also reports that ISIS is coercing its captives to convert to Islam. The 
report provides a detailed timeline of events in Mosul and areas South 
of Kirkuk (June-Aug). “Amnesty International’s field investigations 
have concluded that the ISIS is systematically and deliberately 
carrying out a program of ethnic cleansing in the areas under its 
control. This is not only destroying lives, but also causing irreparable 
damage to the fabric of Iraq’s society, and fuelling inter-ethnic, 
sectarian and inter-religious tensions in the region and beyond.” 
 
05/09/2014  Florence Gaub (EUISS) discusses a potential causal link between 




suggests that rising temperatures and the lack of rainfall since 2006 in 
Syria resulted in poverty, making Syria more vulnerable to civil war.  
She argues that “although heat is not currently a cause of regional 
conflict, spill-over effects in a region plagued by porous borders 
cannot be ruled out in the future”. 
 
HRW writes that the murders of American journalists James Foley and 
Steven Sotloff highlight the high risk of reporting on the conflicts in 
Syria and Iraq in particular, and the risks to humanitarian workers, who 
ISIS have also kidnapped and threatened to murder.  
 
EIU “UAE Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140906ea950002d) 
EIU reports that the UAE has announced that it is willing to act in 
accord with UN Security Council Resolution 2170 and participate in a 
Western-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. What form this 
assistance will take is not clear. EIU argues that it could do more to 
block money flows to ISIS fighters, and possibly assist in general 
security and intelligence cooperation. 
06/09/2014  EIU “Iraq/Iran/Syria Politics: Unsavoury Allies”  
(Document EIUCP00020140909ea960001y) 
EIU writes about the growing power of Shia militias in Iraq and Syria 
and the challenge for Western forces allying with such forces without 
deepening sectarian divides. In Iraq, the U.S. will struggle to avoid 
working with Shia militias as is evidenced by their key role in the 
battle for Amerli. The aversion of these Shia militias to the idea of 
giving Sunnis more rights will make it a highly difficult task for PM 
Abadi to create a new, inclusive government. “As the war splits 
Iraq and Syria along sectarian lines, any American action against ISIS 
risks unwittingly supporting Iran and the Shias, thereby deepening the 




08/09/2014  Amnesty International reports about the case of Abbas Medlej, a 
Lebanese soldier taken captive by ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra militants, 
who was beheaded after trying to escape. ISIS and al-Nusra have 
threatened that if Syrian refugees are mistreated in Lebanon they 
would kill more of their hostages. 
 
EIU “India Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140909ea9600021) 
EIU reports that Al-Qaeda has launched a South Asia branch in the 
Indian Subcontinent. Experts believe that the new wing, Qaidat al-
Jihad, is an effort to fill the vacuum left by the death of its former 
leader, Osama bin Laden, and in response to the growing influence of 
ISIS in the Middle East, which has been attracting new recruits from 
Al-Qaeda. 
 
09/09/2014  An in-depth report by ICG details the state of the Syrian civil war and 
the significance of Aleppo to ensuring that the regime opposition is not 
defeated. ICG explains that the Syrian rebels are engaged in a two-
front battle with the regime and ISIS who are currently making 
advancements in preparation to retake Aleppo, putting the rebels in a 
dangerous position and at risk of defeat unless urgent action is taken. 
This risk is heightened as ISIS and the regime currently share some 
short- and medium-term goals, including the defeat of the rebels. The 
loss of Aleppo would be an enormous blow and would result in the 
prolonging of the war in Syria and simultaneously strengthen ISIS who 
would absorb rebel remnants who are faced with no other credible 
alternative. ICG proposes two options to avoid the defeat of the rebels 
and the loss of Aleppo. They suggest an immediate ceasefire between 
the regime and anti-ISIS rebels in Aleppo, and prioritisation of the 
fight against ISIS. ICG believes that this would be an unlikely scenario 
as it is evidenced that Damascus has no intention of changing its 
strategy. Second, ICG recommends that the U.S. and its regional allies 




rebels to help prevent their defeat and block any further advancements 
by ISIS. They indicate that this option carries the inevitable risk that 
the weapons could fall into the hands of ISIS fighters. ICG maintains 
that an expansion of airstrikes by Western governments would not 
produce any valuable outcome and the best approach in countering 
ISIS would be to strengthen Sunni alternatives (both locally and in the 
context of national governance). ICG also emphasises that sectarian 
governance further exacerbates the problem. “Syria is sliding toward 
unending war between an autocratic, sectarian regime and an even 
more autocratic, more sectarian jihadi group that, on present trends, 
will potentially destabilise the Middle East well beyond Syria and 
Iraq.”  
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140910ea990001q) 
EIU reports that Haider al Abadi has been approved by Iraq’s 
parliament as new prime minister, along with a new cabinet. The 
defence and interior ministers have not yet been appointed due to 
disagreements. EIU highlights that all of Iraq’s governments have been 
inclusive: “the problem is not their composition but their failure to 
develop and implement productive policies, along with corruption and 
nepotism within the ministries”. Consequently, the government’s 
success in defeating ISIS will depend on its actions over the next few 
months. 
11/09/2014  EIU “US & Middle East risk: Alert – Mission Creep”  
(Document RSKW000020140912ea9b0000d) 
EIU writes that the new U.S. strategy on ISIS includes widening air 
strikes to Syria. This comes with complications as although it is vital to 
target ISIS strongholds, the U.S. military will need to avoid being 
accused of assisting the Syrian regime. This will provide an 
opportunity for ISIS to turn its focus to the south and west of Syria 




13/09/2014  HRW reports on a government-back airstrike on a school in Tikrit. It 
calls for foreign governments providing military assistance to the Iraqi 
government to ensure that their aid is not being used in violation of 
war crimes. 
 
14/09/2014  ICG’s Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Noah Bonsey explain for Western 
attention and efforts against ISIS to be focused on Syria as this is 
where the group is making its most significant gains and is likely to 
continue to expand. They state that the sectarian politics and military 
tactics in Baghdad and Damascus, coupled with loose Turkish border 
controls have facilitated the rise of ISIS and need to be addressed. 
They highlight the importance of strengthening Syrian rebels which 
can be done either through a cease-fire between the regime and rebels, 
or a rapid increase in funding, ammunition, and anti-tank weapons 
from the U.S. and other coalition governments. However, such support 
also bears the risk of these resources falling into the hands of ISIS or 
Jabhat al-Nusra fighters. “If mainstream opposition is defeated in 
Aleppo, ISIS will expand westward. And by appearing to be the sole 
Sunni force capable of sustaining war against the regime, ISIS will win 
still more recruits.” 
 
15/09/2014  EIU “Middle East and North Africa Politics: Quick View”  
(Document EIUCP00020140916ea9f00009) 
EIU reports that all six Gulf Cooperation Council states have agreed to 
support the U.S. efforts against ISIS by providing military basing and 
overflight rights. 
 
17/09/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140918ea9h0001p)  
EIU reports that on 16 September, Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi’s 
proposed candidates for the contentious positions of interior and 
defence ministers were rejected by parliament. EIU writes that the 
rejection of Jaber al-Jaberri, an Anbari Sunni, for defence minister is of 
serious note as the inclusion of a credible Sunni in the Ministry of 




community in the Iraqi security forces and consequently spurring their 
opposition to ISIS. 
18/09/2014  EIU “Iraq: Key developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020140919ea9i0001u) 
EIU reports that with US support, it seems that momentum is moving 
against ISIS, but recapturing territory will be slow. The ability of the 
new government to unite the Sunnis, Kurds and Shias against ISIS will 
determine the future of the Iraqi state. If they fail to unify, “then a 
prolonged and violent de facto partition is likely”. 
The EP adopts a resolution on 
the situation in Iraq and Syria 
and ISIS’ offensives. It 
assesses developments in 
ISIS’ core conflict zone and 
calls for various counter 
measures. 
19/09/2014  Amnesty International’s open letter to Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi urges 
him and his government to protect and promote the human rights of 
civilians, and to abide by international law in its fight against ISIS. It 
lists recommendations on how to do so, among others discussing 
measure to enhance the accountability of the Iraqi security forces. 
 
EIU “Algeria Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140920ea9j00031) 
EIU reports that the Algerian wing of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) has created a new splinter group and sworn 
allegiance to ISIS. “Indeed, by pledging allegiance to Islamic State it 
probably wants to capitalise on its current high-profile role in 
international affairs, although the Algerian outfit will struggle to 
replicate the success seen in Syria and Iraq”. 
 
23/09/2014  Julien Barnes-Dacey (ECFR) argues that U.S. air strikes in Syria will 
have limited results and may risk consolidating ISIS’ position as the 
only credible defender of the Sunni population. Barnes-Dacey explains 
that both opposition forces and Bashar Al-Assad are competing to be 
the West’s partner in its counter-ISIS efforts. Yet, neither party views 
the defeat of ISIS as their main priority, as they are primarily interested 
in “leveraging international support to secure victory in the broader 
domestic conflict”. This motivation is in part shared by Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar, two key regional actors involved in the air strikes. President 
The EC increases its aid to 
Syria and neighbouring 




Obama’s arming of rebels and insistence on no co-ordination with 
Assad bolsters rebel efforts to become the West’s only legitimate 
partner in tackling ISIS. Barnes-Dacey predicts that the West will 
inevitably be drawn into deeper intervention in Syria. 
 
EIU “MENA Politics: Syria air strikes presents risks and 
opportunities” (Document EIUCP00020140924ea9n00012) 
EIU writes that the air strikes carried out by the U.S. and its Arab allies 
which hit ISIS’ stronghold in Raqqa especially hard, and targeted 
Jabhat al-Nusra, are diplomatically and politically significant. The 
involvement of Qatar in the operation is of note as it signifies a 
measure of reconciliation in the face of a shared threat posed by ISIS. 
On the other hand, EIU suggests that these strikes, which were 
undertaken without the permission of the Syrian regime, may hinder 
reconciliation efforts with Iran who are staunch defenders of Assad’s 
regime. Another point of concern will be for Arab states who are 
contributing to the anti-ISIS coalition the fear of retaliatory attacks at 
home. 
24/09/2014  HRW argues that by arming non-state armed groups in Syria without 
proper vetting to ensure they do not carry out human rights abuses, 
Western governments are implicated in these violations. HRW 
highlights that the abuses of the Assad regime, ISIS and Jabhat al-
Nusra are systematic and increasing. Further, U.S. support of the 
government of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq, without holding him 
accountable for his human rights abuses contributed to the rise of ISIS. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140925ea9o0003o) 
EIU reports that France has joined the U.S. in air strikes against ISIS 
and it is likely that the UK and Australia will join as well. The 
broadening of the coalition will boost its legitimacy and allow for the 
U.S. to continue its efforts. 
In an EP subcommittee  
meeting on security and 
defence (SEDE), EU counter-
terrorism coordinator Gilles 
de Kerchove warns that there 
is a risk of competition 
between ISIS and Al-Qaeda. 
“It is possible that al Qaeda 
may want to mount attacks to 
show that the organisation is 
still relevant, (that) they are 





EIU “Algeria Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020140925ea9o00042) 
EIU reports that the new Algerian ISIS affiliate, Jund al-Khalifa, 
kidnapped a French tourist in Kabyle, Algeria. The group has 
demanded that France cease its participation in the air strikes in Iraq or 
it will kill its hostage. EIU explains that this is an attempt by the group 
to carry out a high-profile mission soon after its formation to amplify 
the impact of its alignment with ISIS. This recent abduction could 
indicate an additional surge in terrorist activity predominantly aimed at 
Westerners, although EIU believes the group does not have the 
capability to conduct anything more than hit-and-run operations in its 
strongholds in border regions and Kabyle. 
25/09/2014   Speech by President of the 
European Council Herman 
Van Rompuy at the 69th 
General Assembly of the UN: 
Financial and weapon flows 
to ISIS must be cut off, and 
there must be collective 
action to stop foreign fighters 
joining the extremist groups. 
Further, the EU offers its full 
support to the new 
government of Iraq’s efforts 
to form an inclusive 
leadership. However, this 
crisis will not be resolved 





A senior EU official says that 
returning foreign fighters are 
the main threat member states 
are facing and some fear that 
“this could be totally out of 
control. It may already be too 
late”. Executives from large 
social media providers are to 
attend the interior ministers’ 
meeting in Luxembourg to 
aid the EU in stopping the 
highly effective use of the 
internet by ISIS 
propagandists. 
26/09/2014  HRW claims that Shia militias led by former PM Maliki are laying 
siege to the strategically located town of Latifiya which is being 
overlooked by Washington and its allies. “Failure to address the 
broader effects of international assistance in Iraq’s fight promises to 
further polarize Iraq’s communities, multiply abuses, and may 
ultimately undermine the efforts against the Islamic State: it threatens 
to push Sunnis directly into the Islamic State’s waiting arms.” 
 
28/09/2014  HRW argues that any viable anti-ISIS strategy in Iraq needs to address 
and end abuses by the Iraqi government and its allies. “ISIS’s 
spectacular gains in Iraq and its horrifically brutal tactics there and in 
Syria have diverted attention from the critical need for the Iraqi 
government to stop using abusive tactics, especially if President 
Obama and his allies hope to undermine the militant group.” 
 
30/09/2014  José Ignacio Torreblanca (ECFR) writes that the West has become a 
passive observer of the decline of the world order. In the case of 
Middle Eastern conflicts, the dominant disorder is the fragmentation of 
states. Torreblanca argues that the state as a political and 




replaced with deep entrenched sectarian and religious violence. Chaos 
will continue in the region in the absence of state builders. 
 
EIU “Iran/Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020141001ea9u00005) 
EIU reports that Iran has warned of a direct military response to ISIS if 
it threatens its borders with Iraq. Iran and the U.S. have suggested tacit 
intelligence-sharing cooperation in the campaign against ISIS should 
Iran intervene. The move signifies the seriousness with which Iran 
views the threat of ISIS.  
 
EIU “Iraq/Jordan Politics: Quick View”  
(Document EIUCP00020141001ea9u0000f) 
EIU reports that Jordan’s air force has joined the US-backed coalition 
against ISIS in Syria. Jordanian Islamist fighters in Syria make up the 
largest foreign contingents taking part in the civil war. EIU believes 
Jordanian involvement was in response to the increasingly porous 
nature of its borders to protect its territorial stability. 
 
EIU “Iraq: Country Outlook” (Document 
EIUCP00020141008ea9u00003) 
EIU writes that ISIS reached the peak of its expansion in mid-August 
when it pushed back Peshmerga forces from Sinjar and the Nineveh 
province. However, it seems that the US-led coalition airstrikes, along 
with military assistance, has bolstered Kurdish, Iraqi and Shia militia 
forces against ISIS, stifling their momentum. EIU predicts that the 
campaign against ISIS will continue to gain support from different 
countries, in the form of arms, advisers and transport aircraft, and that 
it is likely the UK will join in airstrikes soon. EIU believes the option 
of ground combat troops in Iraq is unlikely at present. 
Sept 2014  On Iraq, ICG reports that the beheadings of US journalists and UK aid 




the UK launched first air strikes targeting ISIS in northern Iraq. An 
ISIS spokesman has called for the killing of citizens of coalition 
countries. Fighting has continued in Anbar province over the past 
month. 
On Syria, ICG reports that the U.S. began airstrikes in Syria against 
ISIS, Al-Qaeda central and Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Nusra has threatened 
retaliation in response to scores of AQ-linked fighters being killed by 
U.S. strikes in northern Aleppo and Idlib. It is reported that most of the 
senior leadership of the Ahrar as-Sham group were killed in an 
unexplained blast in Idlib on 9 September. ICG states that ISIS 
continues to gain ground and observers are concerned that intervention 
risks the strengthening of the group.  
01/10/2014  EIU “Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa Economy: EIU’s latest 
assumptions” (Document EIUCP00020141003eaa10001r) 
EIU writes that US-led airstrikes that have extended to Syria will limit 
ISIS’ freedom of action. However, the group will benefit from 
sectarian and ethnic support in the country along with the lack of a 
credible opposition to the Syrian regime. Consequently, EIU states that 
ISIS “will continue to pose a risk to regional stability in the near term”. 
 
02/10/2014  ICG’s Peter Harling argues that Western airstrikes only increase the 
group’s ability to mobilise. He explains that ISIS is filling a void and is 
constantly recruiting more fighters. The group pursues territories it is 
confident it can seize, either due to the lack of presence of the Syrian 
regime or the incompetence of Iraqi security forces. Harling states that 
the rushed response of the West, under pressure of timelines imposed 
by the media, will aggravate the situation. Instead, “time, skilfulness, 
considerable means and real strategic reflexion are all going to be 
needed in order to fight this organisation”. 
 
Nick Witney (ECFR) writes that European involvement in the US-led 
coalition against ISIS has proven to be a costly and ineffective decision 




intelligent policy responses. Witney asserts that the threat of ISIS has 
been “grossly over-hyped” and the group has already been weakened 
through battle with the Peshmerga, Iraqi Shia militants and US 
airstrikes. He asserts that the main threat is ideological which presents 
a direct risk to European countries whose own citizens may be 
recruited by ISIS and then return home to carry out attacks. “Western 
intervention is a great recruiting sergeant” and Europeans should 
recognise that “Islam is an integral part of their own societies”. By 
joining the U.S.-led intervention, they have made themselves targets of 
the narrative for revenge for Western oppression. Witney recommends 
that European governments limit their military involvement, leaving it 
to a better equipped U.S., and follow a diplomatic route, encouraging a 
Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. 
 
Ellie Geranmayeh writes for ECFR that Iran’s strategy against ISIS is 
to coordinate and arm Shia groups in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, as well 
as Kurdish forces, and gather vast intelligence on ISIS. It also 
recognises the need for a political track to resolve sectarian divisions in 
Iraq and Syria, but while it is supportive of the formation of an 
inclusive government in Iraq, it has not come up with a solution for 
Syria that has been deemed acceptable by rebel opposition groups. 
Iranian involvement in Iraq and Syria has been used as an ideological 
tool for recruitment by ISIS. Despite tensions between Iran and 
regional players, namely Saudi Arabia, and with the US, there is some 
sign of cooperation in the face of the common threat of ISIS. However, 
Iran has not been included by the West in the official anti-ISIS 
coalition which has further exacerbated tensions between them. 
 
Saleem Haddad writes for ECFR that Jordanians fear that ISIS sees 
them as their next target and that this fear is not unfounded. Of concern 
is the rise of Jihadi rhetoric among Salafi Jordanians although this 
movement is divided about its support for ISIS. Motivations for the 
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support of ISIS do not only originate from religious beliefs. Jordanians 
worry that long-standing political and economic grievances toward the 
Jordanian regime, especially in Ma’an which protestors have already 
dubbed as the ‘Fallujah of Jordan’, could be exploited by ISIS. An 
opinion poll suggests that 89% of its respondents reject extremist 
ideologies. Therefore, Jordan must avoid forceful retaliation for 
grievances which could alienate and radicalise segments of its 
population. Jordan’s battle against ISIS should occur both on a 
regional and domestic level. Regionally, it should encourage 
governmental reforms in Iraq to address the underlying issues behind 
radicalisation in the country. Domestically, it should address economic 
and political grievances while keeping its borders secure. It is unlikely 
that ISIS will be able to size its border crossings due to Jordan’s state-
of-the-art technology and stationing of a significant number of 
Jordanian and U.S. troops. 
 
Elizabeth Dickinson writes for ECFR that Kuwait faces one of the 
greatest risks from ISIS in the region. This is exemplified by increasing 
Kuwaiti Sunni sympathy toward ISIS and its large Sunni donor 
community funding the jihadists, transforming Kuwait into a hub for 
private donors of ISIS, Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. These 
donors originally shunned ISIS and its involvement in Syria, yet the 
groups advancements in Iraq were very well received. This divide in 
donor support for ISIS in Iraq but not Syria will risk splitting the donor 
community and accelerate their efforts to fund and offer ideological 
support to their preferred groups, spurring radicalisation and possibly 
destabilising Kuwait and fuelling sectarian tensions. Kuwait must 
balance domestic opinion and international pressures to ramp up its 
efforts against ISIS. “In the long term, the persistence of radical donor 
networks is a risk not only to Kuwait but to the broader region. These 
communities are deeply connected, and their ideologies are persistent. 
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And with each political event that reaffirms their convictions, they 
become more difficult to break”. 
  
Julien Barnes-Dacey (ECFR) writes that only when the core dynamics 
behind the Syrian civil war are sufficiently addressed and resolved can 
there be any hope of defeating ISIS. He explains that ISIS’ current 
expansion in Syria is a pivotal moment in the conflict and U.S. action 
will have limited effects as Syrian rebel groups and the regime remain 
focused on their civil war goals rather than prioritising the battle 
against ISIS. U.S. strikes against extremist sections of the Syrian 
opposition and avoidance of striking regime targets has resulted in a 
surge of support of ISIS. The group currently controls approximately 
35% of Syria. They are increasingly viewed as the only credible force 
able to tackle the Syrian regime, given their resources and capabilities. 
 
Writing for ECFR, Nawaf Obaid and Saud al-Sarhan argue that Saudi 
Arabia as leader of the Sunni Muslim world should lead the fight 
against ISIS in the region, especially as it is one of the main targets of 
the group given its wealth of resources and guardianship of the holy 
mosques of Mecca and Medina. Saudis believe that military airstrikes 
will not be enough to halt ISIS’ advances and that a response must be 
coupled with significant arming of moderate Syrian opposition groups 
as well as meaningful policy on the ground. 
 
Cale Salih writes for ECFR that ISIS’ significant advancements have 
put the Kurdish Regional Government in its most vulnerable position 
since 2003, increasing its reliance on external support and dampening 
its ambitions for independence. Furthermore, the rise of ISIS has 
increased intra-Kurdish rivalries, particularly between the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This 
divide will continue to impact the Kurdish response to ISIS and the 
group’s rise will further curtail their competing visions of nationalism. 
122 
 
Forces affiliated with the PKK have come out as the dominant force 
and protectorate of Kurds in Syria. In Iraq, the PKK and People’s 
Defence Units’ (YPG) have been successful in regaining territories 
which had been lost to ISIS which has won them widespread support 
among Iraqi Kurds. 
 
Daniel Levy (ECFR) writes that the most serious threat by ISIS for 
Israel is the possibility of an ISIS’ advance into Jordan. Further, the 
threat of ISIS is viewed as a branding opportunity by Israel, which can 
market its counter-terrorism practices and resources to Western allies 
and refute European initiatives to recognise Palestine. 
 
Andrew Hammond (ECFR) writes that there are several reasons for 
Turkey’s refusal to commit to combat missions against ISIS. 
Domestically, polls suggest that only 62.5% of AKP supporters view 
ISIS as a terrorist group and disapproval of the U.S. intervention in 
Syria is high. Focus is on the removal of the Assad regime in Syria 
which they believe Washington fails to address. Ankara is pushing for 
a protected buffer zone to protect its borders and allow for the return of 
Syrian refugees from Turkey. Further, given peace talks with the PKK, 
Ankara is hesitant to do anything to strengthen the Kurds’ negotiating 
position or jeopardise their talks. “For a buffer zone to be truly 
effective against ISIS, a wide net would have to be cast against men 
and arms crossing the border. Then Turkey would have clearly come 
off the fence on which it has been sitting for so long”. 
 
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi explains for ECFR that ISIS’ expansionism 
carries constraints and calculations on the part of ISIS and must be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis. If ISIS were to consolidate their 
position across Syria and Iraq, this would pose a direct threat of 
invasion to their neighbours. However, it is unlikely they will be able 
to do so. A more likely threat is that Western citizens will be targeted, 
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and Western countries struck by terrorists, along with Arab states 
which have participated in the US-led airstrikes. Al-Tamimi explains 
that the real threat of ISIS in the region is posed in the Gaza-Sinai area 
where a distinguishable ISIS network exists and is expanding. He 
predicts that they could have the ability to overthrow the government 
in the space of 5-10 years which would put Egypt at risk. Another real 
threat is present in Saudi Arabia where it is reported that ISIS is 
actively attempting to establish terrorist cells. Saudi Arabia would 
present a lucrative source of opportunity for ISIS should it gain control 
of some of its areas. 
 
Sajad Jiyad writes for ECFR that given ISIS’ significant advances and 
its establishment of a caliphate, the future of Iraq hangs on 
comprehensive governmental reform. PM Haider al-Abadi must grant 
disaffected Sunnis meaningful federalist control as well as ease 
tensions with the Kurdish Regional Government, keeping the country 
loosely united and avoiding full disintegration.  
 
All ECFR outputs produced on this date look at the regional 
dimensions of the ISIS crisis. 
09/10/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020141010eaa90000w) 
EIU reports that ISIS has adjusted its tactics in the face of the setbacks 
it has incurred due to coalition airstrikes and has managed to capture 
new territory in both Syria and Iraq. The group now controls 
approximately 80% of Anbar province. Its most significant 
advancement in two months was capturing the city of Hit on 2 
October.  
 
10/10/2014  ICG’s Hugh Pope highlights the urgent need for the completion of the 
Turkish-Kurdish peace process in order to successfully combat their 
shared enemy, ISIS. He claims that this “partnership is achievable and 
The EU releases a detailed 
report on the implementation 
of its Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, among others 
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should not be put at risk by political grandstanding over the ruins of 
Kobane”. 
 
EIU “Algeria Politics” (Document EIUCP00020141011eaaa0000v) 
EIU reports that the Algerian jihadist group Jund al-Khalifa, which has 
pledged allegiance to ISIS, has killed its French hostage, Hervé 
Gourdel, in an execution mimicking ISIS’ murder of two US 
journalists and two British aid workers. EIU writes that there is little 
evidence to believe that there was any co-ordination between ISIS and 
Jund al-Khalifa, or that ISIS intended to wage a terrorist campaign in 
Algeria. However, the high-profile nature of the attack could inspire 
other groups to replicate it. 
referring to the situation of 
European foreign fighters. 
 
EEAS statement on the 
situation in Kobane: “We 
strongly condemn ISIL and 
its offensive in Kobane and 
remain committed to play our 
role to the full in the fight 
against ISIL and in solidarity 
with all people suffering from 
ISIL actions. The EU, Turkey 
and all other regional and 
international partners need to 
work together more, to isolate 
and contain the threat of ISIL. 
The EU continues to fully 
support the diplomatic efforts 
of the UN's Special Envoy for 
Syria Staffan De Mistura 
towards a political solution to 
the Syrian crisis.” 
11/10/2014  HRW reports that Yazidi women have been forced to marry ISIS 
fighters while young Yazidi boys have been taken away and were 
forced to convert to Islam.  
 
12/10/2014   The EU increases its 
humanitarian aid by EUR 3.9 
million to support Syrian 
refugees in Turkey who 




14/10/2014  Amnesty International reports in-depth about the conduct of 
paramilitary Shia militias in Iraq and their abductions and killings of 
Sunni men. Amnesty explains that these actions amount to war crimes 
and are contributing to the increasing insecurity of Iraq. It recommends 
that PM Haider al-Abadi urgently ends militia rule in Iraq. 
 
EIU “Lebanon/Saudi Arabi Politics” (Document 
EIUCP00020141021eaae00057) 
EIU reports that Lebanon is to receive USD 1bn military aid from 
Saudi Arabia to combat ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Iran is also 
ready to deliver military equipment to the Lebanese army. The Saudi 
commitment, which would be used to purchase French weapons, has 
been delayed as the Saudis battle between funding the fight against 
ISIS and its fears that military equipment could fall into the hands of 
Hezbollah. “The danger in all this is that regional geopolitics will 
ultimately thwart the speedy distribution of much-needed new military 
hardware, as Lebanon's army struggles to quell the jihadi assault on its 
eastern flank. The security situation around the border town of Arsal, 
where Islamist militants have taken a number of Lebanese soldiers 
hostage, underlines the gravity of the situation.” 
 
Considering ISIS is now controlling approximately one-third of Syrian 
territory and its seizure of a portion of Kobane, ICG’s Noah Bonsey 
explains that the group’s success is in part due to an increase in funds 
and manpower. The lack of capacity and organisation of the rebels who 
are fighting both ISIS and the Syrian regime is rendering them 
ineffective. The U.S. is partly to blame for this as they did not invest 
enough resources to improve the rebel forces’ capacities in time. 
Bonsey suggests that the effectiveness of strikes targeting ISIS are yet 
to be determined as the group is using this as an opportunity for 
propaganda and what is needed most are credible ground forces which 




and ISIS have allowed the groups to brand the US-led coalition’s 
efforts as a broader attack on Islam. Bonsey explains that a no-fly zone 
in the north could potentially benefit the rebels to better organise 
themselves. 
 
ICG’s Didem Aykel Collinsworth explains that Turkey’s decision to 
allow the U.S.-led coalition to use its territory to train moderate Syrian 
rebels and launch attacks is a move to restore confidence in its allies 
that it is committed to the fight against ISIS. She considers it unlikely 
that Turkey would engage in direct involvement in the Syrian war as 
its 900km porous border with Syria makes it extremely vulnerable to 
security threats from ISIS. Additionally, it would be unpopular 
domestically which is undesirable for the government as they are in an 
election cycle until the summer of 2015. Collinsworth highlights the 
urgency for the government and the PKK to move forward with the 
peace process and confidence building measures to ensure better 
cooperation in their fight against ISIS in Kobane and elsewhere. 
Turkey wants a buffer zone to accommodate refugees, but they cannot 
do it alone and the U.S. has been reluctant to pursue it. 
15/10/2014  EIU “Pakistan Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020141021eaaf00063) 
EIU reports that six senior commanders of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP, the Pakistani Taliban) have pledged allegiance to ISIS. It is most 
likely that TTP will first join ISIS’ efforts in Syria and Iraq before 
returning home to fight. Given the pressure on ISIS in Syria and Iraq 
from US-led coalition airstrikes, EIU suggests that it is unlikely that 
they will be able to offer their new allies any material support. 
 
20/10/2014  EIU “Syria Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020141021eaak000iy) 
EIU reports that despite a local ceasefire in effect from May, political 
tensions remain high in Homs, Syria, as a dual car-bomb attack on a 
school in a regime-controlled area sparked loyalist protests against the 
FAC condemns atrocities by 
ISIS and Iraq and Syria and 
expresses determination to 
join international efforts to 
counter ISIS. “Non-inclusive 
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authorities. Regime forces have begun an offensive on Al Waer, in a 
signal that it is taking a tougher stance against rebel-held areas in the 
city. 
 
EIU “Iraq Politics” (Document EIUCP00020141021eaak000j7) 
EIU reports that the final line-up of the Iraqi cabinet has been 
completed, and all ministers have been sworn into office, positioning 
the Iraqi government to better tackle ISIS. Although there has been 
little formal progress on Kurdish demands, Iraqi Kurds participated in 
the government and were appointed to two new ministries, boosting 
their representation. Discussions over the outstanding issues with the 
Kurds is to be carried out over an initial three-month deadline, which 
need to be quick and satisfactory to strengthen efforts against ISIS.  
policies in Iraq, and 
instability in Syria caused by 
the Assad regime's brutal war 
against its own people have 
allowed ISIL/Da'esh to 
flourish. As a consequence of 
its policies and actions, the 
Assad regime cannot be a 




The EU strengthens its 
sanctions against the Syrian 
regime by placing restrictions 
on an additional 14 people. 
Further details on the EU’s 
Syria policy are summarised 
here. 
21/10/2014  EIU “Iraq: Key Developments” (Document 
EIUCP00020141023eaal0000j) 
EIU writes that the extension of U.S.-led airstrikes against ISIS into 
Syria has important implications for Iraq, as ISIS strongholds in Syria 
have allowed for the funnelling of supplies for its operations in Iraq. 
 
EIU “Iraq/Syria/Turkey Politics: Quick View”  
(Document EIUCP00020141022eaal0000i) 
EIU reports that U.S. planes have airdropped weapons provided by 
Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces to Syrian Kurdish fighters defending 
Kobane against an ISIS assault. Simultaneously, ISIS has revitalised 
offensives on multiple fronts against Kurdish forces in Iraq, including 




from delivering support to Syrian Kurdish fighters. EIU writes that the 
military assistance to forces in Kobane has highlighted political splits 
within the Iraqi Kurdish community and its Peshmerga forces, but 
there are signs of a thaw.  
22/10/2014   The EU increases its 
humanitarian aid to Iraq by an 
additional EUR 3 million. 
 
In an EP plenary, the Italian 
Presidency on behalf of EU 
HR/VP Catherine Ashton 
discusses the situation in 
Kobane: ‘It is time to express 
our determination to contain 
and defeat ISIL in practice. 
Kobanê provides further 
evidence that military action 
by the coalition is necessary 
to contain ISIL. But at the 
same time, we need to 
recognize that military action 
alone is not sufficient to 
defeat ISIL. It will require 
sustained engagement and 
comprehensive and 
coordinated actions to tackle 
the regional threat posed by 
terrorism and violent 
extremism and address the 
underlying instability and 
violence which has given 
ISIL / Da'esh and other 
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terrorist groups a foothold. 
This is what the EU 
collectively needs and is 
committed to doing. (…) On 
the military side, it is crucial 
that the recent decision by 
Turkish authorities to 
authorize the passage of Iraqi 
Peshmerga fighters to Kobanê 
translates into concrete 
action. (…) More generally, 
we want to treat the fight 
against ISIL as a key focus of 
our foreign policy dialogue 
with Turkey.” 
23/10/2014   EU officials attend an expert 
meeting in which they discuss 
various responses to the 
threat of foreign terrorist 
fighters. 
24/10/2014  HRW reports that the lawless behaviour of government-backed Shia 
militias has increased over the past year as they continue to kidnap and 
kill Sunni civilians in Iraq. It argues that “by turning a virtual blind eye 
to the abuses committed by Iraqi government forces and its proxy 
militias, key partners may be helping to push reluctant Sunnis into the 
Islamic State camp”. 
 
EIU “Syria/Saudi Arabia Politics: Quick View”  
(Document EIUCP00020141025eaao00040) 
EIU writes that the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has reported 
533 deaths since the start of U.S.-led airstrikes in Syria. 32 were 




underlining the precision of the attacks. The civilian deaths draw 
attention to the risks associated with foreign attacks which could result 
in backlash. Further, the targeting of oil refineries and grain silo to 
interrupt ISIS’ revenue streams has led to a hike in fuel prices and 
shortages. All of this could result in the loss of support for foreign 
intervention. Syrian opposition forces are frustrated at the reluctance of 
air forces to strike regime targets, as well as the slow pace in which the 
U.S. has provided arms to them. The Syrian regime is under growing 
pressure as local populations in areas under regime control are growing 
angrier, and its losses of main agricultural areas mean that the regime 
will have to use up its foreign currency reserves to import wheat. 
27/10/2014  EIU “Iraq Politics: Quick View” (Document 
EIUCP00020141028eaar00006) 
EIU reports that Iraqi security forces seem to have made some progress 
against ISIS in a major operation to reassert control between Baghdad 
and Karbala ahead of the Shia pilgrimage of Ashura. The Iraqi security 
forces claim that they have pushed ISIS out of the town of Jurf al-
Sakhar and that Sunni tribal fighters have resisted a major ISIS attack 
against Amiriyat al-Fallujah. 
 
30/10/2014  HRW reports that ISIS executed approximately 600 Shia inmates after 
seizing Badoush prison when they captured Mosul on 10 June 2014. 
 
Oct 2014  On Iraq, ICG reports that ISIS advanced in Anbar and around its 
provincial capital, Ramadi. Provincial officials petitioned for urgent 
military assistance warning of the potential fall of the province. 
Criticism of PM Haider al-Abadi increased over the past month, with 
particular focus on his belated efforts to rebuild the army. Fatal attacks 
continued in Baghdad. 
On Syria, US-led airstrikes continued, although they failed to strike 
ISIS fighters heading to seize Kobane despite increasing air support to 
Kurdish forces. The U.S. called on Turkey to join the anti-ISIS 
coalition which they refused. ICG reports that US efforts lacked 




limited. Clashes between the regime and ISIS persisted, racking up the 
death toll. 
 
